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“...[Foreign capital] instead of being viewed as a rival ought to be considered as a
most valuable auxiliary, conducing to put in motion greater quantity of productive
labour and a greater portion of useful enterprise than could exist without it”.
Alexander Hamilton
1
The last two decades have witnessed an increasingly rapid development in the
process of ﬁnancial globalization (i.e. the integration of international capital mar-
kets). Most importantly, in recent years, private equity ﬂows have become more
relevant to many developing and emerging countries than aid ﬂows. In particu-
lar, foreign direct investment (FDI) has become a major source of foreign capital
to many countries. In this context, countries have started to compete in order to
attract international investors. But which factors are the driving force behind inter-
national capital ﬂows? and what is more important, do all types of foreign capital
inﬂows contribute equally to convergence? Is the interest in attracting FDI justi-
ﬁed? On theoretical grounds, FDI has traditionally been regarded as a source not
only of physical capital but a potential mechanism through which to increase the
overall country’s productivity. However, the empirical evidence has not been conclu-
sive on this matter. Based on these facts and open questions, Chapter 1 addresses
an old paradox that is still relevant nowadays: “Lucas paradox” or the direction
of international capital ﬂows paradox. Once shedding light on the factors shaping
international capital movements, Chapters 2 and 3 will investigate the potential
spillover eﬀects from MNCs’ activities.
Lucas (1990) argues convincingly that the lack of north-south capital ﬂows is
inconsistent with the standard neoclassical growth model predictions. According
to the neoclassical theory, rates of return to capital in developing countries should
1The above quotation was made by the ﬁrst ﬁnance minister of a newly independent developing
country nearly two centuries ago. The cabinet oﬃcer was Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton
and the developing country was the United States.
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be much higher than those in developed countries therefore promoting north-south
ﬂows. In addition, the standard neoclassical growth model suggests that in the ab-
sence of convex adjustment costs or irreversibility conditions for physical capital and
given perfect capital mobility, once the economy opens up to foreign capital, total
capital in the economy should immediately converge towards its steady state level.
However, in practice, while there are capital ﬂows from developed to developing
countries, those ﬂows are much smaller than what theory predicts and moreover,
convergence in output and income per capita is gradual. While much attention
has been devoted to study the implications of the neoclassical model in terms of
the direction of international capital ﬂows, less emphasis has been placed on the
convergence predictions of the model. Chapter 1 incorporates dynamics into the
empirical analysis of the neoclassical growth model. The inclusion of dynamics is a
step further in the literature on the determinants of international capital ﬂows and
provides and empirical framework within which it is possible to study a country’s
speed of convergence towards its steady state. The main ﬁndings are that ﬁrst, the
composition of external liabilities matters for the speed of convergence. Countries
with higher FDI inﬂows converge faster to their steady state. Second, there is het-
erogeneity in the determinants of international capital ﬂows according to the type of
foreign inﬂow. Foreign equity liabilities are mainly driven by well functioning stock
markets while FDI is attracted to countries with higher educational levels.
Chapter 2 presents new microeconomic evidence on the link between ﬁnancial
sector development, ﬁnancial globalization and productivity. Based on country level
studies there is a consensus on the relevance of domestic ﬁnancial factors if countries
are to beneﬁt from ﬁnancial globalization. However, there is limited microeconomic
evidence that supports this hypothesis. The analysis in Chapter 2 ﬁlls the gap be-
tween macroeconomic and microeconomic evidence. Most of the relevance of FDI
for the domestic economy relies on the possibility that domestic ﬁrms, by being
exposed to the new products and production techniques brought in by the multina-
tional company (MNC), manage to improve their own performance as well. However,
the possibility of upgrading technology and production processes heavily relies on
the development of local ﬁnancial markets. In particular, the chapter explores the
hypothesis that even if domestic ﬁrms would like to undertake investments to adopt




new technologies brought in by foreign investors, they may lack access to the ﬁ-
nancial resources necessary to do so. Using data of Mexican manufacturing ﬁrms
operating in 1991, 1999 and 2001 it is found that in general, larger ﬁrms beneﬁt from
foreign companies operating in their same region. In contrast, domestic ﬁrms only
enjoy higher productivity if they are relatively large and located in well ﬁnancially
developed regions.
Finally, Chapter 3 explores the potential for FDI export spillovers. More gen-
erally, the chapter provides empirical evidence on the determinants of the export
decision by Mexican manufacturing ﬁrms. Two diﬀerent sets of variables that might
inﬂuence the decision to export are considered. First, within a simple dynamic speci-
ﬁcation sunk costs of entry into the export market are disentangled from observable
ﬁrm characteristics. Size, productivity, the exposure of the ﬁrm to international
markets or the ownership structure of the ﬁrm are often thought as determinants of
the ﬁrm export decision. After controlling for ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects only the exposure to
international markets through the acquisition of imported intermediate inputs and
the foreign ownership status of the ﬁrm are relevant characteristics of the decision
to export. However, entry costs are signiﬁcant for Mexican ﬁrms. Exporting today
increases the probability of exporting tomorrow by 60%. These high entry costs
seem to be mainly driven by exports to North America which account for 80% of
the total export value by Mexican manufacturing ﬁrms. Second, the chapter ana-
lyzes the economic geography hypothesis that the export activities of neighboring
ﬁrms might reduce the cost of entry. In particular, it focuses on the special role that
MNCs might have along this dimension. There is robust evidence of positive and
signiﬁcant spillovers from MNCs export activities. In other words, the decision of
domestic ﬁrms to export is positively inﬂuenced by the export intensity of MNC in
the same sector and region.
To summarize, the three chapters of this thesis will show ﬁrst, that foreign in-
vestors are attracted to countries with higher levels of human capital stock. Second,
countries attracting foreign investors will manage to enjoy beneﬁts from FDI beyond
the increase in physical capital if the domestic ﬁnancial system is well developed.
Finally, there is an additional channel for MNCs spillovers which materialize in the
decision of domestic ﬁrms to engage in export activities.
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The Composition of External Liabilities and Speed of
Convergence
Abstract. Despite the predictions of the neoclassical theory, in prac-
tice, foreign capital neither ﬂows to developing countries nor contributes
to faster income per capita convergence. Cross-section regressions test
for steady state permanent eﬀects but are ill-suited to study the conver-
gence implications of the neoclassical model. To gauge the importance
of dynamics in the neoclassical growth model, we propose to estimate
a partial adjustment model by means of dynamic panel techniques. We
ﬁnd that a country’s composition of external liabilities has a heteroge-
neous eﬀect on the speed of convergence. Foreign direct investment (FDI)
inﬂows, as opposed to equity or debt, contribute to faster convergence.
Moreover, the determinants of international capital ﬂows vary according
to the type of inﬂow. Foreign equity liabilities are mainly driven by well
functioning stock markets while FDI is attracted to countries with higher
educational levels.
Keywords. International capital ﬂows, speed of convergence, composi-
tion of foreign stock liabilities.
JEL Classification. F21;F41;O1.





The open economy version of the neoclassical growth model has two main impli-
cations for international capital ﬂows. First, the rates of return to capital in devel-
oping countries should be much higher than those in developed countries therefore
promoting north-south ﬂows. Second, in the absence of adjustment costs or irre-
versibility conditions for physical capital and given perfect capital mobility, once the
economy opens up to foreign capital, total capital in the economy should immedi-
ately converge towards its steady state level. However, in practice, while there are
capital ﬂows from developed to developing countries, those ﬂows are much smaller
than what the theory predicts and moreover, convergence in output and income per
capita is gradual. While much attention has been devoted to study the failure of the
neoclassical model in explaining current patterns of international investment, less
emphasis has been placed on the convergence predictions of the model. The main
contribution of this paper is to incorporate dynamics into the empirical analysis of
the neoclassical growth model. The inclusion of dynamics constitutes a step fur-
ther in the literature on the determinants of international capital ﬂows and provides
and empirical framework within which it is possible to study a country’s speed of
convergence towards its steady state. In addition, we show that the composition of
external liabilities has an heterogeneous eﬀect on a country’s speed of convergence.
Therefore, we study within a dynamic framework the two main predictions of
the open economy version of the neoclassical growth model: do countries that re-
ceived more foreign inﬂows converge faster? and also, what are the determinants
of international capital ﬂows?. In answering both questions, we pay particular at-
tention at the composition of external liabilities. Many previous studies have used
either total capital ﬂows or FDI ﬂows only. One notable exception is Faria, Lane,
Mauro and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) that underline the importance of a high share of
equity in total external liabilities for improving a country’s ability to share risk with
foreign investors. Similarly, we would expect diﬀerent types of capital inﬂows (debt,
equity or FDI) to be determined by diﬀerent country fundamentals and to have a
distinctive eﬀect on convergence. In particular, while debt and equity ﬂows have
often been blamed for increasing countries macroeconomic instability, FDI might




“crowd in” domestic investment1 (Mody and Murshid (2005)). FDI can stimulate
domestic business opportunities by lowering the cost of adopting new technologies
or buying most of their inputs locally.
We use data on total capital stock and foreign stock liabilities for a sample of
developed and developing countries from 1970 to 1999. We make use of a par-
tial adjustment model, where current capital inﬂows serve to ﬁll the gap between
the initial capital stock and the economy’s steady state capital stock, to specify a
law of motion for the total capital stock in the economy and for the foreign stock
liabilities. However, we assume that there are capital market imperfections and ad-
justment costs that prevent immediate convergence. Lately, there has been some
new emphasis on the relationship between capital inﬂows and convergence. Abiad,
Leigh, and Mody (2008) suggest that a proper test of the role of international capi-
tal ﬂows must recognize its role as inﬂuencing the income converge process. Henry
(2007) underlines that the lack of empirical evidence supporting the link between
capital account liberalization and growth is the result of performing cross-sectional
regressions. Cross-sectional regressions test the hypothesis of whether changes in
capital account openness have a permanent eﬀect on diﬀerences in long run growth
across countries. However, the predictions derived from the neoclassical growth
model refer to whether capital account liberalization in a capital-scarce economy
will temporarily increase the growth rate of its GDP per capita. This paper adds
to this literature by shedding some light on the role of foreign capital inﬂows in
the transition dynamics to the economy’s steady state and addresses previous en-
dogeneity concerns by choosing the System GMM estimation strategy proposed by
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998).
By looking at the determinants of international capital ﬂows, the paper is also
related to the Lucas paradox literature. Lucas (1990) argues convincingly that
the lack of north-south capital ﬂows is inconsistent with the standard neoclassical
growth model predictions. As suggested by recent work, almost twenty years after
the paradox was ﬁrst posed, the issue of whether there are substantial diﬀerences in
the marginal return to capital across countries and its implications for north-south
capital ﬂows is still open. Caselli and Feyrer (2007) show that once marginal returns
1While the literature has stressed the potential indirect eﬀects of FDI on productivity we do
not directly incorporate this channel in the analysis and have to assume that the contribution of
the diﬀerent types of foreign capital inﬂows to convergence is through capital accumulation.




to capital are adjusted for diﬀerences between natural resources and reproducible
capital and diﬀerences in prices of output goods relative to capital, the marginal
product of capital is similar across countries. Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan and Volosovych
(2008) explore the role of diﬀerent explanations for the lack of capital ﬂows from rich
to poor countries and ﬁnd that low institutional quality is the leading explanation.
Prasad, Rajan and Subramanian (2008) focus on the recent phenomenon of “uphill”
ﬂows of capital from nonindustrial to industrial countries. Moreover, they show
that there is no evidence that increases in foreign capital inﬂows directly boost
growth since developing countries lack the appropriate absorptive capacities. Finally,
Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007) point to a reﬁnement in the paradox by which among
developing countries, foreign capital does not ﬂow even to those poor countries with
more rapidly growing economies.
We complement this literature in two ways. First, the empirical work that has
previously examined Lucas paradox has mainly focused on the long run determinants
of foreign investment. Using cross-sectional approaches this literature has found a
signiﬁcant eﬀect of institutions on foreign investment. However, as pointed out by
Papaionnau (2008) the use of cross-section analysis casts doubts on this correlation
being a causal relationship2. First, there might be unobserved country speciﬁc char-
acteristics that inﬂuence both the foreign investment decision and its determinants.
Second, it might not be that countries with better fundamentals attract foreign
investors but rather that foreign investment has a positive eﬀect on country funda-
mentals. Papaionnau (2008) adds the time dimension to this literature and shows
that there is a positive causal relationship between institutions and foreign invest-
ment after controlling for country speciﬁc eﬀects and using instrumental variable
techniques. We go one step further and include dynamics into the analysis. The in-
clusion of dynamics allows to control for country speciﬁc characteristics, to address
not only the reverse causality of institutions but also the potential endogeneity of all
the variables thought as aﬀecting the foreign investment decision. Most importantly,
it allows to diﬀerentiate among the short and the long run eﬀects of fundamentals
and capital market imperfections on foreign investment. Second, by looking at the
composition of external liabilities we provide evidence on the country fundamentals
and capital market imperfections that are more relevant for attracting each type of
2One exception is Alfaro et al (2008) that show how their results are robust to the use of
instrumental variable techniques.
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capital inﬂow. If as we shall see foreign inﬂows contribute diﬀerently to the speed of
convergence, identifying the determinants of each type of inﬂow would provide the
policy-maker with a set of variables that should be targeted in order to attract one
type or another of foreign investor.
The main ﬁndings of the paper can be summarized as follows. First, there is het-
erogeneity in the determinants of international capital ﬂows according to the type of
foreign inﬂow. Foreign equity liabilities are mainly driven by well functioning stock
markets while FDI is attracted to countries with higher educational levels. This last
results is of particular importance since although there has been wide consensus in
the theoretical literature about the importance of a country’s level of human capital
in attracting international capital ﬂows there is almost no empirical evidence sup-
porting this hypothesis. Previous empirical studies failed to ﬁnd any eﬀect (see Root
and Ahmed (1979), Schneider and Frey (1985), Alfaro et al (2008) one exception is
Noorbakhsh, Paloni and Youssef (2001)). Second, there is a strong feed-back eﬀect
of past investment on current investment which in turn means a higher long-term
eﬀect (compared to the short-run eﬀects) of changes in fundamentals and capital
market imperfections in foreign investment. This long-term eﬀect is specially pro-
nounce in the case of FDI. Finally, we ﬁnd that the composition of external liabilities
matters for the speed of convergence. Countries with higher FDI inﬂows converge
faster to their steady state. The evidence on the role of debt and portfolio ﬂows
is mixed and suggests that debt ﬂows tend to decelerate the convergence process.
However, this result is not robust to alternative speciﬁcations.
The paper is organized as follows, section 2 provides a brief introduction to
the theoretical model, section 3 describes the empirical framework and estimation
technique. Section 4 explains the data used in the analysis and section 5 reports the
empirical results, where we ﬁrst look at the determinants of international capital
ﬂows and then study the convergence process.
1.2. Theoretical Foundations
The open economy version of the neoclassical growth model has two main im-
plications. First, regarding the direction of capital ﬂows, if the rate of return to
capital associated with the initial level of capital stock to labor ratio is higher than
the world interest rate, once the economy opens up to foreign investment, foreign




capital would ﬂow into the country. In fact, with free capital mobility, we should
observe large capital ﬂows from developed (capital-abundant) to developing (capital-
scarce) countries. Second, as regards the speed of convergence, in the absence of
adjustment costs for physical capital, the neoclassical growth model with perfect
information and perfect capital mobility envisages immediate convergence of capital
to its steady state level. However, despite these theoretical predictions, in practice
we do not observe either large north-south capital ﬂows or inﬁnite rates of conver-
gence for capital. In what follows we will show how the lack of North-South capital
ﬂows can be explained by diﬀerences in fundamentals across countries, that could
make returns to capital across developed and developing economies more similar,
controls to capital mobility, the existence of capital market imperfections and/or
adjustment costs.
1.2.1. The direction of international capital ﬂows. Accounting for diﬀer-
ences in fundamentals and policies across countries the following steady state capital
market equilibrium condition has to be satisﬁed for each country i:
Aitf
0(kit,zit)(1 − τit) = rt (1.1)
where f() is the net of depreciation production function in per capita terms
satisfying the neoclassical properties; kit represents the steady state capital stock
to labor ratio and rt is the equilibrium interest rate (equalized across countries in
the steady state). Both zit and Ait represent diﬀerences in fundamentals (country
speciﬁc factors of production and productivity, respectively) while τit captures diﬀer-
ences in government policies. In particular, zit refers to non-traded country speciﬁc
factors of production. Clemens and Williamson (2000) identify this third factor of
production with concepts such as natural resources, specialized intermediate inputs,
or social capital while Lucas (1990) emphasizes the importance of country diﬀerences
in human capital levels when calculating the rate of return to capital investment.
Assuming educational level raises the productivity of both capital and labor, cap-
ital ﬂows would equalize the rate of return to capital across countries but will not
manage to equalize capital-labor ratios and hence neither capital output ratios.
Regarding TFP diﬀerences across countries (Ait), previous theoretical and em-
pirical literature suggests that TFP is determined by the institutional environment,
the degree of openness and the development of the ﬁnancial system. Lately there has
Villegas Sanchez, Carolina (2008), International Capital Flows, Technology Spillovers and Local Credit Markets 
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been a new focus on the role of institutional quality in fostering economic growth (See
Acemoglu, Simon and Robinson (2001) for a recent review) and even more recently
on its role as the driving force behind capital ﬂows. In these models the quality
of institutions is assumed to have an eﬀect on total factor productivity At, so that
the better institutions the higher productivity. Hall and Jones (1999) provide em-
pirical evidence showing that diﬀerences in productivity across countries are driven
by diﬀerences in institutions and government policies. The second factor proposed
as enhancing TFP is the economy’s exterior exposure. Edwards (1997) shows that
there is a positive and signiﬁcant association between trade openness and growth.
Openness can make inputs more eﬃcient because larger trade implies greater open-
ness that facilitates the economy’s adoption of more eﬃcient production techniques.
Finally, Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) ﬁnd a robust positive link between ﬁnan-
cial development and TFP growth. According to them, this ﬁnding supports the
Schumpeterian view that ﬁnancial intermediaries play a crucial role in economic de-
velopment because they are responsible of choosing which ﬁrms get to use society’s
savings. Moreover, the domestic level of ﬁnancial development and its ability to
facilitate short and long-term ﬁnance can ease inward investment. Garibaldi et al
(2001) showed that well-developed ﬁnancial markets appear to be almost the sole
determinant of portfolio inﬂows. In the case of FDI, results are not so drastic but
still better ﬁnancial institutions can be seen as a complementary factor to foreign
investments since domestic ﬁnancial institutions might result appealing as an alter-
native source of ﬁnancing or as providers of a domestic yield curve against which
assets can more easily be priced (Griﬃth-Jones and Leape, 2002).
Finally, diﬀerences in government policies not directly aimed at limiting foreign
capital ﬂows are captured in τit. Policies such as taxes, subsidies, or privatization
policies although not designed to directly regulate capital ﬂows they may nonetheless
generate a distorted rate of return on investment. For instance, a relative increase
in the host country tax rates is expected to raise the cost of investment, resulting
in lower proﬁtability rates. The eﬀect of government policies on the returns to
capital is modeled as representing a country speciﬁc tax on capital returns. On the
other hand, as we shall see in the next section, we expect policies directly aimed
at regulating capital ﬂows and asymmetric information to constrain the amount of
foreign capital inﬂows. As a result we would expect that capital controls and capital




market imperfections will translate into lower speed of convergence but would not
directly aﬀect the steady state capital stock.
1.2.2. The speed of convergence. The main contending theories explaining
the sluggish speed of convergence are the existence of policies directly aimed at
limiting the amount of foreign capital in the economy, the importance of capital
market imperfections and the relevance of adjustment costs. Adjustment costs refer
to the costs incurred after a change in the production process due to installation of
new machinery or reorganization of the workforce and especially, the opportunity
costs of foregone output during the period of adjustment (Hamermesh and Pfann,
1996). By capital market imperfections we understand asymmetric information
in the investment decision on the part of the foreign investors. Problems of moral
hazard, adverse selection or costly state veriﬁcation can hinder the amount of capital
foreign investors are willing to invest. We would expect capital controls and capital
market imperfections to limit foreign investment which in turn could potentially
decrease the speed of convergence. Similarly, the importance of adjustment costs
for the speed of convergence is based on modern investment theory that postulates
that ﬁrms postpone the adjustment of their capital stocks in response to demand
shocks.
Suppose a country initially endowed with k0 capital stock per worker, produc-
ing with a country speciﬁc factor of production, characterized by a TPF level and
government policies that diﬀer from other countries. Under free capital mobility,
perfect information and no adjustment costs, once the economy opens up to foreign
capital we should observe an immediate jump from k0 to the steady state capital
stock (kSS) (where the steady state capital stock is the one associated with equa-
tion (2.1)). Adjustment costs have two eﬀects. First, the steady state capital stock
once we control for adjustment costs should be lower for developing countries where
adjustment costs are higher3. Second, adjustment costs forbid immediate rates of
convergence. Firms adjust periodically their capital stock to achieve the long-run
equilibrium gradually.
3Chirinko and Mallick (2008) show that the long term marginal product of capital is aﬀected
by convex adjustment costs. Although their study focuses on convex adjustment costs they argue
that non-convex adjustment costs also inﬂuence the returns to capital. Non-convex adjustment
costs are thought as an “irreversibility premium” by which the ﬁrm is reluctant to invest if she
thinks that ﬁxed costs of investing and disinvesting could make her held ex-post more capital than
desired.




Now suppose we relax the assumptions of perfect capital mobility and perfect
information. The existence of restrictions to capital mobility and asymmetric infor-
mation, deﬁnes a new capital market equilibrium condition where the correspondent
capital stock per worker equilibrium level is kCM. In other words, foreign capital
ﬂows are not enough to ﬁll the gap between k0 and kSS and therefore, the steady state
capital stock would be reached by progressive domestic investment4. The higher the
restrictions on capital mobility and the uncertainty about the investment the wider
the gap would be and the slower would overall capital stock in the economy converge
to the steady state. Consequently it is possible to distinguish between the speed of
convergence of overall capital stock in the economy towards the steady state capital
stock per worker (kSS) and the speed of convergence of foreign capital towards the
open economy capital market equilibrium (kCM).
1.3. Methodology
1.3.1. Description of the empirical model. We adopt a partial adjustment
model that assumes that the investment ﬂow adjusts the current capital stock to-
wards the long-term capital stock and therefore, expresses the observed ﬂow as a
function of the required ﬂow to close the gap between the capital already invested
in the economy and the equilibrium capital stock5.
We make use of this model to describe both the evolution of overall capital stock
in the economy and that of foreign capital stock6. Total capital stock in the economy
evolves according to:
kit − ki,t−1 = γ
T(k
SS
it − ki,t−1) (1.2)
where k refers to total capital stock to output ratio in the economy, γT is the overall
speed of convergence and kSS is the economy steady state capital stock to output.
We follow Hall and Jones (1999)7 and write the decomposition of the production
function in terms of capital to output ratio rather than capital to labour ratio. As
they point out in a capital to labour framework increases in productivity translate
4See Wiederholt (2005), based on a Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model, for a formal derivation of
the steady state and capital market equilibrium stocks of capital in the presence of foreign capital
and restrictions to capital mobility.
5See Cheng and Kwan (2000) for a similar exercise using Chinese FDI data.
6See section 4 for a description of the foreign capital stock data.
7Based on previous work by Mankiw et al (1992) and Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997).




over time in increases in the capital to labour ratio making impossible to diﬀerentiate
increases in the marginal return to capital due to productivity amelioration or factor
accumulation. Also the capital to output ratio is proportional to the investment rate
along the balance growth path providing further grounds to our empirical framework.











where kF is foreign capital stock to output ratio in the economy, γF is the foreign
capital speed of adjustment and kCM is the capital market equilibrium stock of
capital to output ratio.
The existence of adjustment costs is represented by the condition /γ/ < 18. In
addition, although we do not directly model the form of adjustment costs, the fact
that the speed of adjustment is characterized by a constant parameter, suggests
quadratic adjustment costs (QAC) rather than ﬁxed adjustment costs (FAC). With
QAC, the ﬁrm makes continuous small adjustments every period to achieve the long-
run equilibrium gradually. On the contrary, the FAC assumption implies that the
ﬁrm undertakes a large investment concentrated in one or few periods (Bigsten et
al (2005)). It is argued that models on FAC are more consistent with plant-level
data (see Caballero and Engel, 1999) however, recent research in Thomas (2002)
shows how although individual production units adjust in a discrete manner, at the
aggregate level there is smooth adjustment.
Rearranging terms equations (2.2) and (1.3) can be respectively re-expressed as:















To estimate these equations we need to identify those factors characterizing the
steady state stock level (kSS) and those factors determining the capital market
equilibrium stock level (kCM). The choice of these variables is based on our previous
theoretical discussion, so that based on equation (2.1), kSS is expressed as a function
8/γ/ = 1 immediate convergence; γ < 1 the existence of adjustment costs make capital not to
fully adjust from period t − 1 to t;γ > 1 overadjustment.

















where φi refer to adjustment costs, CKit are controls on foreign capital and AIi
represents asymmetric information. Both the long term rate of return (rSS
t ) and the
world interest rate (rCM
t ) are constant in equilibrium.
1.3.2. Econometric speciﬁcation and estimation technique. The steady




0yit + αi + λt + εit (1.8)
where yit = [xitτit] is a matrix including those variables identiﬁed as aﬀecting total
factor productivity and speciﬁc factors of production (xit) as well as government
policies not directly aimed at capital control (τit), αi represents country speciﬁc
time invariant eﬀects, λt accounts for time-speciﬁc eﬀects and εit is an error term.
Although ideally we would have liked to include a measure of country-time varying
adjustment costs, lack of data prevented this possibility. However, Chirinko and
Mallick (2008) show that the variation in adjustment costs is across countries10 and
therefore, we would expect country-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects to control for the cross-
country variation in adjustment costs11.





0Yit + αi + λt + Σit (1.9)
9See next section for the rationale behind the inclusion of adjustment cost as a determinant of
the steady state capital stock.
10They suggest a ratio of adjustment costs/net output for rich countries between 4.0% and 5.0%.
And a ratio between poor and rich countries of the adjustment costs/net output ratio between 2.00
to 3.00.
11Similarly, country speciﬁc eﬀects would address Caselli and Feyrer (2007) critique about the
role of cross-country diﬀerences in natural endowments.




where Yit = [yitCKit] and αi as in equation (1.8) controls for country speciﬁc eﬀects
including diﬀerences in adjustment costs and asymmetric information. Traditionally,
the literature on trade and recently also studies dealing with capital ﬂows has used
distance as a measure of asymmetric information12. The idea is that the greater
the distance between two countries the more diﬃcult to monitor investments and
therefore, the greater asymmetric information. Country ﬁxed eﬀects capture cross-
country diﬀerences in remoteness.
The ultimate models to be estimated can be described as follows. The evolution
of overall capital to output ratio is determined by substituting (1.8) into (1.4):
kit = (1 − γ
T)ki,t−1 + β
0yit + uit (1.10)
where uit = ηi + ωt + χit; β = γTπ; ηi = γTαi and ωt = γTλt. Note that γT is an
adjustment coeﬃcient which measures how kit adjust to changes in the deviations
from the steady state and β measures the short run eﬀect of yit on kit given ki,t−1.
According to this speciﬁcation it is also possible to diﬀerentiate the long term eﬀect
of variables aﬀecting the steady state capital stock to output ratio, which is then
given by β/γT.
The dynamics of foreign capital stock are captured in the following speciﬁcation,
obtained by substituting (1.9) into (2.3):
k
F




0Yit + ξit (1.11)
where ξit = νi + ot + ςit; σ = γFΠ; νi = γFαi and ot = γFλt. Again, the estimates
for the variables included in Yit correspond to short run eﬀects but we can retrieve
the long term eﬀects from σ/γF.
Models (1.10) and (1.11) are standard dynamic panel models. The within estima-
tor turns out to be inconsistent in models that include a lagged dependent variable
and therefore, we use the GMM-System estimation technique proposed by Arellano
and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). This estimator reduces the po-
tential biases associated with the traditional diﬀerence estimator by combining, in
a system, the regression in diﬀerences with the regression in levels13. In addition,
the GMM estimation technique allowed us to directly tackle a common drawback
12See Alfaro et al (2008), Portes and Rey (2005) and Wei and Wu(2002).
13All estimations were done in Stata 10. We used Roodman (2006) “xtabond2” program in
Stata.




of studies on the determinants of capital ﬂows, the endogeneity of the explanatory
variables.
Under the assumptions (i) that the error term is not serially correlated, (ii) that
the lagged levels of the explanatory variables are weakly exogenous and (iii) that the
diﬀerences of the explanatory variables and the errors are uncorrelated14, the GMM-
System estimator uses appropriate lagged levels as instruments for the equations in
diﬀerences and suitable lagged diﬀerences as instruments for the equations in levels.
All variables considered are supposed to be endogenous and only the lagged depen-
dent variable and the beginning of the period human capital to be predetermined.
Overall instrument validity is examined using the Hansen test for overidentifying
restrictions. The Hansen test as opposed to the Sargan test is supposed to be ro-
bust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, and therefore a better indicator of
whether the instruments as a group appear exogenous. One drawback of the GMM-
system estimator is that it tends to generate many instruments compared to the
number of observations15. We follow Roodman (2006) and “collapse” the instru-
ments. In the standard form, we have as many moment conditions as instrumenting
variables for each time period and lag available for that time period. By collapsing
the instruments we have one single moment condition per instrumenting variable.
Finally, we use the two-step version of the GMM-System estimator, which is more
eﬃcient than the one-step estimator, once adjusted by Windmeijer’s (2005) ﬁnite
sample correction of the asymptotic variance.
1.4. Data
1.4.1. The dependent variables: Capital stock data. Data covers the pe-
riod 1970 to 1999 for a sample of developed and developing countries16. Data is
averaged over non-overlapping ﬁve year periods so that we have six observations
per country. Time periods are deﬁned is this way to exploit the time dimension of
14Although we can expect the levels of the explanatory variables to be correlated with unob-
served country speciﬁc eﬀects such as geographical characteristics or cultural norms, which do
inﬂuence capital accumulation but are ﬁxed in the short and medium terms, the lack of correlation
between diﬀerences and the ﬁxed eﬀects permits lagged diﬀerences to be used as instruments in
the levels equations.
15The instruments can overﬁt endogenous variables, failing to expunge their endogenous com-
ponents and biasing coeﬃcient estimates. The use of “many” lags as instruments can vitiate the
Hansen J test for joint validity of those instruments (Roodman (2007)).
16See Appendix A for a detailed explanation of the countries included in the analysis.




the data avoiding random ﬂuctuations over time. The dependent variables are total
capital stock to GDP and the stock of foreign liabilities to GDP (in its diﬀerent
forms: debt, equity and portfolio). The use of the stock as opposed to the ﬂow of
capital as well as the normalization by GDP is dictated by the theory outlined in
Section 2. As already suggested by Lane and Milessi-Ferretti (2000) in a macroeco-
nomic model the relevant state variable is the stock position and capital ﬂows are
the result of closing the gap between desired and actual stock positions.
Figures of total capital stock are obtained from Caselli and Feyrer (2007), where
capital is constructed with the perpetual inventory method from time series data on
real investment (originally from the PWT) using a depreciation rate of 0.06. In what
refers to data on the stock of foreign investment liabilities, Lane and Milesi-Ferreti
(2006) have made available a comprehensive dataset of foreign assets and liabilities
estimates adjusted to reﬂect the eﬀect of changes in market prices and exchange
rate (see Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2001) and (2006) for a detailed explanation of
how the data is constructed). While foreign assets might be an important element
of a country’s external capital structure, especially for developed countries, we are
concerned with the process of capital accumulation in a country and how foreign
investments, again in a country, aﬀect the speed of convergence. Consequently, we
focus on foreign stock liabilities. Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2006) provide data on total
foreign liabilities which include portfolio investment (equity and debt securities),
FDI (which refers to equity participations above 10 percent), other investments
(which includes debt instruments such as loans, deposits, and trade credits), ﬁnancial
derivatives and reserves. We limit our analysis to the behavior of overall total
liabilities, debt, equity and FDI since they are characterized by longer time series.
Private refers to the sum of equity and FDI liabilities17.
Figure 1 shows that Lucas paradox is present irrespective of the type of foreign
capital ﬂow although it is more pronounced in the case of equity ﬂows18. However,
despite the evidence of scarce foreign capital ﬂowing to developing countries, these
ﬂows were highly signiﬁcant in relation to developing countries GDP. Figure 2 shows
that this is particularly the case for FDI and debt. Although in the case of debt
17Although debt includes private debt, it also considers data on government debt and it is not
possible to diﬀerentiate among the two.
18Flows in Figure 1 were constructed as yearly changes in capital stock liabilities.




ﬂows, recent years have witnessed a sharp decrease in their relative importance in
GDP.
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the total capital stock data and the
foreign stock liabilities (in their diﬀerent forms) as a percentage of GDP. Note that
the data on total capital stock and foreign stock liabilities are in 1996 constant U.S.
dollars however, they are not directly comparable since the foreign stock liabilities
have been adjusted for market price and exchange rate valuations. The upper panel
of the table refers to data for 99 countries between 1970 and 1999. The original
Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2006) dataset includes 145 countries however, since we
average over ﬁve non-overlapping years we only keep countries with at least three
observations in each ﬁve year period. The same methodology was applied to the
rest of the regressors and therefore the bottom panel in Table 1 reports summary
statistics for the ﬁnal sample of 41 countries that we will use later on in the analysis.
Values across the two samples of countries are very similar. In general, the average
share of total capital stock in gdp is 1.67 with a standard deviation of 0.83; 76 with
a standard deviation of 74 for the total foreign stock of liabilities; 59 with a standard
deviation of 62 for the foreign stock of debt liabilities; 2.52 with a standard deviation
of 9.15 for the foreign stock of equity liabilities and ﬁnally, 14.55 with a standard
deviation of 19.2 for the foreign stock of fdi liabilities. As expected from Figure 2,
the data shows large variation in the relative importance of foreign capital stock in
GDP. For example there are countries without any foreign equity endowment while
in others the share of equity in GDP exceeds a hundred percent.
1.4.2. Regressors.
1.4.2.1. Fundamentals. The stock of human capital is a key determinant of the
rate of return to capital in the neoclassical theory. Moreover, diﬀerent studies under-
line the importance of a well-educated labor force in attracting FDI (See Noorbakhsh
et al (2001)). Based on the theoretical speciﬁcation we use a measure of the stock
of human capital per capita rather than its ﬂow. Although data on educational at-
tainment over time are very limited, the Barro and Lee (2001) database is probably
up to date the most widely used19. The closest proxy for the stock of human capital
they provide is the average years of schooling in the population. In particular, we
19In addition to Barro-Lee database on education Nehru et al (1995) use annual data based on
UNESCO enrolment data but for a shorter period. It is not clear which one is superior but the
correlation coeﬃcient between the two exceeds 80%.




use data on the average years of schooling in the total population for age group 15
and over.
Drawing on previous empirical and theoretical evidence total factor productivity
is expressed as a function of institutional quality, the degree of openness and ﬁnancial
development. The multidimensional character of the concept of institutions and to
certain extent its qualitative nature makes it often diﬃcult to ﬁnd a proper proxy in
empirical work. We measure institutional quality using the Economic Freedom of the
World index published in Gwartney and Lawson (2005)20. The institutional variables
chosen refer to the regulation of credit, labor and business which are deﬁnitely crucial
in the foreign investment decision21. We also looked at longer term institutional
variables like legal structure and the security of property rights. Data is reported as
an average index disclosed over 5-year intervals which takes values between 1 and
10, where higher values reﬂect better institutional quality of a country. A priori a
positive sign is expected on the estimated institutional quality coeﬃcient of both
overall and foreign capital adjustment equations. Better institutions are supposed
to serve not only to attract foreign investors but to improve the country’s overall
investment climate, facilitating simultaneously domestic investment.
Second, we use the ratio of total trade to GDP as an indicator of openness.
The sign of the coeﬃcient on this variable in the foreign capital adjustment estima-
tion is not straight forward particularly in the case of FDI liabilities. On the one
hand, tariﬀ jumping FDI has been usually associated to horizontal diversiﬁcation
and market seeking investment. In this case we would expect a positive relation
among a country tariﬀ restrictions and its capacity to attract FDI. On the other
hand, the alternative (and more frequent view) is that foreign investors are attracted
by countries with lower trade barriers, so that they are not faced with extra produc-
tion and distribution costs, suggesting a positive coeﬃcient in this case. Edwards
(1990), Singh and Jun (1995) and Gastanaga, Nugent and Pashamova (1998) found
a positive signiﬁcant inﬂuence of openness on FDI ﬂows.
20Berggren (2003) provides an overview of the index and other studies in which it has been
used.
21In particular, credit market regulations refer to ownership of banks, foreign bank competi-
tion, private sector credit, interest rate controls and/or negative real interest rates; Labor market
regulations include minimum wage, hiring and ﬁring regulations, centralized collective bargaining,
mandated cost of hiring, mandated cost of worker dismissal and conscription; ﬁnally, business reg-
ulations include price controls, administrative requirements, bureaucracy costs, starting a business,
extra payments/bribes, licensing restrictions and cost of tax compliance




Finally, we include two measures of ﬁnancial development from the Beck, Demirguc-
Kunt and Levine (2000) database. These measures account for the development of
credit markets and that of the stock market and are the value of credits by ﬁnancial
intermediaries to the private sector divided by GDP and the value of the stock mar-
ket capitalization to GDP , respectively. We would expect a well developed ﬁnancial
market to be a positive determinant of capital accumulation and in particular, we
would expect equity ﬂows being determined by the development of the stock market.
1.4.2.2. Government Policies. We use data from the IMF’s Exchange Arrange-
ments and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) publication on whether the country
has multiple exchange rates, controls on current account transactions or surrender
of export proceeds requirements. Although these measures are not directly imple-
mented to deter foreign capital inﬂows they nevertheless have an impact on the
foreign investment decision. Asiedu and Lien (2004) ﬁnd that the exchange rate
structure was the only restriction having a signiﬁcant eﬀect on FDI prior to the
1990s; while all the measures were inﬂuential in the 1990s (including restrictions to
the capital account). Finally, inﬂation volatility is included in the empirical anal-
ysis as a source of uncertainty. High inﬂation volatility is usually identiﬁed as a
deterrent of capital ﬂows since it worsens investors’ perception of country stability
and lowers expected proﬁt. Therefore we would expect that countries with higher
inﬂation volatility would tend to be less attractive to foreign investors.
1.4.2.3. Capital Controls. Despite the theoretical beneﬁts of capital mobility,
capital controls are still implemented by numerous countries for a number of diﬀer-
ent reasons. Frequent claimed motives are the will of preventing volatile ﬂows or
ﬂows that exacerbate distorted incentives in the domestic ﬁnancial system and do-
mestic protection from foreign companies. Given that capital controls are a common
practice in many developing countries, it could be the case that capital restrictions
explain the lack of North -South capital ﬂows. We use data from the AREAER on
restrictions on capital account transactions.
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of all variables used in the analysis,
including those used later on in the robustness analysis.





We now turn to the empirical investigation of the partial adjustment models
by means of dynamic ﬁxed eﬀect panel estimation technique. In what follows we
present results from estimating equation (1.10) that sheds light on the economy’s
overall speed of convergence towards the steady state and (1.11) that attempts to
explain the direction of international capital ﬂows.
1.5.1. International Capital Flows and Speed of Convergence. In this
section we look at the economy’s total capital stock data and the implications of
the composition of external liabilities for the overall speed of convergence. Table
3 reports the results from estimating the adjustment of total capital in the econ-
omy towards the steady state capital stock to output ratio as expressed in equation
(1.10), without considering the role of foreign capital ﬂows. Column (1) reports the
coeﬃcients from the estimation in levels. Human capital and the development of
the ﬁnancial sector as indicated by the share of credit to GDP are the main deter-
minants of capital accumulation. The levels estimation does not control for country
speciﬁc eﬀects though. If there are signiﬁcant unobserved country eﬀects, OLS will
yield inconsistent estimates and, in particular, will produce an upward-biased coef-
ﬁcient on the lagged endogenous variable. In fact, we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient on
past capital stock is large and highly signiﬁcant. Therefore, column (2) of Table
3 reports results from the ﬁxed-eﬀects estimation. As expected, the coeﬃcient on
the lagged dependent variable is considerably reduced. Regarding the rest of the
determinants of capital accumulation only the ﬁnancial system development retains
its signiﬁcance after controlling for country speciﬁc eﬀects. Column (3) of Table 3
reports results from the System-GMM estimation. As expected the coeﬃcient on
the lagged dependent variable is between the OLS and the ﬁxed eﬀects estimates.
Among the country characteristics, again only the share of credit to GDP is signiﬁ-
cant. Hence, Table 3 highlights the importance of a well developed ﬁnancial system
in the capital accumulation process.
As we saw in the description of the empirical model, one of the advantages of the
partial adjustment model is that it allows to incorporate dynamics into the estima-
tion of the neoclassical model and consequently, to study the speed of convergence.
In particular, we would like to address two related questions: do countries that re-
ceive higher foreign capital ﬂows converge faster to their steady state? and are there
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diﬀerences in convergence rates depending on the type of foreign capital inﬂow? In
order to answer these questions we need to establish how the speed of convergence
parameter (γ) varies with diﬀerent capital inﬂows. Table 4 shows the results from
interacting the lagged dependent variable in equation (1.10) with diﬀerent types of
capital inﬂows. Column (1) looks at aggregate data of foreign liabilities, column
(2) focuses on the role of private capital inﬂows (FDI plus equty) and columns (3),
(4) and (5) consider the eﬀect of disaggregated capital inﬂows (i.e. FDI, equity
and debt). Finally, column (6) tries to establish the relative importance of each
capital inﬂow by incorporating the three types of inﬂow together into the analy-
sis. The speed of converge will vary with capital inﬂows according to the following
speciﬁcation:
TotalEffect = (1 − γ
T) + βCapitalFlow∗CapitalStockt−1 ∗ CapitalFlowit (1.12)
where (1−γT) is the coeﬃcient on the lagged dependent variable and CapitalFlow
refers to total capital inﬂows, private, FDI, equity or debt, correspondingly. There-
fore, we will be paying particular attention at the overall signiﬁcance of the inter-
action terms and the lagged dependent variable, which is the total eﬀect we are
interested in. Moreover, if capital inﬂows contribute to the country’s speed of con-
vergence we would expect the interaction term to be positive. Column (1) shows
that the positive total eﬀect from overall foreign capital inﬂows on the speed of
convergence is highly signiﬁcant. In column (2) we ﬁnd that this positive eﬀect is
mainly driven by private capital inﬂows, in fact, column (5) shows that countries
receiving foreign capital in the form of debt will tend to converge slower. Columns
(3) and (4) ﬁnd an overall positive eﬀect on convergence both from equity inﬂows
and FDI. When looking at the relative importance of each type of inﬂow for con-
vergence, as expected from the previous results, column (6) shows that while equity
and FDI positively contribute to faster speed of convergence, debt inﬂows decelerate
the convergence process.
We explored other sources that could potentially contribute to a higher speed of
convergence. First, the theory outlined in section 2 suggested that capital controls
would not aﬀect the steady state capital stock but rather the speed of convergence.
Table 3 already showed that capital controls are not a signiﬁcant determinant of the
capital accumulation process. However, the interaction between the lagged stock of




capital and the capital controls dummy in the estimation of equation (1.14) turned
out to be insigniﬁcant. Second, we looked at the eﬀect of other measures of ﬁnancial
and economic integration like the degree of trade openness, multiple exchange rate
arrangements, controls on the current account, the surrender of export proceeds and
the combined Chin-Ito index on restrictions to capital mobility. None of them had
a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the speed of convergence. The lack of signiﬁcant results when
considering other variables might be due to measurement error problems with the
liberalization indicators. For example, as suggested in Henry (2007), the AREAER
aggregate data does not specify whether changes in the capital account indicator
refer to changes in restrictions on capital inﬂows or capital outﬂows. However, that
distinction matters since liberalizing capital inﬂows would translate in a permanent
fall of the cost of capital and a temporary increase in the growth rate of capital
stock and GDP per capita. On the contrary, liberalizing capital outﬂows would in
theory not have an impact neither in the cost of capital, nor investment or GDP.
In this case, the use of direct measures of ﬁnancial liberalization, like the actual
capital inﬂows, provides strong evidence on the link between ﬁnancial liberalization
and speed of convergence.
1.5.1.1. Obtaining a Direct Estimate of the Speed of Convergence. Results in
Table 4 have the advantage that can be estimated by dynamic panel System-GMM
and therefore, control for the potential endogeneity of all the variables included in
the analysis. However, the coeﬃcient on the lagged dependent variable in equation
(1.10) is (1 − γT) while the relevant speed of convergence parameter is γT. Conse-
quently, to get a direct estimate of the speed of convergence and its interaction with
foreign capital ﬂows we re-express equation 1.10 as:
kit − ki,t−1 = −γ
Tki,t−1 + β







where kit is total capital stock in the economy as a percentage of GDP; CapitalFlow
refers to the ﬂow of total foreign liabilities, debt, private, equity or FDI, depending
on the ﬂow we are interested in and; yit includes all the variables characterizing the
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steady state. We are interested in how γT varies in the presence of diﬀerent capital
inﬂows therefore, the total eﬀect is:
TotalEffect = −[γ
T + β2CapitalFlowit] (1.15)
Results from estimating equation (1.14) for diﬀerent types of capital inﬂows are
presented in Table 5. Notice that equation (1.14) does not include the lagged depen-
dent variable as a regressor anymore since the dependent variable is investment and
therefore the estimation method chosen is ﬁxed eﬀects estimation. It is important to
highlight at this point that if not interested in a direct estimate of γ, the speciﬁca-
tion in equation 1.10 would be preferred since it allows to estimate by System-GMM
and therefore, control for the endogeneity of all the regressors. Column (1) in Table
5 shows that in general, foreign capital inﬂows contribute to a faster convergence
rate. The coeﬃcients on the lagged capital stock and the interaction term are jointly
signiﬁcant. The total eﬀect as in equation 1.15 is an increasing function of total cap-
ital inﬂows. Therefore, the greater foreign capital inﬂows into a country the higher
the speed of convergence and as shown in Column (2) this is also true for private
capital inﬂows. In fact, a closer look at the data, shows that not all types of foreign
capital ﬂows have a signiﬁcant and positive eﬀect on a country’s speed of conver-
gence. Comparing columns (3), (4), (5) and (6) it turns out that FDI inﬂows are
the main driving force behind the results in columns (1) and (2). These results in
Table 5 diﬀer slightly from the results shown in Table 4. While the positive eﬀect of
equity ﬂows and the negative eﬀect of debt inﬂows on convergence is still present in
columns (4) and (5), respectively, these results are no longer signiﬁcant. Moreover,
the negative eﬀect of debt on convergence although not signiﬁcant disappears once
we control for other sources of foreign investment (see column (6)). Consequently,
results in Table 10 indicate that FDI is the sole driving force behind higher speed
of convergence.
The main concern related to the estimation of equation (1.14) and the corre-
sponding results in Table 5 is that countries with higher domestic investment might
attract foreign investors rather than foreign investment stimulating domestic in-
vestment. To deal with this concern we try to ﬁnd appropriate instruments that
are correlated with the foreign investment decision in a particular country but are
largely independent of the domestic investment conditions. We follow Mody and




Murshid (2005) that estimate a dynamic version of equation (1.14) where instead
of the lagged stock of domestic capital, they include lagged investment. They pro-
pose a set of instruments that proxy for changes in the supply of capital. We use
the weighted average of capital ﬂows to GDP ratios to other countries in the same
region22 where the weights are the inverse of the distance between the two largest
cities in any two countries23. Table 6 shows how these variables aﬀect capital inﬂows
and some heterogeneity in their relative importance. The number of observations
in Tables 6 to 8 drops to 34 countries because there are six countries with data
available only for one time period24. Overall, the share of foreign capital available
to other countries in the same stage of development positively inﬂuences all capital
inﬂows, irrespective of the type. Also, the average of capital ﬂows to other countries
in the area is another important determinant of capital ﬂows except in the case of
FDI. In general, the set of instruments can explain between 20 and 30 percent of
the variation in capital inﬂows depending on the type of inﬂow.
Table 7 shows the second stage results, from the two stage least square esti-
mation, when instrumenting for the capital ﬂows data and the interaction between
capital ﬂows and the lagged capital stock. Results conﬁrm the ﬁndings in Table
5 and suggest a greater impact of foreign capital inﬂows, in particular of FDI, on
convergence. The preferred speciﬁcation in column (6) shows that the interaction
term between FDI inﬂows and the lagged capital stock is signiﬁcant at the 1% level
and most importantly, the total eﬀect is also signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The IV
estimate is higher (in absolute value) that the panel ﬁxed eﬀect estimate, suggest-
ing a downward bias of the ﬁxed eﬀect estimation due to reverse causality and the
short time dimension of the panel. In fact, Tables 6 to 8 include 5-year average
data only for the period 1980-1999. Regarding the instrument validity, while the
Hansen J-test of overidentifying restrictions suggest that we cannot reject the null
hypothesis of instrument validity, the F-statistics in the case of equity and private
inﬂows arise weak instruments concerns. We re-estimate equation (1.14) by means of
limited-information maximum likelihood methods that are supposed to outperform
22We deﬁne 10 regions: Region 1 (EU-15 plus Switzerland, Norway, Cyprus, Malta and Turkey);
Region 2 (USA, Canada and Japan); Region 3 (Latin America); Region 4 (Caribbean); Region 5
(Middle East and North Africa); Region 6 (South Asia); Region 7 (East Asia); Region 8 (Sub-
Saharan Africa); Region 9 (Paciﬁc); Region 10 (Central and Eastern Europe).
23Distance are obtained from CEPII.
24These countries are Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nepal and Fiji.
Villegas Sanchez, Carolina (2008), International Capital Flows, Technology Spillovers and Local Credit Markets 
European University Institute
 
10.2870/269781.5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 27
the 2SLS estimation in the presence of weak instruments. The results are reported
in Table 8. The capital ﬂows and the interaction term estimates are very similar to
the 2SLS ones although slightly higher in absolute value. Our preferred speciﬁcation
in column (6) shows that the positive contribution of FDI inﬂows to the speed of
convergence is robust.
Finally, while the positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect of FDI inﬂows on the speed of
convergence is robust to diﬀerent speciﬁcations and estimation methods, the chang-
ing sign and lack of signiﬁcance of debt ﬂows is striking and deserves further con-
sideration. The main diﬀerences between the System-GMM estimation results in
Table 4 and those from the instrumental variable approach in Tables 7 and 8 are
the number of countries and the time period. We could think that the 70s and
beginning of the 80s was a period where the share of government debt in GDP was
considerable for many emerging and developing countries. However, over time the
relative importance of government debt as a share of GDP in this group of countries
has declined (see ﬁgure 2). Moreover, over time there has been an increase in cor-
porate debt over government debt which has diﬀerent implications for growth and
convergence. Therefore, the negative eﬀect of debt on convergence in Table 4 might
be the result of including the initial periods. However, re-estimating the results in
Table 4 for the sample of 34 countries and the same time period as in Tables 7 to 8
delivered the same negative eﬀect of debt of convergence. Another plausible expla-
nation would be that since government debt ﬂows are often not driven by interest
rate diﬀerentials but rather by more complex political decisions, the System-GMM
estimator purged better the endogeneity of debt ﬂows than the instrumental variable
approach. However, given the lack of consistent results regarding the eﬀect of debt
ﬂows on convergence we refrain from drawing strong conclusions on this evidence.
1.5.2. The Determinants of International Capital Flows. We ﬁnally study
the determinants of international capital ﬂows taking dynamics and the external
composition of liabilities into account.
1.5.2.1. Basic Speciﬁcation. Table 9 reports the results from estimating equa-
tion (1.11) which includes all the variables described in the theoretical analysis as
characterizing the capital market equilibrium capital stock to GDP ratio [kCM]. In
Table 9, each column corresponds to a diﬀerent foreign capital stock as dependent
variable. Columns (1) and (3) refer to aggregated stocks. Column (1) includes the




sum of all foreign stock liabilities in the country while (3) focus only on the evolution
of private foreign stock liabilities (i.e. the sum of equity and FDI). Columns (2), (4)
and (5) present the results from disaggregated foreign capital stocks into debt, eq-
uity and FDI. The coeﬃcient on the lagged dependent variable is highly signiﬁcant
across speciﬁcations although it varies in size. The coeﬃcient is greater in the case
of FDI suggesting a very strong feedback eﬀect of the variable’s past values on its
current value. This is in line with the empirical evidence that FDI ﬂows are highly
persistent. If we focus on the stock of total foreign liabilities, a coeﬃcient of 0.558
on the lagged dependent variable implies that the long-term eﬀects of changes in
variables characterizing the capital market equilibrium on the dependent variable
are approximately two and a half times higher than the short-term eﬀects25.
Column (1) in Table 9, shows that in general foreign capital is attracted to
countries where the population has higher average years of education and lower re-
strictions to capital mobility. However, countries with more restrictions to current
account transactions and where the surrender of exports proceeds is an extended
practice seem to also attract higher foreign capital. It turns out that looking at
aggregated data shrouds diﬀerent behavior depending on the type of capital ﬂow.
Therefore, debt data is behind the signiﬁcance of the restrictions to the capital ac-
count, current account and surrender of exports proceeds while the FDI capital stock
data is responsible for the signiﬁcance of the average years of education. Focusing on
private foreign capital stock data (column (3)) a somewhat surprising result arises.
Better developed ﬁnancial systems in terms of higher availability of credit to GDP
tend to attract less portfolio inﬂows and, this is the case both for equity and FDI
data. In the case of FDI, this ﬁnding corroborates previous results by Fernandez-
Arias and Hausman (2000) who state that well functioning ﬁnancial systems attract
capital in general but not FDI in particular. One alternative explanation for the
unexpected sign could be the negative correlation between macroeconomic instabil-
ity and ﬁnancial liberalization
26 however, this is not supported by the data. The
contradictory sign remain even when the variables are included in the analysis one
at a time. Moreover, capital account liberalization does not seem to inﬂuence the
25ˆ γ = 1 − ˆ (1 − γ) in this case:ˆ γ = 1 − 0.558. Remember the long run eﬀect is given by β/γ. In
addition, results from a Wald test showed that we cannot reject the hypothesis that ˆ (1 − γ)(0,1).
26Noorbakhsh et al (2001) suggest that a necessary precondition for ﬁnancial liberalization is
macroeconomic stability and successful inﬂation control is associated with an increase in private
sector’s share of domestic credit, so that both variables would be capturing the same eﬀect.
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decision of private foreign investment. Since abolishing barriers to capital mobility
might not be enough to attract capital in the presence of underdeveloped ﬁnancial
systems, we include an interaction term between restrictions to capital mobility and
ﬁnancial development which turned out to be insigniﬁcant. Continuing with the re-
sults in Table 9, column (4) shows that the main determinant of equity inﬂows is the
development of the stock market while as already stated, FDI inﬂows are positively
driven by the average years of education in the population aged 15 and over and
the degree of trade openness. The ﬁnding of human capital as a main determinant
of FDI location is of great importance since previous cross-section empirical studies
failed to ﬁnd any eﬀect (see Root and Ahmed (1979), Schneider and Frey (1985),
Alfaro et al (2008)). Only Noorbakhsh et al (2001) ﬁnd that human capital is a
statistically signiﬁcant determinant of FDI inﬂows, its importance increasing over
time. While Noorbakhsh et al (2001) study uses cross-section data, we ﬁnd that
FDI is driven by country’s human capital stock even after controlling for country
ﬁxed eﬀects
27.
From a policy point of view, the long-run implications and the economic relevance
of the results are key. Higher levels of human capital have a substantial positive
long-run eﬀect on FDI. A permanent increase of 1% in a country’s average years of
schooling will translate into a 1.50% increase in FDI inﬂows to GDP
28. Moreover,
the results seem to be economically relevant even in the short-run. Consider, for
example Cameroon. Its average years of schooling in the population aged 15 and
over during the period 1970-1999 was 2.6. An exogenous increase that would have
brought it to the sample average of 6.31 would have result in about 0.58 percentage
point
29 higher inﬂows of FDI to GDP per year in the short run.
1.5.2.2. Robustness. Table 10 shows the results obtained from the ﬁxed eﬀects
estimation (i.e. without correcting for the bias introduced by including the lagged
dependent variable in the estimation). As expected, the coeﬃcients on the lagged
dependent variables are considerably reduced
30. Overall results remain for the most
part the same. The only exception are the results regarding the foreign debt stock
27See section 5.1.3. for further discussion.
28The long run eﬀect of average years of schooling=(0.661/(1 − 0.558))
29This result is obtained as: 0.661 ∗ [ln(6.31) − ln(2.6)] = 0.58
30This reduction is the result not only of the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable but also
it arises in part from the biased estimates of the ﬁxed eﬀects model in short panels.




liabilities. In this case, countries with worst business environments but good ﬁnan-
cial markets seem to attract more foreign debt. This is not surprising if we think
that countries with weak policies and weak institutions could have higher levels of
debt. And it is in contrast with what other studies have found for private capital
ﬂows. Wei and Wu (2001) show that a corrupt country receives substantially less
FDI compared to other types of capital ﬂows; and Alfaro et al (2008) aﬃrm institu-
tional quality is the main driving force behind international capital ﬂows. However,
controlling for the presence of a lagged dependent variable plus the endogeneity of
the regressors wipes away this result.
Table 11 conﬁrms that the main results in Table 9 are robust to other deﬁnitions
of the regressors or the inclusion of alternative control variables. For brevity we
present results for aggregate data referring to the total foreign liabilities stock in
the economy and the stock of foreign private liabilities (equity plus FDI). Columns
(1) and (2) investigate the eﬀects of using an alternative deﬁnition of human capital
stock. Column (1) considers the case when the average years of education refer to the
population aged 25 and over rather than 15 and over. By looking at the population
aged 15 and over and therefore, adding the population between 15 and 25, we
might be overestimating the role of primary and secondary education, especially in
developing countries. Results in columns (1) and (2) show that this is not the case,
the average years of education continues to be one of the main determinants of total
and private capital ﬂows.
In columns (3) and (4) we turn to potential concerns with the measure of in-
stitutional quality chosen. It might be argued that the business environment is a
short term indicator of a country’s institutional quality. To consider a longer term
indicator of institutional quality we use data published by the Freedom of the World
Institute on the legal structure and the security of property rights. In particular,
the data is available in an index that combines the following factors: judicial inde-
pendence, impartial courts, protection of intellectual property, integrity of the legal
system and military interference in the rule of law and the political process. Re-
sults in columns (3) and (4) show that this measure of institutional quality is not
signiﬁcant either and most importantly, the signiﬁcance of the main determinants
identiﬁed in Table 9 remain mostly unchanged.
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Similarly, in columns(5) and (6) we include an index of capital openness con-
structed by Chinn and Ito (2005). This index is based on the IMF’s Exchange
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions publication and it combines indicators on
the presence of multiple exchange rates, restrictions on current account transactions,
restrictions on capital account transactions and requirement of the surrender of ex-
port proceeds. It ranges from -2.0 in the case of countries with most controls to
2.5 in the case of countries that have liberalized cross-border capital transactions.
Results from including this combined index are shown in columns (5) and (6) and
revealed that the index is not statistically signiﬁcant.
Finally, despite having aggregated the series over 5 non-overlapping years, the
coeﬃcient on the lagged stock of FDI liabilities in Table 9, suggest a higher persis-
tence of the FDI capital stock series that could rise concerns about the estimation
method chosen. As noticed in Phillips and Sul (2007) the GMM procedure might
suﬀer bias or weak instrumentation problems in the presence of high persistent series.
However, a Wald test rejected the hypothesis that the estimated coeﬃcient on the
lagged dependent variable equals 1 (p-value: 0.0558). A more thorough analysis of
this hypothesis, which would include testing for the presence of unit roots or cointe-
gration among the variables of interest, could not be carried out given the short time
dimension of the panel (again notice data has been averaged over 5 non-overlapping
years)
31.
1.5.2.3. Static vs Dynamic Approach. Traditionally, the literature on the deter-
minants of capital ﬂows has adopted a static approach. The goal of our paper is
broader, we are not only concerned with the direction of foreign capital ﬂows but
we are also interested in the country’s overall speed of convergence. Given these
concerns, estimation within the framework of a partial adjustment model turned
out to be more relevant. However, in order to asses the value-added of our dynamic
model we ﬁnd it useful to present the results obtained from a pooled OLS and a
panel ﬁxed eﬀect analysis that do not consider dynamic eﬀects.
31Alternatively, in order to mitigate the biases associated with the GMM estimation of dynamic
panels with a non-stationary dependent variable and avoid spurious regression caused by any
potential cointegration relation among the variables under analysis, we could have re-estimated
equation (1.14) in ﬁrst diﬀerences. However, this alternative could not have delivered in any case
exactly equivalent results since the diﬀerencing shortens the time dimension and in addition, due
to the unbalanced nature of the panel it also decreases the sample size. Even in the preferred
scenario of having the same periods and sample size results would only be equivalent if the error
term follows an MA(1) and the capital stock series is integrated of order one.




When dynamics are not included in the model a better approach is to use as
dependent variable the ﬂow of FDI normalized by GDP
32. The reason is that in
this static framework it is not possible to incorporate the adjustment process to the
long run capital stock. However, the main concern is still the lack of capitalflows
to developing countries suggesting that the best way of shedding light on the small
North-South capital ﬂows is to identify the factors that foster or hinder capital ﬂows
rather than characterizing the optimal capital stock to output ratio.
Tables 12 and 13 report the results from a pooled OLS estimation and a ﬁxed ef-
fects estimation, respectively. In Table 12, the degree of trade openness and the lack
of restrictions to capital mobility are in general, the main determinants of interna-
tional capital ﬂows. Once we control for unobserved country speciﬁc eﬀects, in Table
13, the degree of trade openness remains a signiﬁcant factor explaining international
capital mobility however, the importance of capital restrictions is limited to the case
of total and private foreign liabilities. Most importantly the static approach reveals
that under these estimation strategies we would have found no signiﬁcant eﬀect of
human capital on capital ﬂows, ﬁnding that is in line with previous cross-sectional
studies in the literature. One plausible explanation for the discrepancy between the
static and the dynamic results is the changing pattern in the MNCs investment mo-
tive. While most of the MNCs during the 70s and mid-80s in developing countries
were resource or market seeking, since the mid-80s we have witnessed an increase
in the value added of MNCs operating in developing countries as well as a relative
skill biased in their production processes (Miyamoto (2003)).
Therefore, the dynamic speciﬁcation has several advantages: it allows to ex-
ploit the time varying dimension of the data, it facilitates a way to control for the
endogeneity of all regressors under consideration and it is best suited to test the
neoclassical model predictions in terms of convergence.
1.6. Conclusion
The neoclassical theory predictions in terms of the direction of international
capital ﬂows and speed of convergence are not supported by the empirical evidence.
While most of the previous empirical work is based on a cross-sectional approach, we
32The ﬂow is computed as the diﬀerence in capital stock levels so it is not possible to rule
out negative values. This computational procedure excludes the use of a log-log linear form for
estimation. Instead, we use a semi-log transformation.




go one step further in the literature and add dynamics to the analysis of the predic-
tions of the open-economy version of the neoclassical growth model. In particular,
we address to questions: what are the determinants of international capital ﬂows?
and do countries that receive higher foreign inﬂows converge faster to their steady
state? Moreover, we establish the importance of looking at the composition of exter-
nal liabilities, not all foreign inﬂows are attracted by the same country fundamentals
and not all foreign inﬂows have an heterogeneous eﬀect on convergence. Using data
on total capital and foreign capital stock liabilities from 1970 to 1999 we estimate a
partial adjustment model by means of GMM-System estimation techniques.
The main ﬁndings of the paper are that countries with higher FDI inﬂows con-
verge faster to their steady state. The evidence on the contribution of equity and
debt to the speed of converge is mixed. In addition, there is heterogeneity in the
country fundamentals that are relevant for attracting either type of inﬂow. Foreign
equity liabilities are attracted to countries with well-functioning stock markets while
FDI is driven by higher educational levels.
The evidence on FDI inﬂows contributing to faster convergence adds to the the-
oretical and empirical literature on the growth-enhancing eﬀects of FDI. In this re-
spect, although we ﬁnd that countries attracting higher FDI inﬂows converge faster
to their steady state, additional work should be done on whether absolute conver-
gence is also facilitated by FDI inﬂows. Similarly, we have assumed that capital
is homogenous. This consideration is of particular importance in the open econ-
omy context where foreign and domestic capital are considered perfect substitutes.
Consequently, it is implicitly assumed that the eﬀect of foreign capital on growth is
solely through capital accumulation and not through a potential indirect eﬀect on
total factor productivity. In a way, abstracting from the eﬀect of FDI on productiv-
ity means an underestimation of the total eﬀect of FDI on convergence if FDI has a
positive eﬀect on productivity.
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Countries and Variable Deﬁnition
Sample of Countries
United States of America†∗Chile HongKong∗ Mali
United Kingdom†∗ Colombia India† Mauritius
Austria†∗ CostaRica† Indonesia Morocco
Belgium∗ DominicanRepublic† Korea† Mozambique
Denmark†∗ Ecuador† Malaysia† Niger
France†∗ ElSalvador† Nepal† Nigeria
Italy†∗ Guatemala† Pakistan† Zimbadwe
Netherlands†∗ Haiti Philippines† Rwanda
Norway†∗ Honduras† Singapore∗ Senegal
Sweden†∗ Mexico† Thailand† Namibia
Switzerland∗ Nicaragua Algeria Tanzania
Canada†∗ Panama† Angola Togo
Japan†∗ Paraguay† Botswana Tunisia
Finland†∗ Peru Cameroon Uganda
Greece†∗ Uruguay Chad BurkinaFaso
Ireland†∗ Jamaica† Benin Fiji†
Portugal∗ TrinidadandTobago† EquatorialGuinea PapuaNewGuinea
Spain∗ Iran Ethiopia China
Turkey Israel∗ Gabon Poland






There are 99 countries for which data on foreign stock liabilities and capital stock is available for at least two time
periods within each ﬁve year period series. ∗ Refers those countries identiﬁed as developed by the World Bank in
2000. † Refers to the the ﬁnal sample of 41 countries that is used in the empirical part. The sample drops to 41
countries due to data constraints.
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Variable Sources
Description Unit Source
Human Capital 15 Average years of schooling in the pop-
ulation aged 15 and over
years Barro and Lee (2001):http :
//www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html
Human Capital 25 Average years of schooling in the pop-
ulation aged 25 and over
years Barro and Lee (2001):http :
//www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html
Business Environment Regulation of credit, labor and busi-
ness
index Economic Freedom of the World http :
//www.freetheworld.com/datasetsefw.html
Legal Property Rights legal structure and the security of
property rights
index Economic Freedom of the Worldhttp :
//www.freetheworld.com/datasetsefw.html
Openness Share of export plus imports to GDP percentage World Development Indicators
CreditGDP Private Credit by Deposit Money
Banks to GDP
percentage Financial Structure Databasehttp :
//econ.worldbank.org/staff/tbeck
StockMktGDP Stock Market Capitalization to GDP percentage Financial Structure Databasehttp :
//econ.worldbank.org/staff/tbeck
Inﬂation volatility Standard Deviation of Inﬂation over a
5 year window
World Development Indicators
MER Multiple Exchange Rates dummy 0/1 AREAER: IMF publication on Ex-
change Arrangements and Exchange
Restrictions
Carest Controls on the Current Account dummy 0/1 AREAER: IMF publication on Ex-
change Arrangements and Exchange
Restrictions
Karest Controls on the Capital Account dummy 0/1 AREAER: IMF publication on Ex-
change Arrangements and Exchange
Restrictions
SURR Surrender of Export Proceeds dummy 0/1 AREAER: IMF publication on Ex-
change Arrangements and Exchange
Restrictions
Capital Index Chinn-Ito Capital Openness Index index A New Measure of Fi-
nancial Opennesshttp :
//www.ssc.wisc.edu/ mchinn/research.html
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Figure B.1. Lucas Paradox: Mean Share of Flows in Total Flows
by Income Group
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Mean Share of FDI Flows in GDP by Income Country Group
Figure B.2. Economic Relevance of Foreign Capital Flows





Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics: Dependent Variables
(Variables expressed as percentage of GDP)
Panel A: Sample of 99 countries
Total Foreign Foreign Foreign FDI
Capital Liabilities Debt Equity
Mean 1.67 76.62 59.49 2.52 14.55
Std Dev 0.83 73.64 62.21 9.15 19.20
Min 0.12 0.55 0.00 0.00 0.00
Max 4.47 1046.95 1035.20 171.50 252.29
Panel B: Sample of 41 countries
Mean 1.93 72.98 54.04 3.66 15.31
Std Dev 0.77 74.29 62.03 9.54 17.26
Min 0.45 1.99 1.50 0.00 0.34
Max 3.62 661.78 596.62 96.08 108.94
All variables are stock data. Capital refers to total capital stock in the economy. Liabilities refers to total foreign liabilities
(sum of foreign debt liabilities (column 3), foreign equity liabilities (column 4), foreign fdi liabilities (column 5), foreign
derivatives liabilities and other foreign liabilities). See the text for a description of the variables. Note data on total
capital stock and foreign liabilities stock are not directly comparable. Panel A includes those countries with at least two
observations available in every ﬁve year period for all the dependent variables under consideration. Panel B includes those
countries used in the ﬁnal estimations (i.e. countries for which data on the rest of regressors is available.
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Table 2 - Descriptive Statistics: Other Variables




Foreign Liabilities Flow to GDP 246 9.97 15.45 -46.38 170.49
Foreign Debt Flow to GDP 246 7.02 13.21 -44.06 159.43
Foreign Pivate Flow to GDP 240 2.84 4.68 -5.39 46.82
Foreign Equity Flow to GDP 240 0.91 3.35 -0.28 33.78
FDI Flow to GDP 246 2.04 2.49 -2.33 13.97
Investment/GDP 246 0.08 0.05 -0.03 0.27
Human Capital 15 245 6.31 2.65 0.20 11.89
Human Capital 25 245 6.03 2.80 0.04 12.18
Business Environment 218 5.97 1.11 3.09 8.66
Legal and Property Rights 214 6.32 2.48 1.20 9.89
Openness 246 47.64 23.20 7.38 170.95
Private Credit to GDP 246 0.40 0.31 0.02 2.07
Stock Market to GDP 122 0.35 0.39 0.01 1.98
Inﬂation Volatility 246 5.17 6.22 0.25 44.82
Multiple Exchange Rates 246 0.19 0.35 0 1
Current Account Restrictions 246 0.39 0.44 0 1
Capital Account Restrictions 246 0.67 0.44 0 1
Surrender of Export Proceeds 246 0.63 0.46 0 1
Chin-Ito Capital Openness Index 244 0.25 1.44 -1.80 2.54




Table 3 - Determinants of Total Capital Stock Accumulation
(Dependent variable: log of the stock of Capital to GDP)
OLS Fixed Eﬀects System-GMM
(1) (2) (3)
Lagged Dependent Variable(1 − γT) 0.907*** 0.606*** 0.839***
(0.036) (0.144) (0.183)
Human Capital 0.086** 0.077 0.057
(0.038) (0.073) (0.151)
Business Environment -0.052 -0.058 0.183
(0.066) (0.085) (0.166)
Openness 0.018 0.093 0.111
(0.017) (0.078) (0.128)
Credit to GDP 0.063*** 0.106*** 0.121**
(0.020) (0.027) (0.052)
Stock Market to GDP -0.013 -0.035 -0.025
(0.010) (0.023) (0.027)
Inﬂation volatility 0.019* 0.018 0.047
(0.011) (0.021) (0.030)
Multiple Exchange Rates -0.017 0.070** -0.027
(0.040) (0.030) (0.136)
Current Account Restrictions -0.044* -0.019 0.077
(0.026) (0.041) (0.077)
Surrender of Export Proceeds -0.014 -0.022 0.011
(0.032) (0.028) (0.095)
Capital Account Restrictions 0.027 -0.005 -0.032
(0.026) (0.036) (0.103)
Observations 122 122 122





Note:Standard errors in parenthesis.* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level; ** Signiﬁcance at the 5%
level;*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level. Time dummies are included in all speciﬁcations. All regres-
sors are expressed in logs, except the capital controls. Dynamic System-GMM estimation with
“collapsed” instruments (see text for further explanation).AR1: Arellano-Bond test for ﬁrst order
serial autocorrelation; AR2: Arellano-Bond test for second order serial autocorrelation; Hansen:
test for overidentifying restrictions.




Table 4 - Capital Flows and Speed of Convergence
(Dependent variable: log of the stock of Capital to GDP)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CapitalStocktt−1 0.839*** 0.781*** 0.853*** 0.816*** 0.923*** 0.785***
(0.125) (0.164) (0.140) (0.186) (0.128) (0.168)
TotalLiabilities -0.010
(0.008)
















DebtLiabilities ∗ CapitalStockt−1 -0.024 -0.005
(0.023) (0.015)
Human Capital 0.085 0.050 -0.015 0.051 0.142 0.227*
(0.126) (0.125) (0.137) (0.175) (0.160) (0.115)
Business Environment -0.163 0.020 0.099 0.100 -0.785 -0.158
(0.169) (0.272) (0.177) (0.331) (0.675) (0.305)
Openness 0.172*** 0.149* 0.080 0.135 0.067 0.183*
(0.054) (0.081) (0.122) (0.113) (0.242) (0.108)
Credit to GDP 0.035 0.049 0.062 0.034 0.048 0.033
(0.045) (0.056) (0.059) (0.057) (0.122) (0.082)
Stock Market to GDP -0.020 -0.004 0.014 -0.011 0.045 -0.019
(0.032) (0.033) (0.037) (0.035) (0.050) (0.034)
Inﬂation volatility -0.015 -0.007 0.024 -0.012 -0.023 -0.016
(0.032) (0.046) (0.026) (0.043) (0.057) (0.037)
Multiple Exchange Rates -0.083 -0.064 -0.054 -0.104 -0.132 -0.119
(0.072) (0.116) (0.097) (0.106) (0.101) (0.071)
Current Account Restrictions 0.025* 0.007 0.013 0.029 -0.141 -0.039
(0.091) (0.141) (0.101) (0.121) (0.154) (0.120)
Capital Account Restrictions -0.098 -0.021 -0.040 0.014 -0.091 -0.020
(0.051) (0.076) (0.068) (0.091) (0.147) (0.083)
Surrender of Export Proceeds 0.016 0.004 0.048 -0.020 0.037 -0.027
(0.056) (0.070) (0.087) (0.119) (0.097) (0.136)
Observations 122 122 122 120 122 120
Gtoups 41 41 41 41 41 41
AR1 0.073 0.029 0.05 0.076 0.077 0.026
AR2 0.249 0.681 0.325 0.152 0.334 0.561
Hansen 0.846 0.286 0.592 0.580 0.300 0.985





Note:Standard errors in parenthesis.* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level; ** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level;*** Signiﬁcance at
the 1% level. Time dummies are included in all speciﬁcations. All regressors are expressed in logs, except the capital
controls and the capital ﬂows. Dynamic System-GMM estimation with “collapsed” instruments (see text for further ex-
planation).AR1: Arellano-Bond test for ﬁrst order serial autocorrelation; AR2: Arellano-Bond test for second order serial
autocorrelation; Hansen: test for overidentifying restrictions. Total, Private, FDI, Equity and Debt Liabilities refer to
ﬂow data. JointSignificance variables:CapitalStocktt−1 and CapitalFlows ∗ CapitalStockt−1 the CapitalFlows variable
varying in each column accordingly. JointSignificance1 variables: CapitalStocktt−1 and FDILiabilities∗CapitalStockt−1,
EquityLiabilities∗CapitalStockt−1, DebtLiabilities∗CapitalStockt−1; JointSignificance2 variables: CapitalStocktt−1 and
FDILiabilities∗CapitalStockt−1; JointSignificance3 variables: CapitalStocktt−1 and EquityLiabilities∗CapitalStockt−1;
JointSignificance4 variables: CapitalStocktt−1 and DebtLiabilities ∗ CapitalStockt−1.




Table 5 - Robustness: Alternative Specification
(Dependent variable: Log of Total Investment to GDP)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CapitalStocktt−1 -0.754 -0.948 -1.333 -1.063 -1.476 -0.860
(1.116) (1.125) (1.243) (1.084) (1.150) (1.192)
TotalLiabilities 0.046***
(0.016)
















DebtLiabilities ∗ CapitalStockt−1 0.015 -0.005
(0.042) (0.040)
Human Capital 0.220 0.254 0.176 0.202 0.087 0.256
(0.542) (0.520) (0.522) (0.536) (0.575) (0.527)
Business Environment -0.491 -0.711 -0.539 -0.583 -0.301 -0.729
(0.691) (0.644) (0.664) (0.572) (0.579) (0.653)
Openness 0.435 0.549 0.468 0.571 0.494 0.507
(0.327) (0.358) (0.362) (0.397) (0.388) (0.336)
Credit to GDP 0.039 0.043 0.162 0.003 0.095 0.063
(0.154) (0.157) (0.174) (0.154) (0.160) (0.156)
Stock Market to GDP 0.311** 0.247* 0.235* 0.250* 0.219 0.239*
(0.136) (0.144) (0.138) (0.146) (0.145) (0.141)
Inﬂation volatility -0.375*** -0.441*** -0.371*** -0.435*** -0.360*** -0.436***
(0.118) (0.103) (0.113) (0.107) (0.111) (0.103)
Multiple Exchange Rates 0.317 0.295 0.311 0.236 0.233 0.304
(0.192) (0.202) (0.216) (0.206) (0.205) (0.217)
Current Account Restrictions -0.473* -0.302 -0.323 -0.405 -0.469* -0.301
(0.244) (0.216) (0.204) (0.243) (0.236) (0.234)
Capital Account Restrictions 0.181 0.016 0.194 0.059 0.232 0.010
(0.204) (0.193) (0.292) (0.204) (0.249) (0.204)
Surrender of Export Proceeds -0.153 -0.011 -0.210 -0.042 -0.213 -0.006
(0.257) (0.266) (0.326) (0.256) (0.288) (0.290)
Observations 118 118 118 116 118 116
Groups 40 40 40 40 40 40
R2within 0.5347 0.5446 0.5220 0.5225 0.4971 0.5496





Note:Standard errors in parenthesis.* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level; ** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level;*** Signiﬁcance at
the 1% level. Time dummies are included in all speciﬁcations. All regressors are expressed in logs, except the capital
controls and the capital ﬂows. Dynamic System-GMM estimation with “collapsed” instruments (see text for further ex-
planation).AR1: Arellano-Bond test for ﬁrst order serial autocorrelation; AR2: Arellano-Bond test for second order serial
autocorrelation; Hansen: test for overidentifying restrictions. Total, Private, FDI, Equity and Debt Liabilities refer to
ﬂow data. JointSignificance variables:CapitalStocktt−1 and CapitalFlows ∗ CapitalStockt−1 the CapitalFlows variable
varying in each column accordingly. JointSignificance1 variables: CapitalStocktt−1 and FDILiabilities∗CapitalStockt−1,
EquityLiabilities∗CapitalStockt−1, DebtLiabilities∗CapitalStockt−1; JointSignificance2 variables: CapitalStocktt−1 and
FDILiabilities∗CapitalStockt−1; JointSignificance3 variables: CapitalStocktt−1 and EquityLiabilities∗CapitalStockt−1;
JointSignificance4 variables: CapitalStocktt−1 and DebtLiabilities ∗ CapitalStockt−1.




Table 6 - The Relevance of the Instrument Set
(Dependent variable: CapitalFlows to GDP)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Foreign Foreign FDI Foreign Foreign
Liabilities Private Equity Debt
CapitalFlows Weighted Average of Flows 499.294*** 690.706*** 260.535 782.257*** 383.038***
to the Region (141.855) (218.224) (175.529) (213.110) (131.644)
Share of CapitalFlows Available to High Income, 41.742** 5.388* 5.219** 3.776** 31.054***
Emerging or Developing (15.893) (2.980) (2.424) (1.778) (11.164)
Lagged CapitalFlows 0.096*** -0.116 -0.078 0.416 0.092***
(0.010) (0.246) (0.097) (0.995) (0.008)
Observations 136 132 136 132 136
Groups 34 34 34 34 34
R2 0.2137 0.3969 0.2854 0.2813 0.1784
Note:Standard errors in parenthesis.* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level; ** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level;*** Signiﬁcance at the
1% level. Time dummies and country ﬁxed-eﬀect are included in all speciﬁcations. CapitalFlows refers to total liabilities,
private, FDI, portfolio or equity inﬂows accordingly.




Table 7 - IV Results: Two Stage Least Square Estimation
(Dependent variable: Log of Total Investment to GDP)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CapitalStocktt−1 -0.185 0.199 -1.081 -0.573 -1.118 -0.083
(0.662) (1.035) (0.910) (0.982) (0.829) (0.753)
TotalLiabilities 0.073**
(0.036)




















Partial R2 0.446 0.117 0.168 0.118 0.687
F-test 37.41 1.88 3.08 8.32 110.88
CapitalFlows*CapitalStockt−1
Partial R2 0.295 0.068 0.110 0.099 0.512
F-test 29.09 0.95 6.33 3.81 47.84
Overidentiﬁcation 0.262 0.389 0.353 0.349 0.224 0.6255





Countries 34 34 34 34 34 34
Observations 103 103 103 103 103 101
Note:Standard errors in parenthesis.* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level; ** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level;*** Signiﬁcance at
the 1% level. Time dummies are included in all speciﬁcations. All regressions include the steady state capital deter-
minants: human capital, business environment, openness, credit to GDP, stock market to GDP, inﬂation volatility and
restrictions to capital mobility. Total, Private, FDI, Equity and Debt Liabilities refer to ﬂow data. The complete set of exter-
nal instruments is: CapitalFlowt−1,CapitalFlow ∗ CapitalStockt−1t−1, CapitalFlowsWeightedAverageofFlowstoRegion,
CapitalFlowsWeightedAverageofFlowstoRegion ∗ CapitalStockt−1, Share of Capital Flows Available to High In-
come, Emerging or Developing. JointSignificance variables:CapitalStocktt−1 and CapitalFlows ∗ CapitalStockt−1
the CapitalFlows variable varying in each column accordingly. JointSignificance1 variables: CapitalStocktt−1
and FDILiabilities ∗ CapitalStockt−1, EquityLiabilities ∗ CapitalStockt−1, DebtLiabilities ∗ CapitalStockt−1;
JointSignificance2 variables: CapitalStocktt−1 and FDILiabilities ∗ CapitalStockt−1; JointSignificance3 vari-
ables: CapitalStocktt−1 and EquityLiabilities ∗ CapitalStockt−1; JointSignificance4 variables: CapitalStocktt−1 and
DebtLiabilities ∗ CapitalStockt−1.




Table 8 - IV Results: Limited Information Maximum Likelihood
(Dependent variable: Log of Total Investment to GDP)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CapitalStocktt−1 -0.015 0.785 -0.841 -0.147 -1.028 0.156
(0.763) (1.803) (1.072) (1.745) (0.834) (1.043)
TotalLiabilities 0.082*
(0.047)
















DebtLiabilities ∗ CapitalStockt−1 -0.076 -0.036
(0.099) (0.149)
WeakIdentiﬁcation 6.107 0.641 4.931 0.437 6.564
(Stock-Yogo critical value=4.32)
Overidentiﬁcation 0.28 0.5848 0.3767 0.4391 0.2175 0.7187





Countries 34 34 34 34 34 34
Observations 103 103 103 103 103 101
Note:Standard errors in parenthesis.* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level; ** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level;*** Signiﬁcance at
the 1% level. Time dummies are included in all speciﬁcations. All regressions include the steady state capital deter-
minants: human capital, business environment, openness, credit to GDP, stock market to GDP, inﬂation volatility and
restrictions to capital mobility. Total, Private, FDI, Equity and Debt Liabilities refer to ﬂow data. The complete set of exter-
nal instruments is: CapitalFlowt−1,CapitalFlow ∗ CapitalStockt−1t−1, CapitalFlowsWeightedAverageofFlowstoRegion,
CapitalFlowsWeightedAverageofFlowstoRegion ∗ CapitalStockt−1, Share of Capital Flows Available to High In-
come, Emerging or Developing. JointSignificance variables:CapitalStocktt−1 and CapitalFlows ∗ CapitalStockt−1
the CapitalFlows variable varying in each column accordingly. JointSignificance1 variables: CapitalStocktt−1
and FDILiabilities ∗ CapitalStockt−1, EquityLiabilities ∗ CapitalStockt−1, DebtLiabilities ∗ CapitalStockt−1;
JointSignificance2 variables: CapitalStocktt−1 and FDILiabilities ∗ CapitalStockt−1; JointSignificance3 vari-
ables: CapitalStocktt−1 and EquityLiabilities ∗ CapitalStockt−1; JointSignificance4 variables: CapitalStocktt−1 and
DebtLiabilities ∗ CapitalStockt−1.




Table 9 - Determinants of International Capital Flows: Dynamic Panel Estimation
(Dependent variable: Log of the stock of foreign liabilities to GDP)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Foreign Foreign Foreign Foreign FDI
Liabilities Debt Private Equity
Lagged Dependent Variable(1−γF) 0.558*** 0.461*** 0.647*** 0.523** 0.722***
(0.196) (0.134) (0.133) (0.254) (0.141)
Human Capital 0.645** 0.672 0.788** -1.072 0.661**
(0.320) (0.522) (0.352) (2.457) (0.276)
Business Environment 0.195 -0.324 0.187 -4.917 0.593
(0.813) (0.606) (0.710) (3.689) (0.634)
Openness 0.286 0.426 0.241 -0.286 0.487*
(0.222) (0.479) (0.223) (0.774) (0.273)
Credit to GDP 0.155 0.208 -0.501*** -1.391** -0.479***
(0.263) (0.264) (0.157) (0.606) (0.170)
Stock Market to GDP 0.010 -0.033 0.164* 1.359*** 0.062
(0.074) (0.112) (0.089) (0.493) (0.095)
Inﬂation volatility 0.076 0.059 -0.169** -0.689 -0.052
(0.074) (0.120) (0.069) (0.703) (0.070)
Multiple Exchange Rates 0.097 0.066 -0.243 -3.941 -0.201
(0.191) (0.172) (0.183) (2.757) (0.195)
Current Account Restrictions 0.537** 0.638*** 0.220 -1.034 0.235
(0.212) (0.204) (0.241) (1.279) (0.413)
Surrender of Export Proceeds 0.449** 0.348* 0.374** -0.447 0.179
(0.208) (0.191) (0.167) (1.052) (0.164)
Capital Account Restrictions -0.640*** -0.509** -0.210 -0.154 -0.063
(0.186) (0.234) (0.349) (1.269) (0.160)
Observations 122 122 119 119 122
Groups 41 41 41 41 41
AR1 0.038 0.044 0.058 0.087 0.038
AR2 0.37 0.174 0.232 0.37 0.931
Hansen 0.576 0.887 0.742 0.715 0.887
Note:Standard errors in parenthesis.* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level; ** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level;***
Signiﬁcance at the 1% level. Time dummies are included in all speciﬁcations. All regressors are expressed
in logs, except the capital controls. Dynamic System-GMM estimation with “collapsed” instruments
(see text for further explanation).AR1: Arellano-Bond test for ﬁrst order serial autocorrelation; AR2:
Arellano-Bond test for second order serial autocorrelation; Hansen: test for overidentifying restrictions.




Table 10 - Robustness Checks (1): Fixed Effects Estimation
(Dependent variable: Log of the stock of foreign liabilities to GDP)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Foreign Foreign Foreign Foreign FDI
Liabilities Debt Private Equity
Lagged Dependent Variable(1−γF) 0.377*** 0.262*** 0.529*** 0.062 0.453***
(0.083) (0.076) (0.095) (0.125) (0.072)
Human Capital -0.020 -0.158 0.311* 2.595** 0.384**
(0.160) (0.281) (0.184) (1.280) (0.160)
Business Environment -0.634** -0.649** -0.177 -1.470 -0.047
(0.238) (0.285) (0.259) (2.548) (0.283)
Openness 0.153 0.148 -0.104 -1.473 0.135
(0.138) (0.141) (0.121) (0.952) (0.148)
Credit to GDP 0.123 0.217** -0.457*** 0.646 -0.286***
(0.073) (0.096) (0.097) (0.688) (0.092)
Stock Market to GDP 0.001 -0.020 0.187*** 0.741* 0.018
(0.048) (0.049) (0.060) (0.415) (0.074)
Inﬂation volatility 0.006 0.064 -0.130** 0.267 -0.057
(0.043) (0.052) (0.053) (0.271) (0.049)
Multiple Exchange Rates -0.057 0.038 -0.217*** -1.108* -0.247**
(0.092) (0.092) (0.057) (0.638) (0.099)
Current Account Restrictions 0.513*** 0.560*** 0.347** -0.161 0.292**
(0.108) (0.110) (0.130) (0.807) (0.114)
Surrender of Export Proceeds 0.158 0.097 0.265* -0.366 0.134
(0.103) (0.090) (0.148) (0.601) (0.106)
Capital Account Restrictions -0.314*** -0.286*** -0.152 -0.332 -0.099
(0.114) (0.100) (0.148) (0.500) (0.120)
Observations 122 122 120 122 120
Groups 41 41 41 41 41
R2-within 0.7933 0.6522 0.9137 0.7513 0.8651
Note:Standard errors in parenthesis.* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level; ** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level;***
Signiﬁcance at the 1% level. Time dummies are included in all speciﬁcations. All regressors are expressed
in logs, except the capital controls.




Table 11 - Robustness Checks (2): Alternative Variable Definition
(Dependent variable: Log of the stock of foreign liabilities to GDP)













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.487*** 0.700*** 0.506** 0.678*** 0.672*** 0.707***
(0.146) (0.157) (0.193) (0.122) (0.179) (0.132)
Human Capital 0.635** 0.634** 0.697* 0.880** 0.471** 1.089**
(0.285) (0.265) (0.363) (0.396) (0.209) (0.527)
Business Environment -0.084 -0.189 -0.038 -0.060 0.312 -0.416
(0.862) (0.503) (0.426) (0.339) (0.651) (0.774)
Openness 0.285 0.348 0.239 0.046 0.181 0.224
(0.188) (0.404) (0.403) (0.396) (0.201) (0.338)
Credit to GDP 0.050 -0.447** 0.082 -0.561* 0.010 -0.370***
(0.221) (0.190) (0.172) (0.284) (0.160) (0.134)
Stock Market to GDP 0.034 0.156* -0.134 0.232** -0.055 0.081
(0.064) (0.081) (0.142) (0.091) (0.098) (0.109)
Inﬂation volatility 0.040 -0.158* -0.080 -0.184 -0.100 -0.110
(0.069) (0.083) (0.112) (0.134) (0.112) (0.096)
Multiple Exchange Rates -0.001 -0.373 -0.038 -0.152
(0.124) (0.325) (0.151) (0.262)
Current Account Restrictions 0.516** 0.383 0.269 0.141
(0.241) (0.381) (0.354) (0.393)
Surrender of Export Proceeds 0.393** 0.221 0.304* 0.481**
(0.193) (0.207) (0.158) (0.212)
Capital Account Restrictions -0.574*** -0.239 -0.386* -0.401
(0.151) (0.461) (0.206) (0.438)
Capital Openness Index -0.102 -0.023
(0.078) (0.084)
Observations 122 119 122 119 122 119
Groups 41 41 41 41 41 41
AR1 0.037 0.089 0.026 0.087 0.037 0.089
AR2 0.263 0.304 0.253 0.198 0.332 0.464
Hansen 0.667 0.477 0.213 0.607 0.614 0.708
Note:Standard errors in parenthesis.* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level; ** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level;***
Signiﬁcance at the 1% level. Time dummies are included in all speciﬁcations. All regressors are expressed
in logs, except the capital controls. All the variables correspond to the variable deﬁnition of Table 3
except: in columns (1) and (2) the human capital stock variables is the average years of schooling in
the population 25 and over; in columns (3) and (4) the variable capturing institutional quality is an
index of legal structure and the security of property rights combining: judicial independence, impartial
courts, protection of intellectual property, integrity of the legal system and military interference in the
rule of law and the political process; ﬁnally, columns (5) and (6) use the Chin-Itto capital controls index.
Dynamic System-GMM estimation with “collapsed” instruments (see text for further explanation).AR1:
Arellano-Bond test for ﬁrst order serial autocorrelation; AR2: Arellano-Bond test for second order serial
autocorrelation; Hansen: test for overidentifying restrictions.




Table 12 - Static vs Dynamic Approach: Pooled OLS Results
(Dependent variable: Flow of foreign liabilities to GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Foreign Foreign Foreign Foreign FDI
Liabilities Debt Private Equity
Human Capital 0.830 0.139 0.622 0.546 0.153
(2.586) (1.790) (1.147) (0.879) (0.480)
Business Environment 4.235 2.514 2.006 -0.078 1.977
(7.186) (4.936) (3.182) (2.318) (1.493)
Openness 6.726* 3.633* 3.062** 1.477 1.585***
(3.493) (2.115) (1.454) (1.178) (0.371)
Credit to GDP -1.433 0.020 -1.376 -0.435 -0.935*
(1.651) (1.212) (1.253) (1.012) (0.542)
Stock Market to GDP 0.989 -0.190 1.138** 0.779* 0.360
(1.022) (0.767) (0.499) (0.420) (0.226)
Inﬂation volatility -1.659* -0.718 -0.843 -0.875 0.024
(0.956) (0.682) (0.755) (0.659) (0.323)
Multiple Exchange Rates -1.654 -1.103 -0.580 0.332 -0.931
(2.007) (1.294) (1.029) (0.618) (0.605)
Current Account Restrictions 1.590 1.085 0.487 0.676 -0.123
(2.105) (1.359) (1.145) (0.853) (0.476)
Surrender of Export Proceeds -0.589 -1.812 1.211 0.210 1.013**
(1.794) (1.123) (0.945) (0.760) (0.397)
Capital Account Restrictions -6.171* -2.388 -3.717*** -1.483* -2.243***
(2.818) (2.112) (1.045) (0.830) (0.484)
Observations 122 122 120 120 122
R2 0.2609 0.1853 0.3428 0.2159 0.4237
Note:Standard errors in parenthesis.* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level; ** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level;***
Signiﬁcance at the 1% level. Time dummies are included in all speciﬁcations. All regressors are expressed
in logs, except the capital controls.




Table 13 - Static vs Dynamic Approach: Fixed Effects Results
(Dependent variable: Flow of foreign liabilities to GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Foreign Foreign Foreign Foreign FDI
Liabilities Debt Private Equity
Human Capital 2.529 3.627 -0.752 -1.132 0.059
(3.492) (3.720) (2.945) (2.284) (0.545)
Business Environment -13.185*** -6.388 -6.568 -5.192 -0.455
(4.758) (4.259) (4.353) (3.681) (0.740)
Openness 6.205** 3.506 2.725* 0.335 0.802**
(2.908) (2.887) (1.422) (1.070) (0.363)
Credit to GDP -4.226* 0.343 -4.471** -2.473 -1.283***
(2.166) (1.376) (2.140) (2.218) (0.286)
Stock Market to GDP 2.354 1.005 1.381 1.173 0.181
(1.728) (1.516) (1.122) (1.011) (0.188)
Inﬂation volatility -3.325*** -0.566 -2.630** -2.044 -0.266**
(1.012) (0.697) (1.012) (1.038) (0.104)
Multiple Exchange Rates -4.282** -2.138 -2.237* 0.147* -1.046***
(1.828) (1.321) (1.242) (0.913) (0.325)
Current Account Restrictions 2.713 1.481 1.127 1.957 0.036
(1.774) (1.441) (1.559) (1.191) (0.423)
Surrender of Export Proceeds 4.149 -0.737 4.681* 3.733 0.042
(2.471) (1.694) (2.589) (2.560) (0.265)
Capital Account Restrictions -6.005** -1.056 -4.725* -3.151 0.030
(2.608) (1.720) (2.549) (2.252) (0.291)
Observations 122 122 120 122 120
Groups 41 41 41 41 41
R2-within 0.3402 0.3217 0.4799 0.3409 0.6373
Note:Standard errors in parenthesis.* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level; ** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level;***
Signiﬁcance at the 1% level. Time dummies are included in all speciﬁcations. All regressors are expressed
in logs, except the capital controls.
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FDI Spillovers and the Role of Local Financial Markets:
Evidence from Mexico
Abstract. This paper presents new microeconomic evidence on the
link between ﬁnancial sector development, ﬁnancial globalization and
productivity. Using data of Mexican manufacturing ﬁrms operating in
1991, 1999 and 2001 it is found that in general, larger ﬁrms beneﬁt
from FDI in their same region of activity. However, domestic ﬁrms only
enjoy productivity increases from FDI if they are relatively large and
located in ﬁnancially developed regions. All the ﬁndings are robust to
instrumenting for ﬁnancial development using historical conditions.
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In recent years a literature on the beneﬁts and costs of ﬁnancial globalization
for developing countries has proliferated. In a recent review of the literature, Kose,
Prasad, Rogoﬀ and Wei (2006) suggest four sets of structural and policy-related
country features that seem to determine whether countries will be able to bene-
ﬁt from ﬁnancial globalization: ﬁnancial sector development, overall institutional
quality, macroeconomic policy framework and trade integration. In particular, the
ﬁnancial sector development is found not only to enhance the growth prospects but
also reduce vulnerability to crises through direct and indirect channels. Based on
country level studies there is a consensus on the relevance of domestic ﬁnancial fac-
tors if countries are to beneﬁt from ﬁnancial globalization. However, there is limited
microeconomic evidence that supports this hypothesis. This paper ﬁlls the gap be-
tween macroeconomic and microeconomic evidence. It studies the eﬀects of foreign
direct investment (FDI) on ﬁrm level productivity and shows that in general, larger
ﬁrms beneﬁt from foreign companies operating in their same region. In contrast,
domestic ﬁrms only enjoy higher productivity if they are relatively large and located
in well ﬁnancially developed regions.
The theoretical beneﬁts from FDI are based on the assumption that FDI not
only brings in physical capital and employment opportunities but foreign aﬃliates
posses a set of non-tangible assets, such as technological know-how, management
skills and production techniques that confer them higher productivity than their
domestic counterparts. Most of the relevance of FDI for the domestic economy relies
on the possibility that domestic ﬁrms, by being exposed to the new products and
production techniques brought in by the multinational company (MNC), manage to
improve their own performance as well. However, despite the extensive empirical
literature on FDI spillovers, studies focusing on developing and emerging countries
fail to ﬁnd any evidence of positive externalities derived from foreign presence in
their same sector or region of activity1.
1The following studies either fail to ﬁnd an eﬀect or hint to the existence of negative spillovers:
Haddad and Harrison (1993) on Morocco, Aitken and Harrison (1999) on Venezuela, Djankov and
Hoekman (2000) on Czec Republic and Konings (2001) on Bulgaria, Romania and Poland. More
encouraging results have been found for ﬁrms operating in developed countries: Haskel, Pereira
and Slaughter (2007) for the UK or Keller and Yeaple (2003) for the US.




Given the limited evidence on horizontal or regional FDI spillovers, I explore
the role of local ﬁnancial markets. In particular, this paper concentrates on the
hypothesis that even if domestic ﬁrms would like to undertake investments to adopt
new technologies brought in by foreign investors, they may lack access to the ﬁnancial
resources necessary to do so. Alfaro, Chanda, Kalemli-Ozcan and Sayek (2004)
study this dimension of host country conditions at a macro level. Using cross-
country data from 1975 to 1995 they show that the contribution of FDI to economic
growth is ambiguous. However, countries with well-developed ﬁnancial markets gain
signiﬁcantly from FDI. They suggest the following ways in which ﬁnancial markets
matter for FDI spillovers. First, in order to take advantage of new knowledge,
domestic ﬁrms will need to undertake investments that allow them to reorganize
their structure or upgrade their technology. Although some local ﬁrms will be able
to ﬁnance these investments with internal funds, others will need external resources
that in most cases are conﬁned to domestic sources. Second, workers of foreign
ﬁrms can learn the insights of the business from the MNC and if ﬁnancial markets
are well developed decide to set up their own business fostering the appearance
of new entrepreneurs. Finally, well functioning ﬁnancial markets can enhance the
potential for FDI to create backward linkages. If foreign ﬁrms acquire most of their
supplies in the domestic market, access to external ﬁnance can beneﬁt those ﬁrms
that were already producing inputs in the industry but also it can encourage the
creation of new ﬁrms. More recently, Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008) ﬁnd for a
sample of 319 Czech ﬁrms supplying 88 MNCs operating in the Czech Republic
that domestic ﬁrms supplying MNCs are less credit constrained than non-suppliers.
Moreover, they argue that this results from less constrained ﬁrms self-selecting into
becoming MNC suppliers rather than the beneﬁts being derived from the supplying
relationship.
I focus on the experience of Mexico during the 1990s. Although Mexico had
started its liberalization process before the 1994 North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA), the agreement was particularly successful in stimulating large FDI
inﬂows especially into the manufacturing sector. FDI inﬂows in Mexico increased
from a yearly average of $4.5 billion between 1988 and 1993 to a yearly average of
$13 billion between 1994 and 2002, and about half of the FDI ﬂowed into manufac-
turing. At the same time, there were two simultaneous forces that made access to




credit become more diﬃcult especially for small and medium size companies. First,
in order to attract FDI the government prioritized the control of inﬂation which
translated into an overvalued exchange rate and high interest rates2. Second, the
chronical ineﬃciency of the domestic banking system in allocating credit created
shortages of credit for domestic ﬁrms (Gallagher and Zarsky (2004)). I will show
that these diﬃculties in accessing credit vary widely across Mexican states due to
legal and historical reasons.
I use ﬁrm level data from three cross-section surveys carried out by the Mexican
national statistical oﬃce in 1992, 1999 and 2001. The fact that the surveys include
micro and small establishments helps determining the role of size in FDI spillovers.
Once, it has been established that it is larger ﬁrms that beneﬁt from FDI, a small
subsample of mainly medium and large ﬁrms that could be linked across surveys, is
used to conﬁrm that the main results are robust to controlling for ﬁrm speciﬁc eﬀects.
However, it is important to note that this subsample refers mainly to larger ﬁrms and
therefore, the focus on the cross-section results is crucial in order to determine the
importance of size. On the methodological side, to obtain ﬁrm level estimates of total
factor productivity, the paper follows the literature on the structural identiﬁcation
of production functions, using a new approach that improves upon the Levinsohn
and Petrin (2003) methodology. Finally, the endogeneity of ﬁnancial development
is addressed using historical instruments. I argue that there are diﬀerences in the
legal framework and historical diﬀerences across the Mexican states that can explain
current disparities in the regional banking sector development. In particular, Laeven
and Woodruﬀ (2008) show that the quality of legal institutions is lower in states
where the indigenous population was more prevalent one hundred years ago. In
addition, I argue that the Mexican government preferential credit program to small
and medium ﬁrms from 1956 to 1989 shaped current regional diﬀerences in access
to credit.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the esti-
mation strategy. From the description of the estimation strategy it would be clear
that in order to conduct the analysis ﬁrm level TFP estimates and an indicator
of local ﬁnancial development are required. Section 3 deals with the productivity
estimation technique and results while Section 4 explains the construction of the
2Interest rates averaged 22% between 1994 and 2002.
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ﬁnancial development index and the eﬀect of a well-developed ﬁnancial system on
productivity. Finally, Section 5 reports the results from the spillover eﬀects and the
role of local credit markets and Section 6 concludes.
2.2. Data and Estimation Strategy
2.2.1. Data. The data use in this study come from the Encuesta Nacional
de Empleo, Salarios, Tecnologia y Capacitacion (ENESTyC) [National Survey of
Employment, Wages, Technology and Training], which is a survey carried out by the
Mexican National Statistical Oﬃce (INEGI). The analysis focuses on three waves of
the survey, implemented in 1992, 1999 and 2001, which were designed as independent
cross-sections.
The following characteristics make the ENESTyC survey ideal for the purposes
of this study3. First, it is possible to identify the sector and region in which ﬁrms
operate. There are 52 ramas (branches) of activity4 and 32 regions corresponding to
the diﬀerent Mexican federal states. Second, the surveys do not only include medium
and large ﬁrms but extend the analysis to micro and small establishments which are
crucial to detect ﬁnancial diﬃculties. According to the INEGI classiﬁcation micro
establishments are those with less than 16 employees; small establishments have
between 16 and 100 employees; medium establishments are those that have between
100 and 250 employees and ﬁnally, large establishments report more than 250 em-
ployees5. Panel A of Table 1 presents data on the ﬁnal number of ﬁrms according to
their size and year of survey. Third, maquiladora plants6 are included in the surveys
reﬂecting their rising importance in Mexico. According to aggregate INEGI data on
employment in exporting maquiladora sectors, between 1991 and 2000 maquiladora
employment grew 197 percent. Correspondingly, in the ENESTyC dataset the per-
centage of employment in maquila plants increased by 230 percent during the same
3See Appendix I for a detailed description of the data and cleaning procedure.
4The industrial classiﬁcation is based on the Clasiﬁcacion Mexicana de Actividades y Productos
(CMAP) [Mexican Classiﬁcation of Activities and Products]. Industries are grouped in 6-digit
industries called clases (classes), 4-digit industries called ramas (branches), and 2-digit industries
called divisiones (divisions).
5The survey is conducted at the establishment level. However, through out the analysis the
words establishment, ﬁrm and plant will be used indistinctively.
6Maquiladora or maquila plants are assembly plants that participate in a Mexican government
export promotion program.




period. Finally, and most importantly, ﬁrms provide detailed information about
their ownership structure in each survey.
Panel B in Table 1 provides some basic information on foreign ownership. For-
eign ﬁrms are deﬁned as those whose capital share owned by foreign investors is at
least 10 percent7. On average, the share of foreign investors in total manufacturing
establishments remains almost unchanged over time however; the fraction of manu-
facturing output accounted for by foreign aﬃliates grew from 39% in 1991 to 52%
in 2000.
Table 2A shows the industrial variation in foreign employment and output share.
Similarly, Table 2B reports the regional variation. According to Table 2A, foreign
investors account for most of the production and employment in sectors like Textiles,
Chemicals and Machinery and Equipment. In addition, over time, Textiles and Non
Metallic Minerals industries have experienced the greatest increase. With respect to
the regional variation, Table 2B shows that the contribution of foreign investment
to employment and output is greater in the border states, the Federal District and
its adjacent states and in the north-center states.
The data have two important limitations. First, the share of micro establish-
ments grew by more than 15 percentage points between the 1992 and 2001 surveys
(Panel A in Table 1). This is the result of an increasing interest on the part of the
Mexican authorities to study the behavior of micro establishments. However, this
change in the sample composition could lead to erroneous conclusions and therefore,
it seemed convenient to exclude micro establishments from the general analysis8.
Second, the sample was designed to be representative at the sectoral level. How-
ever, the wide coverage of the survey and the fact that large and medium ﬁrms were
included with certainty make it possible to focus on regional aspects. A potential
concern may arise if micro and small ﬁrms were drawn systematically from some
particular regions. In order to rule out this possibility, I compared the contribution
of sampled ﬁrms in each region to total value added with aggregate INEGI data on
the share of regional GDP in total GDP and found no signiﬁcant diﬀerences.
7Results are robust to alternative percentage thresholds (i.e. 30 percent and 50 percent)
which in turn suggests limited eﬀects of the extent of foreign ownership. See section 5.4. for
a complementary note to this comment.
8Micro establishments will only be considered in Section 4 when constructing the measure of
regional ﬁnancial development. In this case, only data from the 1999 and 2001 surveys is used and
as shown in Panel A of Table 1, these are comparable in terms of sample composition.
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2.2.2. Estimation Strategy. To examine the relationship between the pro-
ductivity of domestic ﬁrms and FDI in their same sector/region of activity the stan-
dard approach followed in other studies is to estimate an equation of the following
form:
lnTFPijrt = α + β1Spilloverψt + αt + αr + αj + εijrt (2.1)
where TFPijrt stands for the total factor productivity of ﬁrm i operating in sector
j and region r at time t, Spillover is a variable that proxies the extent of foreign
presence at time t in region r if ψ = r or in sector j if ψ = j. αt, αr and αj are time,
regional and sector-speciﬁc controls, respectively. The convention is to deﬁne the
spillover variable as the ratio of foreign ﬁrms’ sales over total sales in industry j or
region r9. In addition, following Javorcik (2004) it is possible to take into account
the share of foreign equity so that the ﬁnal proxy for spillovers is:
Spilloverψt =
P
i∀iψ ForeignShareit ∗ Yit P
i∀iψ Yit
(2.2)
where ForeignShare represents the share of capital owned by foreign investors, ψ
can represent either sector or region and Yit is deﬂated output by ﬁrm i at time
t. There is no theoretical consensus on how broadly regional and sectoral spillovers
should be deﬁned. I distinguish between 32 regions that correspond to the 31 Mexi-
can federal states and the Federal District to compute regional spillovers. Regarding
sectoral spillovers, I focus on the 4-digit CMAP industry classiﬁcation and there-
fore, consider 52 branches of activity. Unfortunately, measures of vertical spillovers10
could not be computed since the most recent Input-Output table is dated in 1980
while the period of analysis refers to the 90s. However, as we will see there is strong
evidence suggesting the existence of regional FDI spillovers and considering that
most of the supplier/distributor contacts are local in scope, it is most probable that
these regional spillovers in fact take place through backward and forward linkages.
Although, this is an open question given the impossibility of distinguishing between
horizontal and vertical spillovers. Finally, in line with theories underlying the role
of dynamics in technology diﬀusion (see Kugler (2006) for a particular application
9Similarly one can use employment as weights (see Aitken and Harrison (1999)).
10Vertical spillovers are nter-industry spillovers that usually take the form of backward linkages
or contacts between clients and suppliers. Evidence of FDI spillovers through backward linkages
has been found in Blalock (2001) for Indonesia, Javorcik (2004) for Lithuania and Kugler (2006)
for Colombia.




to FDI spillovers) it would have been more suitable to use lagged values of sectoral
and regional spillovers rather than testing the contemporaneous eﬀect. However, the
cross-section nature of the ENESTyC survey made this exercise impossible. Never-
theless, the empirical literature does ﬁnd a contemporaneous eﬀect and if anything,
using lagged values translates in larger estimates and higher statistical signiﬁcance.
Therefore, estimates from using current values of FDI spillovers are a lower bound
to the greater positive eﬀects that could take place over time.
As mentioned in the introduction, the traditional approach in search for hori-
zontal or regional spillovers has not been very successful in ﬁnding positive eﬀects
from MNC presence. This paper concentrates on the role of ﬁnancial markets as a
channel for FDI spillovers. In particular, the following equation will be estimated:
lnTFPijrt = α+β1Spilloverψt+β2(Spilloverψt∗FinDevr)+αt+αr+αj+uijrt
(2.3)
where FinDev is a measure of ﬁnancial development at the state level11. Since the
speciﬁcation controls for regional and industry speciﬁc eﬀects the only eﬀects that
are identiﬁed are those relative to variables that vary over time. Therefore, although
the direct eﬀect of ﬁnancial development on productivity cannot be identiﬁed, fol-
lowing Rajan and Zingales (1998) estimation strategy, it is still possible to estimate
the eﬀect of FDI conditional on diﬀerent regional levels of ﬁnancial development.
Regional dummies αr would capture overall region speciﬁc characteristics including
diﬀerences in the ﬁnancial system. In theory, we would expect β2 to be positive and
signiﬁcant so that controlling for sectoral/regional FDI, domestic ﬁrms located in
states characterized by easier access to external funds will beneﬁt more from MNC
presence.
2.3. Productivity Estimation
2.3.1. Theoretical Background. Firm-level productivity estimates are ob-
tained by estimating a Cobb-Douglas production function:
yit = βllit + βmmit + βkkit + ωit + uit (2.4)
11See Section 4 for a description of how this variable is constructed.
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where yit, lit, mit and kit denote the logarithm of deﬂated output, labor, deﬂated
material inputs and deﬂated capital12, respectively. The ﬁrm speciﬁc error can be
decomposed into a term capturing ﬁrm speciﬁc productivity ωit and an additional
term that reﬂects measurement error or an unexpected productivity shock uit. We
are interested in estimating ωit. Given the characteristics of the ENESTyC survey
the main concern related to the estimation of ωit is simultaneity bias13. Productivity
is known by the ﬁrm but ignored by the econometrician, so if the ﬁrm knowing
its own productivity chooses inputs accordingly, OLS will deliver a bias estimate.
The direction of the bias will depend on the correlation between inputs and the
correlation of inputs and productivity. In general, if more productive ﬁrms tend to
hire more workers, buy more materials or invest more in capital, OLS may lead to
an upward bias of the input coeﬃcients. To control for the simultaneity bias I use a
version of the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) semiparametric estimator (LP hereafter)
developed by Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2006) (ACF hereafter) where I consider
a gross output production function rather than a value added production function14.
ACF propose to “give up” the estimation of βl in the ﬁrst stage of the LP
procedure and they formulate the following timing assumptions. First, as in the LP
procedure, kt is chosen at time t − 1 however, lit is assumed to be chosen at time
t − b (0 < b < 1) prior to the choice of mit at time t. In other words, labor is
considered a “less ﬂexible” input than materials which they argue is consistent with
ﬁrms needing time to train new workers or needing to give some period of notice
before ﬁring15. In addition, it is assumed that ωit evolves according to a ﬁrst order
12See Appendix I for a description of the variables and price deﬂators used. Note that including
separately skilled and unskilled labor was not possible due to lack of data referring to previous
years.
13Sample selection due to exit should not be a problem given the cross-section and random
selection nature of the survey. In addition, the “omitted price bias” derived from proxing physical
output by deﬂated sales using an industry price deﬂator should be mitigated. The proxy for output
used is not sales but the value of production priced at “factory” price. Moreover, Katayama, Lu
and Tybout (2003) show that traditional TFP estimates are highly correlated with their proposed
measure of TFP that accounts for imperfect competition. Finally, the ranking provided by the
estimated measures of productivity would still be valid as long as more productive ﬁrms charge
higher markups.
14See Ackerberg et al (2006) for a discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of output
versus value added production functions.
15Even in the context of high labor ﬂexibility it is reasonable to assume that labor is less variable
than material inputs.




Markov process between the subperiods t − 1, t − b and t so that:
p(ωit|Iit−b) = p(ωit|ωit−b) (2.5)
and
p(ωit−b|Iit−1) = p(ωit−b|ωit−1) (2.6)
where Iit−b is the information set at time t−b and It−1 is the information set at time
t − 1. Given these timing assumptions, the ﬁrm’s material input demand function
can be expressed as a function of lit
16:
mit = ft(ωit,kit,lit) (2.7)
were ft represents input prices and/or product market conditions that are allowed
to vary over time but not across ﬁrms. Inverting this function it is possible to
obtain an expression for ωit, that substituted in the production function generates
the following ﬁrst stage equation:
yit = βkkit + βllit + βmmit + f
−1
t (mit,kit,lit) + it (2.8)
Although βl, βk and βm are not identiﬁed at this stage it is possible to recover
an estimate of the composite term ˆ Φit,
ˆ Φit(mit,kit,lit) = βkkit + βllit + βmmit + f
−1
t (mit,kit,lit)
Equation (9) is estimated as a partially linear model including a third order
polynomial in capital, labor, materials and the corresponding cross products, to
approximate the unknown functional form of f
−1
t and obtain as estimates of ˆ Φit the
predicted residuals of this regression.
Given that no coeﬃcient is identiﬁed in the ﬁrst stage three independent moment
conditions are required for identiﬁcation in the second stage. From the ﬁrst order
Markov assumption on the evolution of productivity is it the case that
ωit = E[ωit|Iit−1] + ξit = E[ωit|ωit−1] + ξit (2.9)
which simply decomposes ωit into its conditional expectation at time t−1, E[ωit|Iit−1]
and a deviation from that expectation, ξit, which is often referred to as the “innova-
tion” component of ωit. Since by assumption, capital was determined at time t − 1
16See Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) for a description of the conditions under which the material
input demand function is a strictly increasing function of current productivity ωit.
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this implies that ξit is orthogonal to kit, which is the same moment condition that
LP uses to identify the capital coeﬃcient. Regarding the identiﬁcation of βm, as
mt−1 was decided at t − 1 and hence part of Iit−1, ξit should be uncorrelated with
mt−1. Finally, the identiﬁcation of βl is based on the observation that lagged labor
lit−1, was chosen at time t−b−1 and hence, it is in the information set Iit−1 which
is uncorrelated with ξit










] = 0 (2.10)
In practice, the implementation of these moment conditions is analogous to the




k) which in this case correspond to the OLS estimates from a
Coob-Douglas production function. I compute estimates of ωit as:
ˆ ωit = ˆ Φit − (β∗
l liy + β∗
mmit + β∗
kkit)
and regress non-parametrically ˆ ωit(βl,βm,βk) on ˆ ωit−1(βl,βm,βk) which implies
regressing ˆ ωit on a third order polynomial of ˆ ωit−1 and a constant term. Second, the
predicted residuals from this regression, ˆ ξit(βl,βm,βk), are used to form the sample




















 = 0 (2.11)
and use non-linear least squares to estimate the (ˆ βl, ˆ βm, ˆ βk) that minimize this sam-
ple analogue.
2.3.2. Productivity Results. The production function is estimated separately
for each industry 18. Table 3 reports the estimated coeﬃcients based on OLS, LP
and ACF. In general, all estimation strategies provide estimates that are highly
signiﬁcant for all input variables and for all 9 diﬀerent sectors. Although it is not
possible to establish precisely the direction of the OLS bias in a setting with more
than two inputs, comparing the OLS and the ACF results by sector reveals that
17Ackerberg et al (2006) propose to use wither contemporaneous labor or lagged labor as iden-
tifying conditions. In this case given the short time dimension of the data I opted for lagged labor
values.
18In order to have enough observations for the estimation I use the 2-digit sector classiﬁcation.




OLS tends to overestimate the coeﬃcient on the more ﬂexible inputs. Regarding
capital, there is only one sectors (36) where the ACF coeﬃcients are higher than
the corresponding OLS ones. As suggested in Ackerberg et al (2006) this result
corresponds to a case where labor is more “variable” than capital and as a result lit
is more correlated with ωit than kit. Comparing the ACF results to the LP results,
the most signiﬁcant ﬁnding as in Ackerberg et al (2006) is that the LP estimates of
the labor coeﬃcient are smaller than their ACF counterparts. This result hints the
possibility that the LP labor coeﬃcients from the ﬁrst stage might be downward
bias.
Finally, to obtain a measure of total factor productivity as the diﬀerence between
actual and predicted output19, I use the input coeﬃcients from the ACF estimation:
tfpit = yit − ˆ βllit − ˆ βmmit − ˆ βkkit (2.12)
Furthermore, following Pavnick (2002) I normalized the productivity estimate ob-
tained from equation (12) so as to obtain a measure that describes ﬁrm productivity
over time and ﬁrm’s relative position compared to a reference plant. The normal-
ization consists in subtracting to each plant’s productivity, the productivity of a
reference plant, which in this case is chosen to be a domestic plant with mean out-
put and mean input level in 198920:
tfpr = ¯ y89 − ˆ βl¯ l89 − ˆ βm ¯ m89 − ˆ βk¯ k89 (2.13)
where the bar denotes the mean in year 1989. Therefore, unless otherwise indicated,
the measure of total factor productivity used from now onwards corresponds to:
IndTFPit = tfpit − tfpr (2.14)
2.4. Financial Development
The ENESTyC survey contains very limited information regarding the easiness
with which ﬁrms access credit. Although, there is an extensive literature studying
19Rigorously, to obtain an accurate estimate of ωit one should substract an estimate of error
term uit. However, given that E(uit) = 0 this is generally ignored. Van Biesebroeck (2007)
proposes a way to purge the random noise from the productivity estimates obtained by the Olley
and Pakes (1996) procedure.
20The 1992 survey includes questions on the production process from 1989 to 1991.
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the interaction between ﬁnancial markets and economic growth across countries21
there are very few studies looking at within country diﬀerences in ﬁnancial devel-
opment22. One exception is Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004) that develop a
new indicator of the soundness of the local ﬁnancial system across diﬀerent Italian
provinces. Better developed ﬁnancial markets are deﬁned as those that grant indi-
viduals and ﬁrms easier access to external funds. Following their estimation strategy
I obtain a similar indicator for the various Mexican states.
2.4.1. Financial Development Indicator Methodology. The 1999 and 2001
surveys contain the following two questions:
1. “Mainly, which type of machinery and/or equipment did the establishment
acquire in order to carry out the production process?”
2. “In case the establishment did not acquire any machinery or equipment, what
was the main reason?”
Firms could choose among various options to answer question 2: (1) Because
they did not need it; (2) Lack of ﬁnancing; (3) Importing problems; (4) Trade union
opposition; (5) Other; (6) Do not know. I am interested in option (2) where ﬁrms
state that they did not invest in machinery and equipment because they lacked
ﬁnancial resources. Around seventy percent of the sampled ﬁrms did buy machinery
and equipment, of the 30% remaining that did not buy machinery, 32% (1,311
ﬁrms) did not acquire it because of lack of external funds. In order to estimate the
probability that a ﬁrm lacks access to external funds I consider a ﬁnal sample of
11,574 ﬁrms that either acquired machinery or wanted to buy machinery but were
prevented from doing so because of ﬁnancial problems. Table 4 reports summary
statistics of the distribution of ﬁrms across regions and the proportion of them that
state diﬃculties in accessing credit. The Southern states of Chiapas, Guerrero and
Oaxaca together with states from the Yucatan area like Tabasco and Campeche
are the ones with the highest proportion of ﬁrms reporting diﬃculties in accessing
credit. In addition, the availability of credit does not only vary across regions
but also across sectors. Table 5 shows the sectoral distribution of ﬁrms and the
percentage of them that report diﬃculties in ﬁnancing their investment projects.
21See King and Levine (1993), Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) and Levine, Loayza and Beck
(2000).
22Jayaratne and Strahan (1996); Dehejia and Lleras-Muney (2003); Guiso, Sapienza and Zin-
gales (2004); Bertrand, Schoar and Thesmar (2004); Cetorelli and Strahan (2006).




Sectors 35 (Chemicals), 37 (Basic metals), 38 (Machinery and Equipment) and 32
(Textiles) are in this order the ones with the lowest percentage of ﬁrms reporting
ﬁnancial problems.
Following Guiso et al (2004), I estimate a linear probability model of the like-
lihood a ﬁrm cannot buy machinery and equipment because of lack of ﬁnancial
resources. Controlling for ﬁrm characteristics and including regional dummies, it is
possible to obtain an indicator of how much more likely a ﬁrm is to have diﬃculties
in ﬁnancing machinery investment in one state compared to another. The measure
of ﬁnancial development will be the ranking provided by the coeﬃcients of the re-
gional dummies included in the estimation23. Note that the choice of a regional
ﬁnancial development indicator rather than directly using the answers to the credit
questions provided at the ﬁrm level is based on two issues. First, the credit questions
were only included in the 1999 and 2001 surveys which would prevent the use of
the 1992 survey24. Second, the subsample of credit constrained ﬁrms is as expected
mainly composed of micro establishments. In fact, of the 1,311 ﬁrms that report
some diﬃculty in ﬁnancing machinery and equipment, 62% correspond to micro es-
tablishments and 19% to small establishments, while medium and large ﬁrms only
represent a 13 and 6 percentage, respectively. Using a ﬁrm level measure of access to
credit would mean restricting the analysis to mainly micro and small establishments
which are later shown to be less likely to beneﬁt from MNCs’ activities. However,
the information reported by these ﬁrms is still a valid indicator of the cross-regional
variation in access to credit.
Table 6 reports the results from the linear probability model. As in Beck,
Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven and Maksimovic (2006), older and bigger ﬁrms are less
likely to have problems in accessing credit. Moreover, in the case of age there is an
additional non-linear eﬀect captured by the signiﬁcance and positive sign of Age2.
This result indicates that there is a threshold age level above which the probability
of having access to ﬁnance decreases. The diﬀerence with the Beck et al. (2006)
study is that foreign ownership is not a signiﬁcant determinant of access to external
funds. The export status of the ﬁrm and whether the ﬁrm belongs to a group or not
23The choice of a linear probability model was done for ease of interpretation but since the
object of interest is the ranking provided by the regional dummies, the same results were obtained
from an exponential model.
24See the last paragraph of the section for a discussion on the validity of the ﬁnancial develop-
ment indicator over time.
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both decrease the probability of being credit constrained. In addition to these ﬁrm-
speciﬁc characteristics, the estimation also controls for sector speciﬁc characteristics
that might make ﬁrms in particular sectors more prone to ﬁnancial constraints.
First, the estimation includes the share of total credit in output by sector. This
variable turns out to signiﬁcantly decrease the probability of experiencing borrow-
ing diﬃculties. Second, to further control for sectoral diﬀerences in the availability
of credit, a dummy variable for sectors that beneﬁted from the FOGAIN program
is included25. If commercial banks specialized in lending to particular sectors, we
would expect ﬁrms in those sectors to have easier access to credit. In fact, the esti-
mated coeﬃcient for the FOGAIN variable is statistically signiﬁcant and signed in
the expected direction. Finally, to control for the possibility that sectors with low
ﬁnancial constraints are also sectors with limited external dependence, the external
dependence index developed by Rajan and Zingales (1998) is added to the estima-
tion. Unexpectedly, according to the results in Table 6, sectors in higher need of
external funds are less prone to ﬁnancial constraints26.
The ﬁnancial development indicator is based on the coeﬃcient estimates of the
regional dummies from the previous regression which are reported in Table 7. The
reference region is Oaxaca that is situated in the South of Mexico and according to
the results is the state where ﬁrms have more diﬃculties in accessing credit. In all
other regions, the coeﬃcient on the regional dummy is negative and signiﬁcant at
the 1 percent level, suggesting that compared to Oaxaca it is easier to access credit
in any other state27. In order to have a measure of ﬁnancial development that varies





25See section 5.2 for a description of the FOGAIN program. FOGAIN equals 1 in the food
industry (31), textiles, leather and shoes (32), the basic metal industry (37), the chemical industry
(35) and that of electric apparel (383) (Assidon and Estrada Calderon (2006)).
26An unsolved issue is that of overlending. If in certain states banks tend to lend more irrespec-
tive of the creditworthiness of the borrower, the ﬁnancial development indicator would be higher
but it would not reﬂect a better ﬁnancial system. In order to avoid this potential bias, Guiso et
al (2004) include in the estimation a measure of the percentage of non-performing loans on total
loans by state. Unfortunately, this data in Mexico is not available and therefore, in some sense
this measure reﬂects more credit availability than ﬁnancial development.
27Only the regional dummy referring to the state of Colima is not signiﬁcant, suggesting no
diﬀerences between Oaxaca and Colima in access to credit.




Column (2) of Table 7 reports the ﬁnal measure of ﬁnancial development used in the
rest of the analysis. The indicator of ﬁnancial development displays great variation
across diﬀerent states, disregarding the extremes, it ranges from 0.449 in Tlax-
cala to 0.991 in Nayarit. Although border states seem to be the ones with better
credit markets the division is not clear cut. Figure 1 in Appendix III shows the
regional distribution of the ﬁnancial development indicator. Some Northern states
like Coahuila, Chihuaha or BCS show a lower ﬁnancial development indicator than
we would expect while the opposite phenomenon occurs with southern states like
Guerrero.
Finally, there are some issues associated with the ﬁnancial development indicator.
First, the measure might overstate the availability of credit. The reason is that it
is not possible to know whether ﬁrms that ﬁnanced the acquisition of machinery
with external funds, obtained as much resources as they would have liked. However,
the ranking provided by the indicator would be valid for our purposes if banking
systems, in which ﬁrms cannot undertake investment projects because of lack of
resources, are also systems that tend to pose greater diﬃculties in obtaining the
full amount of credit. Second, the indicator is constructed using data only from the
last two surveys (1999 and 2001) and does not vary over time. There are two main
changes in the banking system during the 90s that could cast doubt on the validity
of the ranking provided by the ﬁnancial development indicator over time. First, in
1991 the banking system was privatized. Before, banks had channeled most lending
to the federal government so private credit was very low. Once privatized, banks
increased their lending to the private sector, especially to risky projects seeking high
returns. However, soon after the privatization the country was shaken by the 1994
Tequila Crisis. The crisis mined the ability of borrowers to repay their debt which
in turn made banks more vulnerable to the crisis and increased their reticence to
lend. Consequently, from 1994 onwards, there has been a sharp decrease in private
credit. These events show how, although for diﬀerent reasons, the low lending rates
in 1991 were also characteristic from the late 90s. The second major change in the
banking system during the 90s was the entry of foreign banks in 1997. However,
foreign banks contributed to the recapitalization of the banking sector after the crisis
but, there is no evidence that they alleviated the credit crunch. Figure 2 shows the
percentage of banking credit to the industrial sector as a fraction of GDP and it can
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be observed that the low ﬁgures of 1991 (only 5% of GDP) were still characteristic of
the late 90s. Finally, if ﬁrms could access credit in markets other than the local one,
local market conditions would become irrelevant. Empirical evidence suggests that
distance matters in the provision of credit and matters even more for small ﬁrms
(Petersen and Rajan (2002), Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004)). In the case of
Mexico, high information costs make the local credit market even more pertinent.
Moreover, results in Table 6 show statistical and highly signiﬁcant coeﬃcients of the
regional dummies, suggesting regional diﬀerences on the probability of reporting
ﬁnancial problems.
2.5. Estimation Results
2.5.1. Baseline Speciﬁcation. Table 8 and Table 9 report the results from
estimating equation (3) when considering sectoral and regional spillovers, respec-
tively. Here, sectoral spillovers refer to the 4-digit industry classiﬁcation. The case
for spillovers from foreign ﬁrms operating in the same sector and region turned out
to be not signiﬁcant and therefore is not reported28. In addition, all estimation equa-
tions include GDP per capita at the state level29 to control for time varying regional
characteristics and the Herﬁndahl index (HHN)30 to control for industry concen-
tration. It is argued that foreign entry can lead to more competition resulting in
an improvement of domestic ﬁrms’ productivity. This pro-competitive eﬀect might
be regarded as an spillover eﬀect but since our primary concern is the existence of
productivity spillovers due to knowledge transfer, the HHN index is supposed to
help disentangling both eﬀects. Finally, provided the main interest of this paper is
the productivity performance of domestic ﬁrms, results are reported separately for
the whole sample of ﬁrms and for the sample of domestic ﬁrms only.
28However, when considering the case of spillovers from ﬁrms operating in the same 2-digit
sector and region (i.e. a broader sector classiﬁcation), results were this time signiﬁcant. This in
turn, would hint to the existence of vertical spillovers, since the broader sector deﬁnition comprises
sectors that do not compete with each other. Nevertheless, these results were not robust to the
instrumental variable approach and therefore were not carry on further.
29The ﬁrst available year for state level GDP is 1993 therefore I use it as an approximation for
the state level GDP in 1991.
30The index is deﬁned as the sum of the squares of the market shares of each individual ﬁrm.
To make the index vary between 0 and 1, it is normalized as HHN =
H−(1/N)
1−(1/N)




Regarding the estimation technique, results were obtained by weighted least
squares (WLS). The weights used in estimation are ﬁrm’s share of sectoral employ-
ment. The advantage of WLS is that it allows attaching greater importance to
larger plants which might be crucial in the context of FDI spillovers if certain tech-
nology sophistication is necessary to beneﬁt from MNCs activities31. In addition,
all reported standard errors are clustered for all observations in the same 4-digit
industry and year or region and year depending on the estimated regression. In the
absence of clustering, Moulton (1990) showed that when an aggregated variable is
used as a regressor in equations estimated at a micro level, OLS standard errors will
be downward bias and will tend to ﬁnd that the aggregate variable is statistically
signiﬁcant.
Table 8 shows the basic results when sectoral spillovers are considered. Columns
(1) and (2) consider the total sample of ﬁrms while (3) and (4) look only at the sam-
ple of domestic ﬁrms. Moreover, in order to unmask any potential concern about
the choice of productivity measure, columns (1) and (3) correspond to exploratory
regressions where the dependent variable is ln(output) and the explanatory vari-
ables include labor, materials, capital, whether the ﬁrms is foreign owned or not
and proxies for spillovers, the interaction between spillovers and ﬁnancial devel-
opment, industry concentration and regional GDP. Similarly, columns (2) and (4)
report results when the dependent variable is lnTFP from the ACF estimation. It
is reassuring that results across estimation strategies are highly consistent. In par-
ticular, it is shown that foreign owned ﬁrms are more productive than their domestic
counterparts. However, as shown in column (2), there is only a marginal positive
signiﬁcant eﬀect from foreign companies on ﬁrm productivity after conditioning on
regional ﬁnancial development. More importantly this marginal signiﬁcant eﬀect
disappears once the sample of domestic ﬁrms is considered (see column (4)).
The lack of sectoral spillovers is consistent with results from previous studies
using data from developing and emerging economies. However, there are reasons for
productivity spillovers being geographically limited. Most of the channels for FDI
spillovers are local in scope. Contacts between clients and suppliers are usually at
31In addition to the economic reasoning behind the choice of WLS a Breusch-Pagan test for
heteroskedasticity on size (ﬁrm number of workers) rejected the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity.
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the local level, labor mobility is rather limited across regions32 and according to the
economic geography literature tacit knowledge is transmitted more eﬃciently over
small distances.
Consequently, Table 9 reports the basic results when considering regional spillovers.
The structure of the table is similar to Table 8 and again, there is consistency be-
tween the results obtained with ln(output) as dependent variable (columns (1) and
(3)) and results where the dependent variable is lnTFP (columns (2) and (4)). Ta-
ble 9 highlights the importance of local ﬁnancial markets conditions if ﬁrms are to
beneﬁt from FDI (i.e. the interaction term between the measure of spillovers and
ﬁnancial development is positive and signiﬁcant both for the total sample of ﬁrms
and the sample of domestic ﬁrms.).
The importance of local ﬁnancial markets conditions if ﬁrms are to beneﬁt from
FDI is a key result given the little success of previous studies in ﬁnding signiﬁcant
eﬀects of foreign presence in the same region on the TFP of domestic ﬁrms. However,
at this point ﬁnancial market development is not exogenous to ﬁrm level total factor
productivity and before going into the interpretation of the results next section
addresses endogeneity concerns.
2.5.2. Endogeneity Issues and Economic Relevance. One of the main
concerns when studying the relationship between ﬁrm level TFP and indicators of
ﬁnancial development is that of reverse causality. In other words, it might not be
that better ﬁnancial systems contribute to higher ﬁrm level productivity but more
productive ﬁrms might attract banking opportunities. In the case of Mexico, it is
possible to ﬁnd instruments that deal with the potential endogeneity of the ﬁnancial
development indicator, based on legal and historical factors shaping state diﬀerences
in access to credit.
Regional diﬀerences in accessing credit are explained by two diﬀerent sets of fac-
tors. First, diﬀerences in the legal framework across states can generate diﬀerences
in the ease of accessing credit. The World Bank publication “Doing Business in
Mexico 2007” reports signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the time and costs involved in the
signing and registering of the collateral required to obtain credit across Mexican
states. Similarly, Laeven and Woodruﬀ (2008) argue that state laws also vary on
32Esquivel (1999) shows that in Mexico the response of domestic labor migration ﬂows to regional
income diﬀerentials is small. Similarly, Chiquiar (2008) shows that NAFTA did not induce a
signiﬁcantly faster migration ﬂow toward the border.




the ease with which collateral can be claimed by a victor in a court decision. Based
on these legal factors shaping state diﬀerences in access to credit, I use a histor-
ical instrument that according to Laeven and Woodruﬀ (2008) explain state-level
variation in legal enforcement. They show that the quality of legal institutions is
lower where the indigenous population was more prevalent at the beginning of the
century33. In states where the share of indigenous population was higher, European
settlers were more likely to develop institutions designed to exploit local labor and
hence, establish a worse institutional environment. Therefore, I use their data from
190034 on the percentage of indigenous population at the state level.
Second, there are various historical reasons to think that the ﬁnancial system
varies across states. Although currently banks can branch freely across diﬀerent
states, from the end of the 19th century and during most of the 20th century the
Mexican banking system was greatly segmented. At the beginning of the twentieth
century, there were only two big banks, Banamex and Banco de Londres y Mexico,
that were allowed to branch across state lines. As for the rest, each state had a
bank that was given a local monopoly thanks to Federal Government restrictions to
entry (Haber (2003)). In addition, the evolution of the regional banking system was
aﬀected by the development policies of the central government. From 1953 to 1989,
the Mexican government channeled preferential credit (in the sense of availability
at a lower interest rate) to targeted sectors and regions through commercial banks.
Among diﬀerent initiatives, the government set up a public fund named FOGAIN
that granted preferential credit to small and medium ﬁrms35. In 1989, as part of
33Laeven and Woodruﬀ (2008) also ﬁnd that lower quality levels in the legal framework are
characteristic from states with higher production of agricultural crops with high economies of scale
(i.e. sugar, coﬀee, rice and cotton.). Therefore, they suggest as a potential instrument the number
of the aforementioned crops by state in 1939. However, ﬁrst stage results showed that this variable
is not signiﬁcant and consequently I did not include it in the analysis.
34The states of Quintana Roo and Baja California were created after 1900. For these states
data from the 1930 census, the ﬁrst census after they became states, is used (Laeven and Woodruﬀ
(2008)).
35FOGAIN: Fondo de Garantia para la Industria Mediana y Pequenia (Small and Medium
enterprise Fund). The criterion used to deﬁned small and medium ﬁrms was based on the social
capital of the ﬁrm. During the ﬁrst years of the program, the social capital required to beneﬁt
from the program was between 25,000 and 5 millions of pesos. The social capital requirement was
modiﬁed thereafter, so that in 1979 in accounted to a ﬁgure between 50,000 and 40 millions of
pesos and in 1980 a ﬁnal upper limit of 60 million of pesos.
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a general attempt to reform the ﬁnancial system the Mexican government elimi-
nated this directed credit program36. However, given the high information costs
characterizing the Mexican ﬁnancial system, commercial banks previously doing the
intermediary function may have continued lending from their own funds, to ﬁrms in
earlier targeted sectors and regions. In fact, according to Galindo and Schiantarelli
(2002), in Latin America access to credit does not only depend upon favorable bal-
ance sheet characteristics but also upon the closeness of the relationship between
ﬁrms and banks. To the extent that credit allocation was driven by personal and
political interests the eﬀectiveness of the program in fostering widespread economic
growth has been often questioned. However, the program strengthened the banking
system by forcing contacts between private banks and credit seekers. By increasing
the volume of operations in commercial banks of particular regions, the program
generated an asymmetric evolution in the local banking system. Therefore, the sec-
ond instrument only for the sample of domestic ﬁrms will be the average of the credit
allocated under the FOGAIN programm during 1960 to 1989 to the manufacturing
sector by state and normalized by the state population in year 198037.
Table 10 shows the results of estimating equation (3) instrumenting for the inter-
action term between regional spillovers and ﬁnancial development. Standard errors
are clustered at the region-time level38. The ﬁrst stage regression is reported at the
bottom of the table.
Column (1) of Table 10 refers to the total sample of ﬁrms and instruments the
interaction term with the interaction between spillovers and the share of indige-
nous population in 1900. The instrument is signiﬁcant, with the expected sign and
36Although the direct credit program was eliminated the development bank continued to oﬀer
rediscounting operations until 1994.
37The year 1980 is the earliest year for which population data is disaggregated by state. Nor-
malizing by state level GDP would have been more relevant unfortunately, data was not available.
I would like to thank Juan Estrada Calderon who kindly provided the data from the FOGAIN
program.
38The number of clusters (96 clusters=32regions*3time periods) is smaller than the sum of ex-
ogenous regressors and excluded instruments and therefore, the covariance matrix of orthogonality
conditions is not of full rank. To sidestep this problem, I follow Baum, Stillman and Schaﬀer (2003).
They argue that by the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell theorem “partialling out” the exogenous regressors
from all the other variables and constant, the two-step GMM estimation provides coeﬃcients for
the remaining regressors that are the same as if the variables would not have been partialled out.
However, the IV identiﬁcation tests are aﬀected by the partialling out procedure since they depend
on the number instruments and exogenous regressors used in the estimation. Hence, the F-test
and Hansen test correspond to the equivalent regression without adjusting for clustering.




explains 24% of the variation in access to credit conditional on regional foreign pres-
ence. Compared with the WLS results in column (2) of Table 9, the interaction
term remains positive and highly signiﬁcant and the WLS-IV estimated coeﬃcients
are more than three times larger than the WLS counterparts in absolute terms39.
Column (2) of Table 10 repeats the estimation for the sample of domestic ﬁrms using
as instruments again the interaction between spillovers and the share of indigenous
population in 1900 and adding the interaction between spillovers and the normal-
ized FOGAIN data. The instruments are both signiﬁcant, signed as expected and
explain 46% of the variation in domestic ﬁrms’ access to credit conditional of foreign
presence in the region. The Hansen statistic conﬁrms that the instruments pass the
test of overidentiﬁcation restrictions. The interaction term between spillovers and
ﬁnancial development remains signiﬁcant and again comparing this WLS-IV results
with the WLS results of column (4) in Table 9 shows that estimates almost tripled.
Although the overidentiﬁcation test provides some conﬁrmation of the validity
of the instruments, there is some remaining concern with exclusion restrictions.
In particular, the current share of indigenous population is highly correlated with
the share in 1900. This will pose an identiﬁcation problem if the current share of
indigenous population is also correlated with ﬁrm level productivity. As suggested
by Laeven and Woodruﬀ (2008) I included the share of indigenous population in
2000 in the estimation and it turned out not to be statistically signiﬁcant leaving the
estimates and signiﬁcance levels of the spillover and interaction variables unchanged.
As already mentioned, the lack of sectoral spillovers is consistent with previous
studies using data from developing and emerging countries however, the existence
of positive productivity spillovers at the regional level contrasts with the ﬁndings
of Aitken and Harrison (1999) for Venezuela or recent evidence by Hale and Long
(2007) using Chinese ﬁrm level data. The case of Mexico might in fact reﬂect positive
agglomeration eﬀects from FDI or be the result of a multicollinearity eﬀect between
the spillover variable and the measure of ﬁnancial development. If foreign ﬁrms
tend to locate in regions with better developed ﬁnancial systems, the interaction
term between the regional spillover variable and ﬁnancial development will tend to
39As suggested by Tabellini (2005) the increase in the size coeﬃcient after IV estimation, can
be the result of measurement error in the ﬁnancial development indicator or as indicated by Heck-
man (1997) the result of “heterogenous treatment eﬀect”. In the later case, if the instrument is
correlated with the heterogeneity in the treatment, then IV estimates are inconsistent even with
valid instruments.
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overestimate the impact of MNC presence in that region. However, the correlation
between these two variables is only 0.3418 and, as we will show later, foreign ﬁrms
operating in Mexico do not seem to depend on the local banking system to ﬁnance
their activities 40.
Despite the positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on the interaction term, the di-
rect eﬀect from FDI is negative and therefore, the total eﬀect from FDI is not
linear and depends on the level of ﬁnancial development. According to the F-test
reported in Table 10, the null hypothesis that the spillover variable and interac-
tion term are jointly insigniﬁcant is rejected by the data. The total eﬀect of the
spillover variable on ﬁrm level TFP is derived from equation (3) and is given by41
βtotal = β1 + β2 ∗ FinDev. Figures 3 and 4 show the total eﬀect and conﬁdence in-
tervals for the total sample of ﬁrms and that of domestic ﬁrms, corresponding to the
estimated coeﬃcients in columns (1) and (2) of Table 10, respectively. Results from
considering the total sample of ﬁrms, indicate that the total spillover eﬀect is only
positive and statistically signiﬁcant for ﬁnancial development values greater than
0.806. Regarding the sample of domestic ﬁrms, the WLS-IV results reveal a loss in
signiﬁcance of the total positive spillover eﬀect. Why do results for the total sample
of ﬁrms and that of domestic ﬁrms diﬀer? There are two possible explanations. The
ﬁrst one asks whether foreign ﬁrms crowd out domestic ﬁrms from the credit market
and whether it is foreign ﬁrms that are to beneﬁt from being located in a region
with a well developed ﬁnancial system. In fact, re-estimating column (1) in Table 10
including interaction terms between spillover, spillover ∗ FinDev and whether the
ﬁrm is foreign owned or not conﬁrms that this does not seem to be the case. The in-
signiﬁcance of the triple interaction term between whether the ﬁrm is foreign owned
or not, the regional measure of spillovers and the indicator of ﬁnancial development
shows that there is no signiﬁcantly diﬀerent eﬀect for foreign ﬁrms. Foreign ﬁrms
do not appear to crowd out domestic ﬁrms from local access to credit. This ﬁnding
is in line with previous empirical evidence by Desai, Foley and Hines (2004) who
showed for a sample of US foreign aﬃliates that aﬃliates were ﬁnanced with less
external debt in countries with underdeveloped capital markets or weaker creditor
40The additional concern by which foreign ﬁrms might choose more developed regions to locate
should be mitigated by the inclusion of regional ﬁxed eﬀects and GDP per capita.
41The corresponding standard errors are computed as
sd(βtotal) =
p
V ar(β1) + FinDev2 ∗ V ar(β2) + 2FinDev ∗ Cov(β1,β2)




rights. The second interpretation is methodological, since results are obtained by
WLS attaching greater importance to larger ﬁrms, once only the sample of domestic
ﬁrms is considered we are left with a subsample of ﬁrms with lower average number
of workers42 and therefore, the scope for positive spillovers conditional on ﬁnancial
development is also lower. Section 5.3.2 pays particular attention to the role of size
and column (2) in Table 12 shows results when only the sample of medium and large
ﬁrms is considered. Figure 5 shows the corresponding total eﬀect and signiﬁcance
levels derived from these estimates. The threshold level of ﬁnancial development
above which FDI spillovers are positive is very similar to the one when considering
the total sample of ﬁrms (0.898). There are 6 regions in which ﬁnancial development
values are high enough to foster positive and signiﬁcant productivity spillovers from
FDI (Guanajuato, Nayarit, Nuevo Leon, Sinaloa, Jalisco and Baja California Norte).
In addition, the magnitude of the eﬀect is economically meaningful, an exogenous 20
percent increase in the regional spillover variable (around one standard deviation of
the regional spillover variable) would increase the productivity of medium and large
domestic ﬁrms in a region with a well developed ﬁnancial system like Durango (in
the 75 percentile of the ﬁnancial development distribution) by 17 percent compared
to a region with low ﬁnancial development levels like Michoacan (in the 25 percentile
of the ﬁnancial development distribution).43
2.5.3. Robustness Checks and Main Implications. So far I have shown
evidence that larger ﬁrms located in ﬁnancially developed regions manage to ben-
eﬁt from FDI in their same region. In what follows I will provide some robustness
checks for the previous statement in particular for the sample of domestic ﬁrms.
Table 11 shows the results from repeating the estimation in column (2) of Table
10 under diﬀerent speciﬁcations that tackle potential estimation and interpretation
concerns. All regressions are estimated by WLS-IV where instruments are the in-
teraction between the spillover variable and the share of indigenous population and
the FOGAIN data, respectively.
42The average number of employees for the sample of foreign ﬁrms is 670 while the corresponding
ﬁgure for the sample of domestic ﬁrms is 282.
43This result is obtained from the coeﬃcients from column (2) in Table 12 as:
Effect = (βSpillover∗FinDev ∗ ∆Spillover ∗ [FinDevHigh − FinDevLow]) ∗ 100
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Column (1) in Table 11 repeats the estimation excluding both HHN and GDP
per capita, since they are rarely signiﬁcant across speciﬁcations. There is no appar-
ent change in the results, if anything coeﬃcients on the interaction term and the
spillover variables become more signiﬁcant and the total eﬀect is positive and sig-
niﬁcant for lower values of ﬁnancial development. Therefore, by including HHN and
GDP per capita we are obtaining a conservative measure of the total eﬀect of foreign
presence in a region conditional on regional ﬁnancial development. Similarly, col-
umn (2) considers the possibility that GDP per capita could in itself be endogenous
to ﬁnancial development and therefore, it is substituted by regional population with
again no signiﬁcant change in the main results. Finally, there are some remaining
concerns regarding whether the measure of ﬁnancial development does actually cap-
ture ﬁnancial development or some other broader regional characteristic. Column
(3) re-estimates the same speciﬁcation inserting a dummy variable equal to one for
regions located in the South of Mexico. As suggested by Guiso et al (2004) this
procedure is important in order to ascertain that the estimated eﬀect is not simply
a North-South diﬀerence. The South dummy is negative but not statistically signif-
icant and what is more important it does not impact the size of the coeﬃcient of the
interaction term. Nevertheless, columns (4) and (5) repeat the same regression using
an alternative measure of ﬁnancial development: the ratio of private credit to GDP
in 2000 by state. A spearman rank correlation test rejects the hypothesis that this
measure and the one we obtained from the linear probability model are independent.
The main drawback of the credit to GDP measure is that due to internal reporting
procedures at Mexican banks, part of the bank lending taking place outside Mexico
City is attributed to the Federal District (Laeven and Woodruﬀ (2008)). Column
(4) conﬁrms the previous ﬁndings and shows that there is a positive and signiﬁcant
eﬀect from the interaction between foreign presence and ﬁnancial development and
a negative and signiﬁcant direct eﬀect from foreign presence in the region. Given
that the measure of private credit to GDP overstate the bank activity in the Federal
District, column (5) conﬁrms that results are robust to excluding the observations
from the Federal District.
Once the robustness of the main results has been conﬁrmed it is possible to turn
to the main implications of these ﬁndings. First, it seems reasonable to ask about




the importance of local ﬁnancial markets. Second, I will analyze the importance of
size.
2.5.3.1. The Role of Financial Development. Would spillovers have taken place
regardless of the local ﬁnancial market conditions? To answer this question Table
12 shows the results from estimating equation (1) both by OLS and WLS (which
attaches greater weight to larger ﬁrms). When the total sample of ﬁrms is considered
(columns (1) and (2)) the positive spillover eﬀect from MNCs gains signiﬁcance in
the WLS estimation, underlying the importance of size. These results indicate that
in general larger ﬁrms would beneﬁt from MNCs operating in their same region
regardless of local banking conditions. However, domestic ﬁrms would have not
beneﬁt unconditionally from foreign companies, not even larger domestic ﬁrms (see
columns (3) and (4)). It is only once we condition on ﬁnancial development (see
columns (5) to (7) in Table 12) that there are positive productivity spillovers for
domestic ﬁrms located in regions where access to credit is relatively easier.
In addition, despite the statistically insigniﬁcant results from OLS and WLS
in columns (3) and (4), it is worth noting the sign discrepancy. Traditionally, the
negative sign from OLS estimation was associated with the way the spillover mea-
sure is constructed. If domestic productivity is procyclical, a negative shock that
translates in lower production of domestic ﬁrms but has no eﬀect or takes time to
aﬀect the production of foreign ﬁrms could mistakenly be interpreted as a negative
spillover eﬀect from MNC presence (Aitken and Harrison (1999)). WLS and OLS
estimations were repeated including the numerator and denominator of the spillover
variable separately in the regression and similar results to the ones reported in Ta-
ble 12 were obtained. Moreover, this explanation would have only accounted for the
negative sign of the OLS results but would have not explained the positive spillover
eﬀects from WLS. The sign discrepancy between WLS and OLS estimation strate-
gies might reﬂect the role of size or point to the possibility that WLS, by giving more
weight to larger ﬁrms, hides two types of sample composition bias. First, if regions
with low inﬂows of FDI are also characterized by a high proportion of small ﬁrms,
which are usually endowed with lower productivity levels than larger ﬁrms, OLS
will tend to ﬁnd a negative eﬀect of FDI on productivity that will not be present in
the WLS estimation. Figure 6 plots the percentage of small ﬁrms by region against
the extent of foreign presence in that region. It is clear that overall the relationship
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is ﬂat, except in the case of ﬁve regions: Baja California Sur (3), Campeche (4),
Quintana Roo (23), Chiapas (7) and Colima (6). Excluding these regions from the
estimation still reveals an insigniﬁcant but negative spillover eﬀect for the sample of
domestic ﬁrms and WLS estimation results remain unchanged. Second, the negative
coeﬃcient from OLS estimation might reﬂect sample selection. Cross-section studies
focusing in the sample of domestic ﬁrms tend to ﬁnd downward bias estimates of
FDI spillovers. If foreign ﬁrms do not invest at random and choose the most pro-
ductive domestic ﬁrms (“cherry picking” phenomenon), expost the TFP distribution
of domestic ﬁrms is upper truncated. The higher the share of foreign ﬁrms in the
sector or region, the lower the truncation point and hence, the more likely to ﬁnd a
negative eﬀect from foreign presence. Given the diﬃculties in ﬁnding valid instru-
ments, panel estimation studies have opted for ﬁxed eﬀect estimation hoping that
unobserved ﬁrm level characteristics correlated with the presence of foreign ﬁrms
are relatively ﬁxed over time. The cross-section nature of the ENESTyC dataset
makes it impossible to control for this dimension at this point however, section 5.4.
presents panel ﬁxed eﬀects results for a subsample of ﬁrms that conﬁrm the sample
selection hypothesis (i.e. once individual ﬁxed eﬀects are controlled for the esti-
mated coeﬃcient on the spillover variable for the sample of domestic ﬁrms although
not signiﬁcant is positively signed (see columns (1) and (4) in Table 14).
Most importantly, results in Table 12 highlight the importance of local credit
markets for domestic ﬁrms. In the absence of a good ﬁnancial system we would
have found no signiﬁcant eﬀect of foreign companies on domestic ﬁrm level pro-
ductivity. Moreover, results repeating the estimation in column (2) but adding an
interaction term between whether the ﬁrm is foreign owned or not and the spillover
variable turned out to be positive and highly signiﬁcant, showing that foreign ﬁrms
tend to beneﬁt more from the presence of other foreign ﬁrms than domestic ﬁrms,
irrespective of local credit conditions. This in turn favors the hypothesis outlined in
the previous section by which foreign ﬁrms do not depend as much on local ﬁnancial
market conditions in order to ﬁnance their investment projects.
2.5.3.2. The Role of Size. The previous results suggest the existence of regional
FDI spillovers given relatively good state level access to credit and ﬁrm size. Table
13 shows how relevant ﬁrm size is in the previous ﬁndings. Considering the sample
of domestic ﬁrms only, columns (1) and (2) repeat the estimation for the sample




of small (between 16 and 100 employees) and medium and large ﬁrms (more than
100 employees), respectively44. It is clear that the positive regional spillover eﬀect
conditioned on ﬁnancial development is due to medium and large ﬁrms. These results
reinforce the hypothesis that positive spillovers are concentrated in larger ﬁrms,
which is consistent with theories in which larger ﬁrms are able to compete more
eﬃciently with foreign entrants or where the technology gap between large domestic
ﬁrms and foreign entrants is relatively smaller. In fact, following Girma (2005) I
deﬁne the absorptive capacity of a ﬁrm as the ratio between its own productivity and
the productivity of a ﬁrm in the 99 percentile of the productivity distribution within
an industry45. In theory, we would expect ﬁrms with higher absorptive capacity to
beneﬁt more from the presence of foreign companies and this is actually, what it is
shown in column (4) of Table 13. According to these results, FDI will have a higher
positive impact on the productivity levels of those ﬁrms with higher absorptive
capacities. Contrary to the ﬁndings of Aghion, Blundell, Griﬃth, Howitt and Prantl
(2006) including a sectoral measure of the technology gap between domestic and
foreign ﬁrms did not turn out to be signiﬁcant, meaning that in the case of Mexico
irrespective of the technology endowment of the sector is the ﬁrm speciﬁc technology
gap that matters for FDI spillovers. Moreover, we would expect the eﬀect of FDI to
be even greater for ﬁrms with higher absorptive capacities that have relative good
access to credit. Hence, column (5) in Table 13 shows the eﬀect of FDI on ﬁrm
level productivity conditioned on ﬁrm’s absorptive capacity and regional ﬁnancial
development. A test for the joint signiﬁcance of the terms involving the spillover
variable cannot be rejected which in turn conﬁrms the hypothesis that FDI is more
relevant for ﬁrms operating close to the sector technology frontier and with better
prospect of accessing credit.
However, there are some caveats associated to these results. First, it is somewhat
counterintuitive to think that larger ﬁrms are the ones beneﬁting from better access
to credit provided that usually these ﬁrms are less ﬁnancially constrained. It is
reasonable to think that larger ﬁrms can ﬁnance their investment projects internally
44Size categories are the oﬃcial ones provided by INEGI however, although not the scope of this
paper a more thorough analysis of the cutoﬀ points could follow a threshold regression analysis
approach.
45Girma (2005) uses the maximum productivity level and corrects for outliers ex-post. By
taking the 99 percentile I expect to avoid the problem of outliers.
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or can more easily tap the local banking system. In fact, column (3) in Table 13
shows that the result does not hold for the sample of very large ﬁrms46
Second, one could be concerned that this evidence corresponds to a situation in
which smaller ﬁrms tend to locate in or are the result of less ﬁnancially developed
regions. If this was the case, the lack of positive spillovers in less ﬁnancially devel-
oped regions does not arise from worse conditions in accessing credit but from the
abundance of small ﬁrms that will not in any case beneﬁt from the MNC presence.
Figure 7 shows the correlation between the percentage of small ﬁrms by region and
the ﬁnancial development indicator and it rules out this possibility. The percentage
of small ﬁrms is roughly the same regardless of the ﬁnancial development indicator
values and, it is only particularly high in some regions characterized by medium ﬁ-
nancial development indicator values47. The only problematic region a priori would
be Colima (6) that is characterized by low levels of ﬁnancial development and a high
proportion of small ﬁrms. I repeated the estimation excluding the observations from
Colima with no apparent statistical diﬀerent results.
Finally, as already mentioned, there are some issues related to the use of cross-
section data. In particular, the potential bias associated to unobserved ﬁrm speciﬁc
characteristics, especially when considering the sample of domestic ﬁrms. However,
once the importance of size has been highlighted and in particular once it has been
conﬁrmed that it is medium and large ﬁrms that are to beneﬁt from regional FDI
and ﬁnancial development, it is possible to consider a subsample of mainly large and
medium ﬁrms in a panel context.
2.5.4. Panel Fixed Eﬀect Results. The advantage of focusing on large and
medium ﬁrms is that it is possible to link ﬁrms across the three diﬀerent surveys,
1991, 1999 and 2001 and have a balanced panel of ﬁrms with data for 1991, 1997,
46The threshold level of 500 employees was chosen based on the facts that the average size
within the sample of large ﬁrms (those with more than 250 employees) is 620 employees and the
median is 450 employees.
47This evidence seems to contradict a priori the Laeven and Woodruﬀ (2008) results. They
ﬁnd that lower quality institutions limit the size of an entrepreneur’s ﬁrm. However, the diﬀerence
might be the result of the diﬀerent samples used. While here the paper focus on manufacturing
ﬁrms, Laeven and Woodruﬀ (2008) use census data including manufacturing, commerce, services
and construction sectors. In fact, they show that changes in the quality of the legal system impact
sectors where proprietorships predominate (such as services) more than sectors where corporations
predominate (such as manufacturing of basic metals).




1998, 1999 and 200048. Having a panel of ﬁrms allows to control for ﬁrm-speciﬁc un-
observable characteristics that do not vary over time and therefore, partially tackles
the potential endogeneity of foreign acquisitions (cherry picking).
The total number of ﬁrms that could be linked across surveys is 945. Table 14
reports the results from panel ﬁxed eﬀect estimation. It turned out that being foreign
owned or not was not a signiﬁcant determinant of ﬁrm level productivity however,
the percentage of foreign capital owned by a foreign investor had a positive and
signiﬁcant eﬀect and was therefore, the variable included in the estimation. This
result conﬁrms previous empirical ﬁndings in which the extent of foreign ownership
mattered for FDI spillovers (see Javorcik (2004)). Results corroborate the ﬁndings
of the cross-section estimation even after instrumenting for ﬁnancial development.
Figure 8 reports the total eﬀect when all sampled ﬁrms are considered corresponding
to the FE-IV estimation in column (3). Similarly, Figure 9 shows the total eﬀect
associated with coeﬃcients in column (6) of Table 14 for the sample of domestic
ﬁrms. Comparing Figure 3 (WLS-IV estimation for the subsample of medium and
large domestic ﬁrms) and Figure 9 (FE-IV estimation for the subsample of domestic
ﬁrms) shows the same threshold level of ﬁnancial development above which domestic
ﬁrms beneﬁt from FDI. Moreover, the overall economic impact is also highly similar.
Repeating the same exercise as in section 5.2., an exogenous increase in the regional
spillover variable of 20 percent would increase the productivity of domestic ﬁrms
in a region with relative good access to credit by 14 percent compared to domestic
ﬁrms in regions with low ﬁnancial development values.
2.6. Conclusion
During the last two decades developing and emerging countries have implemented
policies to attract FDI ﬂows as a means of development and growth. This compe-
tition for FDI ﬂows is based on the believe that the growth-enhancing eﬀects of
FDI go beyond the natural increase in the capital stock of the host country and
involve spillovers stemming from the introduction of new processes and technologies
by foreign aﬃliates. Despite theoretical predictions regarding the positive external-
ities of FDI, in general, in the case of emerging and developing countries empirical
studies ﬁnd no evidence of horizontal or regional FDI spillovers taking place. This
48The sample design of the ENESTyC surveys guarantees that medium and large ﬁrms are
included with certainty.




is the case of Mexico, which despite large ﬂows of FDI and the consolidation of the
openness process during the 90s through the NAFTA agreement, has not been able
to reap oﬀ the beneﬁts of globalization.
Results in this study conﬁrm that in contrast to previous empirical ﬁndings, in
Mexico, there is a positive spillover eﬀect from MNCs operating in the same region,
conditioned on ﬁrm size. In the case of domestic ﬁrms they do not only need to
be large but also operate in a region with a well functioning ﬁnancial system. A
20 percent increase in the FDI spillover variable would increase the productivity of
domestic ﬁrms in ﬁnancially advanced regions by 17 percent compared to domestic
ﬁrms located in less ﬁnancially developed regions.
The results of this paper suggest that countries involved in the process of at-
tracting FDI should not disregard policies aimed at improving local ﬁnancial market
conditions. Maximum beneﬁts could be attained through the right combination of
policies fostering the attraction of foreign capital ﬂows and reasonable access to
credit by domestic ﬁrms.
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-Output: Manufacturing plants: Value of production priced at ”factory price”(ENESTyC).
Maquila plants (99/01): Value of production in pesos according to the exch. Rate
in place at the moment of the transaction (ENESTyC). - Labor: Average num-
ber of workers (ENESTyC). - Materials: Expenditure in materials (ENESTyC)
-Capital: Value of Total Assets (ENESTyC). -Age: Number of years since the
beginning of operation (ENESTyC). Foreign: Dummy equal 1 if the capital owned
by foreign investors is more than 10% (ENESTyC). -Exporter: Dummy equal 1
if ﬁrm sells to non domestic markets (ENESTyC). -Group: Dummy equal 1 if the
ﬁrm belongs to a group (ENESTyC). -SectCred: Share of commercial credit on
value of production by sector of activity (Central Bank of Mexico and INEGI). -
ExtDepen: External Depedence Index (Rajan and Zingales (1998)). -FOGAIN:
Variable that equals one in sectors 31, 32, 35, 37 and 383 (Electrical Apparel) (Own
Construction). -Fogainpop: Credit allocated by NAFINSA from 1960 to 1989 by
state and normalized by population (Juan Estrada Calderon from NAFINSA re-
ports) -Indigenous1900: Share of indigenous population in total population in
1900 (Laeven and Woodruﬀ (2007)) -lGDPpc: Logarithm of GDP per capita by
state level expressed in constant pesos of 1993 (INEGI).
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The following establishments were removed: 1. Establishments that report zero
or missing values for Output, Materials, Average employment and/or Total Assets.
This means removing a total of 216 ﬁrms in 1992, 822 in 1999 and 640 in 2001. 2.
Establishments fully or partially owned by the government. 3. In order to make more
comparable the surveyed samples in 1992, 1999 and 2001, I remove establishments
in sector 3511 ”Basic Petrochemicals” and sector 3530 ”Oil reﬁnery” because these
sectors were only included in the 2001 survey.
In addition, following Angrist and Krueger (1999) I winsorize the main variables
at the tails. The key variables are the real value of output, the real value of materials
expenditure, the real value of total assets and the average number of workers. I
replace values in the lower and upper 1% tails with values at the 1st and 99th
percentiles, respectively. However, I use diﬀerent samples to determine the critical
values. In the case of real assets and average number of employees I consider the
distribution of all ﬁrms included in the sample. Since maquila establishments use
mainly imported materials in their production process and I have use diﬀerent price
deﬂators for domestic and imported materials, I winsorize diﬀerently the variable
real materials for the sample of maquila plants and the sample of nonmaquila plants.
Finally, regarding the process of winsorizing real output ﬁrst, I winsorize the real
output corresponding to the sample of all ﬁrms included in the 1992 survey and only
those included in the manufacturing surveys of 1999 and 2001. Second, I winsorize
real output for the sample of maquila plants identiﬁed in 1999 and 2001.
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Ideally, for output, materials and capital we would need data on physical quan-
tities rather than values. Unfortunately this data is not available in the ENESTyC
survey hence, in order to approximate quantities and express all monetary variables
in real terms I use industry wide price index deﬂators.
Output: I express the value of production priced at the ”factory” price (venta
de fabrica) in pesos of 2003 using producer price index (PPI) data breakdown by
industry, facilitated by the Central Bank of Mexico. The Central Bank of Mexico
uses a diﬀerent industry classiﬁcation (CMAE, Clasiﬁcacion Mexicana de Activi-
dades Mexicanas) than the one used in the ENESTyC (CMAP). I use a table of
correspondence between CMAE and CMAP provided by INEGI and a PPI deﬂator
at the branch level. In order to obtain the PPI at the branch level, for each branch
I take the average over the corresponding classes belonging to that branch. In ad-
dition, I deﬂate diﬀerently output from maquila plants included in the surveys of
1999 and 2001. In these two years, the survey was conducted separately for manu-
facturing and exporting maquila plants. The questionnaire was the same for both
types of plants and therefore all variables of interest are equivalent except for the
value of production. In fact, rather than providing the value of production priced at
the factory price, maquila plants were required to provide the value of production
in pesos according to the exchange rate in place at the moment of the commercial
transaction. There is no export price deﬂator breakdown by industry readily avail-
able so I follow Lach, Roberts and Tybout (1998) and Fernandes and Isgut (2005)
in the construction of export price indexes. As in Lach et at (1998) I use data from
the United Nations COMTRADE database on the values and quantities of manu-
factured exports from Mexico to the rest of the world by product category, and I
conduct the following exercise. First, I develop a correspondence between the UN
ISIC Rev3 classiﬁcation and the Mexican CMAP branch classiﬁcation by careful
examination of the product descriptions in each system. Second, I compute unit
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export values for each ISIC category by dividing the trade value ﬁgures by the trade
quantity ﬁgures. These unit export values are expressed in current US dollars so I
convert them into unit values in pesos using the average nominal ER between peso
and dollar. Third, following Fernandes and Isgut (2005) I regress the log of the unit
export price on 2-digit sector dummies, year dummies and year-sector ﬁxed eﬀects.
The estimation is done by weighted least squares, with weights corresponding to the
square root of the share of each product category trade value in the total 2-digit
sector trade value. From this regression I obtain predicted log unit export prices
for each UN ISIC Rev3 category. Finally, using the previous weights and the corre-
spondence between the ISIC classiﬁcation and the CMAP classiﬁcation I compute
a weighted average of the predicted unit values belonging to the same 2-digit sector
CMAP classiﬁcation. I normalize the export price series for each industry to the
same base year as the domestic producer price index.
Materials: I express the expenditure in materials in pesos of 2003 using a ma-
terials price index (MPI) provided by the Central Bank of Mexico. In particular, I
use the MPI according to which sector consumes those materials. Again, the indus-
try classiﬁcation of the Central Bank of Mexico is the CMAE and I use the same
previous table of correspondence between CMAE and CMAP to obtain the CMAP
ﬁgures at the branch level. Although this price index might be relevant for plants
that buy their materials domestically it might as well be misleading in the case of
plants that import most of their raw materials. To avoid such a bias, I use diﬀerent
price indexes for the expenditure in materials paid at home and the expenditure in
imported materials. To obtain a price index for imports at the CMAP branch level
I follow the same procedure as for the export price index, this time using Mexican
imports from the rest of the world by product category.
Capital: The ENESTyC survey does not diﬀerentiate among diﬀerent types of
capital stock and therefore I use the PPI to deﬂate the value of total assets.





Table 1 — Basic Characteristics of the Sample
Panel A: Number of ﬁrms by size and year
1991 1998 2000
Large 1,701 2,177 2,195
Medium 1,548 1,814 1,942
Small 942 1,098 1,648
Micro 528 1,434 2,243
Total 4,719 6,523 8,028
Panel B: Foreign Ownership Statistics
1991 1998 2000
Domestic 3,223 3,916 4,547
Foreign 968 1,173 1,238
Total 4,191 5,089 5,785
% Employment(a) 36 41 42
% Output(b) 39 42 52
Maquila (Total) 383 572 588
Maquila (Foreign) 306 467 453
(a) Percentage of Employment in Foreign Plants
(b) Percentage of Output produced by Foreign Plants
Table 2A — Share of Foreign Output by Industry
code Sector 1991 1998 2000
31 Food, Beverages and Tobacco 0.19 0.17 0.19
32 Textiles 0.18 0.34 0.35
33 Wood products 0.15 0.27 0.27
34 Paper and Printing products 0.35 0.20 0.26
35 Chemicals 0.58 0.52 0.57
36 Non Metallic Mineral Products 0.10 0.18 0.26
37 Basic Metals 0.10 0.08 0.07
38 Machinery and Equipment 0.56 0.68 0.74
39 Other Manufacturing 0.25 0.35 0.46
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Table 2B — Share of Foreign Output by Region
code State 1991 1998 2000
1 Aguascalientes 0.19 0.41 0.44
2 BCN 0.73 0.75 0.80
3 BCS 0.05 0.29 0.19
4 Campeche 0.00 0.13 0.02
5 Coahuila 0.23 0.50 0.50
6 Colima 0.00 0.00 0.41
7 Chiapas 0.00 0.19 0.23
8 Chihuahua 0.70 0.79 0.77
9 DF 0.47 0.46 0.42
10 Durango 0.10 0.32 0.22
11 Guanajuato 0.15 0.21 0.28
12 Guerrero 0.01 0.01 0.03
13 Hidalgo 0.10 0.23 0.21
14 Jalisco 0.34 0.26 0.38
15 Edo 0.37 0.34 0.39
16 Michoacan 0.08 0.06 0.12
17 Morelos 0.68 0.71 0.74
18 Nayarit 0.00 0.09 0.27
19 Nuevo 0.22 0.33 0.45
20 Oaxaca 0.01 0.00 0.00
21 Puebla 0.13 0.29 0.35
22 Queretaro 0.49 0.46 0.57
23 Quintana 0.00 0.20 0.00
24 San 0.19 0.24 0.34
25 Sinaloa 0.02 0.00 0.03
26 Sonora 0.33 0.66 0.68
27 Tabasco 0.33 0.04 0.00
28 Tamaulipas 0.73 0.78 0.87
29 Tlaxcala 0.27 0.27 0.34
30 Veracruz 0.17 0.26 0.30
31 Yucatan 0.06 0.03 0.19
32 Zacatecas 0.04 0.03 0.25



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4 — Regional Distribution of Firms with Financing Problems
code State Total NLF LF %LF
1 Aguascalientes 317 265 52 16.4
2 BCN 389 376 13 3.3
3 BCS 33 28 5 15.2
4 Campeche 35 27 8 22.9
5 Cohauila 380 346 34 8.9
6 Colima 27 17 10 37.0
7 Chiapas 85 65 20 23.5
8 Chihuahua 452 427 25 5.5
9 DF 1,886 1,669 217 11.5
10 Durango 230 200 30 13.0
11 Guanajuato 607 559 48 7.9
12 Guerrero 111 84 27 24.3
13 Hidalgo 177 153 24 13.6
14 Jalisco 1007 910 97 9.6
15 Edo Mexico 1781 1590 191 10.7
16 Michoacan 247 195 52 21.1
17 Morelos 138 118 20 14.5
18 Nayarit 27 24 3 11.1
19 Nuevo Leon 1,030 978 52 5.0
20 Oaxaca 78 48 30 38.5
21 Puebla 568 452 116 20.4
22 Queretaro 275 248 27 9.8
23 Quintana Roo 26 21 5 19.2
24 San Luis Potosi 249 226 23 9.2
25 Sinaloa 140 125 15 10.7
26 Sonora 225 210 15 6.7
27 Tabasco 38 30 8 21.1
28 Tamaulipas 300 287 13 4.3
29 Tlaxcala 156 124 32 20.5
30 Veracruz 281 230 51 18.1
31 Yucatan 204 170 34 16.7
32 Zacatecas 75 61 14 18.7
Total 11,574 10,263 1,311 11.3
Notes: NLF: Firms that did not lacked ﬁnancial resources. LF: Firms that lacked ﬁnancial
resources. %LF: Percentage of ﬁrms that lacked ﬁnancial resources.




Table 5 — Sectoral Distribution of Firms with Financing Problems
Sector Total NLF LF %LF
31 Food, Beverages and Tobacco 2,358 2,053 305 12.9
32 Textiles 1,830 1,639 191 10.4
33 Wood Products 643 511 132 20.5
34 Paper and Printing Products 760 668 92 12.1
35 Chemicals 1,600 1,507 93 5.8
36 Non Metallic Mineral Products 683 517 166 24.3
37 Basic Metals 233 215 18 7.7
38 Machinery and Equipment 3,252 2,977 275 8.5
39 Other Manufacturing 215 176 39 18.1
Total 11,574 10,263 1,311 11.3
Notes: NLF: Firms that did not lacked ﬁnancial resources. LF: Firms that lacked ﬁnancial re-
sources. %LF: Percentage of ﬁrms that lacked ﬁnancial resources.






















Notes: Robust standard errors clustered for each region are presented in paren-
thesis. Regression includes industry, year and region ﬁxed eﬀects. *Signiﬁcant
at the 10-percent level; ** Signiﬁcant at the 5-percent level;*** Signiﬁcant at
the 1-percent level.




Table 7 — The Financial Development Indicator
code State Coeﬀ. Regional Dummy Financial Development Indicator
11 Guanajuato -0.253 1
18 Nayarit -0.251 0.991
19 Nuevo Leon -0.238 0.941
25 Sinaloa -0.236 0.934
14 Jalisco -0.230 0.909
2 BCN -0.227 0.898
26 Sonora -0.217 0.856
10 Durango -0.208 0.821
28 Tamaulipas -0.205 0.810
24 San Luis Potosi -0.205 0.809
8 Chihuahua -0.204 0.806
22 Queretaro -0.199 0.784
9 DF -0.192 0.760
15 Edo Mexico -0.192 0.759
13 Hidalgo -0.191 0.756
5 Cohauila -0.191 0.756
12 Guerrero -0.189 0.748
17 Morelos -0.184 0.729
32 Zacatecas -0.178 0.705
3 BCS -0.170 0.672
23 Quintana Roo -0.169 0.666
1 Aguascalientes -0.167 0.658
31 Yucatan -0.163 0.642
16 Michoacan -0.156 0.615
30 Veracruz -0.153 0.605
27 Tabasco -0.151 0.598
21 Puebla -0.150 0.593
4 Campeche -0.122 0.481
7 Chiapas -0.121 0.479
29 Tlaxcala -0.114 0.449
6 Colima -0.013 0.052
20 Oaxaca 0.000 0




Table 8 — FDI Sectoral Productivity Spillovers and Financial Development
All Domestic
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Output Productivity Output Productivity
Foreign 0.225*** 0.129***
(0.033) (0.035)
Spillover -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Spillover*FinDev 0.010** 0.009* 0.007* 0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
HHN -0.144 -0.320 0.043 -0.073
(0.192) (0.208) (0.134) (0.139)
lGDPpc 1.703*** 1.902*** 0.426 0.505
(0.528) (0.552) (0.451) (0.482)
cons -15.050*** -18.171*** -2.875 -4.765
(5.082) (5.328) (4.352) (4.675)
Obs 15,043 15,043 11,673 11,673
R2 0.859 0.2025 0.8876 0.2214
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis have been corrected for clustering at the 4 digit sector level.
In columns (1) and (3) the dependent variable is ln ﬁrm output and the right hand side includes
ln labor, ln materials and ln capital. In columns (2) and (4) the dependent variable is normalized
TFP from the ACF estimation. All regressions include 4 digit sector, region and time ﬁxed eﬀects.
Weights in the WLS estimation are ﬁrm share of employment in total 4-digit sectoral employment.
Table 9 — FDI Regional Productivity Spillovers and Financial Development
All Domestic
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Output Productivity Output Productivity
Foreign 0.238*** 0.141***
(0.033) (0.033)
Spillover -0.016* -0.016 -0.015** -0.017**
(0.009) (0.010) (0.006) (0.007)
Spillover*FinDev 0.028** 0.027** 0.020** 0.022**
(0.012) (0.013) (0.009) (0.010)
HHN 0.053 -0.134 0.051 -0.035
(0.203) (0.223) (0.161) (0.175)
lGDPpc 1.460* 1.676** 0.349 0.440
(0.738) (0.765) (0.274) (0.268)
cons -12.826* -16.109** -2.085 -4.066
(7.119) (7.380) (2.640) (2.600)
Obs 15,043 15,043 11,673 11,673
R2 0.8586 0.2008 0.8876 0.2213
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis have been corrected for clustering at the region time level.
In columns (1) and (3) the dependent variable is ln ﬁrm output and the right hand side includes
ln labor, ln materials and ln capital. In columns (2) and (4) the dependent variable is normalized
TFP from the ACF estimation. All regressions include 4 digit sector, region and time ﬁxed eﬀects.
Weights in the WLS estimation are ﬁrm share of employment in total 4-digit sectoral employment.




Table 10 — FDI Regional Productivity Spillovers and Financial Development:
Instrumental Variable Approach




























Joint Signiﬁcance (p-value) 0.009 0.040
Partial R2 0.243 0.461
R2 0.199 0.221
Obs 15,043 11,673
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis have been corrected for clustering at the region-time level. All
regressions include 4 digit sector, region and time ﬁxed eﬀects. Weights in the WLS estimation are
ﬁrm share of employment in total 4-digit sectoral employment. * Signiﬁcant at the 10-percent level; **
Signiﬁcant at the 5-percent level; *** Signiﬁcant at the 1-percent level




Table 11 — Robustness Checks: Sample of Domestic Firms
(Dependent variable: Normalized ﬁrm total factor productivity from ACF estimation)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Spillover -0.033*** -0.032*** -0.031** -0.009*** -0.008***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.003) (0.003)
Spillover*FinDev 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.039** 0.061** 0.063***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.024) (0.024)
HHN -0.053 -0.052 -0.054 0.068
(0.170) (0.172) (0.170) (0.210)






Hansen (p-value) 0.522 0.519 0.540 0.518 0.525
F-test 539.04 492.29 509.04 3251.45 3052.37
Joint Signiﬁcance (p-value) 0.024 0.031 0.040 0.030 0.013
R2 0.220 0.220 0.221 0.222 0.219
Obs 11,673 11,673 11,673 11,673 9,273
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis have been corrected for clustering at the region time level. All
regressions include 4 digit sector, region and time ﬁxed eﬀects. Weights in the WLS estimation are ﬁrm
share of employment in total 4-digit sectoral employment. WLS-IV: Weighted least squares- instrumental
variable approach. Instruments are spillover ∗ indigenous1900 and spillover ∗ fogainpop. Columns (4)
and (5) use as measure of ﬁnancial development, commercial credit by region as a percentage of regional
GDP.
Table 12 — Regional FDI Spillovers: The Role of Financial Development
(Dependent variable: Normalized ﬁrm total factor productivity from ACF estimation)
All Domestic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS WLS OLS WLS OLS WLS WLS-IV
Foreign 0.115*** 0.141***
(0.020) (0.032)
Spillover 0.003* 0.005** -0.001 0.0002 -0.012** -0.017** -0.031**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.007) (0.012)
Spillover*FinDev 0.014* 0.022** 0.039**
(0.008) (0.010) (0.016)
HHN 0.058 -0.136 0.133 -0.029 0.134 -0.035 -0.052
(0.104) (0.223) (0.095) (0.177) (0.095) (0.175) (0.172)
lGDPpc 0.788 1.724** 0.088 0.492* 0.053 0.440 0.402
(0.524) (0.753) (0.200) (0.266) (0.202) (0.268) (0.276)
Hansen (p-value) 0.540
F-test 509.040
Joint Signiﬁcance (p-value) 0.0624 0.040
R2 0.165 0.2001 0.169 0.2208 0.1694 0.2213 0.221
Obs 15,043 15,043 11,673 11,673 11,673 11,673 11,673
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis have been corrected for clustering at the region time level. All regressions
include 4 digit sector, region and time ﬁxed eﬀects. Weights in the WLS estimation are ﬁrm share of employment
in total 4-digit sectoral employment. Columns (4) corresponds to column (5) in Table 9 and Column (5)
corresponds to column (2) in Table 10.




Table 13 — The Role of Size and Absorptive Capacity: Sample of Domestic Firms
(Dependent variable: Normalized ﬁrm total factor productivity from ACF estimation)
Size Absorptive Capacity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Small Medium +500 Total Total
/Large Domestic Domestic
Spillover -0.001 -0.030** -0.030 -0.001 -0.044***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.019) (0.001) (0.016)
Spillover*FinDev 0.002 0.040** 0.041 0.055***









HHN 0.299** -0.139 -0.316 0.250 0.275*
(0.130) (0.197) (0.283) (0.162) (0.155)
lGDPpc 0.534 0.344 0.531 0.185 0.003
(0.326) (0.299) (0.794) (0.240) (0.249)
Hansen (p-value) 0.233 0.734 0.361 0.145
F-test 147.014 491.469 84.911 15.255
JointSignificance1 0.984 0.039 0.285 0.019
JointSignificance2 0.000 0.000
JointSignificance3 0.031 0.022
R2 0.263 0.232 0.245 0.324 0.326
Obs 3,406 8,292 1,637 11,673 11,673
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis have been corrected for clustering at the region time level. The
dependent variable is normalized TFP from the ACF estimation. All regressions include 4 digit sector,
region and time ﬁxed eﬀects. Columns (1) and (2) have estimated by weighted least squares where
weights are ﬁrm share of employment in total 4-digit sectoral employment. AbsCap refers to the vari-
able AbsorptiveCapacity. JointSignificance1 refers to a test for the joint signiﬁcance of spillover
and spillover*FinDev. JointSignificance2 refers to a test for the joint signiﬁcance of AbsCap, Ab-
sCap*Spillover,AbsCap*FinDev and AbsCap*Spillover*FinDev. JointSignificance3 refers to a test for
the joint signiﬁcance of spillover, spillover*FinDev, AbsCap*Spillover and AbsCap*Spillover*FinDev. *
Signiﬁcant at the 10-percent level; ** Signiﬁcant at the 5-percent level; *** Signiﬁcant at the 1-percent
level




Table 14 — Panel Fixed Effect Estimation
(Dependent variable: Normalized ﬁrm total factor productivity from ACF estimation)
All Domestic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FE FE FE-IV FE FE FE-IV
Foreign 0.001* 0.001* 0.001*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Spillover 0.002 -0.014** -0.016*** 0.001 -0.021*** -0.027***
(0.001) (0.005) (0.006) (0.001) (0.007) (0.010)
Spillover*FinDev 0.019*** 0.022*** 0.027*** 0.034***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012)
HHN 0.328 0.308 0.305 0.170 0.171 0.165
(0.219) (0.216) (0.211) (0.159) (0.153) (0.150)
lGDPpc -0.298 -0.394 -0.410 -0.029 -0.170 -0.186
(0.396) (0.348) (0.346) (0.397) (0.330) (0.333)




0.0009 0.0089 0.0004 0.0135
R2-within 0.1014 0.104 0.104 0.107 0.113 0.112
Groups 945 945 945 834 834 834
Obs 4,725 4,725 4,725 3,877 3,877 3,877
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis have been corrected for clustering at the region time level. The
dependent variable is normalized TFP from the ACF estimation. All regressions include time ﬁxed
eﬀects.* Signiﬁcant at the 10-percent level;** Signiﬁcant at the 5-percent level;*** Signiﬁcant at the
1-percent level.
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Figure E.2. Commercial Bank Credit to the Industrial Sector as a
percentage of GDP
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Overall Coefficient of Spillover at Different Levels of Financial Development, Domestic Firms
Figure E.4. WLS-IV Estimation, Domestic Sample of Firms
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Overall Coefficient of Spillover at Different Levels of Financial Development, Medium/Large Domestic Firms
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Figure E.6. Percentage of Small Firms and Regional Spillovers by Region
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Figure E.8. Panel FE-IV Estimation, Total Sample of Firms
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Figure E.9. Panel FE-IV Estimation, Domestic Sample of Firms
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Explaining Firm Export Behavior: Is there a Role for
Export Spillovers?
Abstract. This paper provides empirical evidence on the factors that
increase ﬁrms’ propensity to export. Using a panel of Mexican manufac-
turing ﬁrms from 1997 to 2000, we test for the role of sunk entry costs,
ﬁrm observable characteristics and export spillovers. We ﬁnd that entry
costs into the export market are particularly relevant in the case of Mex-
ican ﬁrms. Moreover, we ﬁnd robust evidence of positive and signiﬁcant
spillovers from MNEs export activities.
Keywords. Export decision, Exporting Spillovers, Multinational
Firms.
JEL Classification. D21, F23, L60





In this paper, we provide empirical evidence on the export decision by Mexican
manufacturing ﬁrms. We explore two diﬀerent sets of variables that might inﬂuence
the decision to export. First, within a simple dynamic speciﬁcation we disentangle
sunk costs of entry into the export market from observable ﬁrm characteristics. Size,
productivity, the exposure of the ﬁrm to international markets or the ownership
structure of the ﬁrm are often thought as determinants of the ﬁrm export decision.
We ﬁnd that after controlling for ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects only the exposure to international
markets through the acquisition of imported intermediate inputs and the foreign
ownership status of the ﬁrm are relevant characteristics of the decision to export.
However, we ﬁnd that entry costs are signiﬁcant for Mexican ﬁrms. Exporting today
increases the probability of exporting tomorrow by 60%. These high entry costs seem
to be mainly driven by exports to North America which account for 80% of the total
export value by Mexican manufacturing ﬁrms.
Second, we turn to analyze the economic geography hypothesis that the export
activities of neighboring ﬁrms might reduce the cost of entry. In particular, we
will focus on the special role that MNEs might have along this dimension. The
literature on FDI spillovers assumes that MNEs are endowed with a set of non-
tangible assets (i.e. managerial skills) that make them more productive than their
domestic counterparts. Domestic ﬁrms by being exposed to the new technologies
and production techniques brought in by the MNEs might in turn decide to upgrade
their own production process which might lead to an increase in their productivity.
An alternative spillover mechanism is the impact of MNEs on the export behavior
of domestic ﬁrms. We will explore the possibility MNE presence aﬀects the export
propensity of domestic ﬁrms. Aitken, Hanson and Harrison (1997) using a panel data
of Mexican manufacturing ﬁrms from 1986 to 1990 were the ﬁrst ones to analyze the
role of MNE export activities in the export decision of domestic ﬁrms. They ﬁnd
evidence of spillovers from multinational companies but not from general export
activity. Similarly, Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998) found some evidence that
ﬁrms in Colombia are more likely to export if they belong to an export-intensive
industry or region but do not analyze the role of MNE.
As in Aitken et al (1997) we ﬁnd evidence that the decision of domestic ﬁrms to
export is positively inﬂuenced by the export intensity of MNE in the same sector




and region. However, we improve upon earlier ﬁndings by considering a dynamic
speciﬁcation, addressing the potential endogeneity of all regressors and controlling
for ﬁrm unobserved speciﬁc eﬀects. In addition, we provide evidence of heterogeneity
in the factors shaping ﬁrm’s decision to export according to export destination.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 deals
with the empirical methodology and the description of the variables used in the
analysis. Section 4 contains the main results and ﬁnally, section 5 concludes.
3.2. Data
The data used in this study come from the National Survey of Employment,
Salaries, Technology, and Training (ENESTYC) implemented by the National Insti-
tute for Statistics, Geography and Informatics (INEGI). The surveys were carried
out in 1992, 1995, 1999 and 2001 as independent cross-sections however, given the
sampling design it is possible to link ﬁrms with more than 100 employees across
surveys. Based on the estimation strategy requirements (the dynamic speciﬁcation
will include lag values of the dependent variable) we will make use of the panel gen-
erated from linking the surveys of 1999 and 2001. The original 1999 survey has data
on 6,840 ﬁrms while that of 2001 reports data for 8,181 ﬁrms. The resulting panel
corresponds to 2,552 ﬁrms over the period 1997-2000. Firms have more than 100
employees and do not include ﬁrms in the export maquiladora sector1. Therefore,
these ﬁrms are not representative of the overall manufacturing population since they
are bigger than the average ﬁrm. However, in 2000, they accounted for 78% of total
employment in the manufacturing sector, around 60% of sales and 46% of export
sales. Table 1 shows the characteristics of the sample and shows that exporters rep-
resent 60% of the sampled ﬁrms. Although the short time dimension of the panel
makes it hard to draw conclusions on entry or exit behavior there seems to be an
increasing number of ﬁrms exiting the export market in 1998 (after the Asian crisis)
while 1999, in the aftermath of the peso depreciation, witnessed an increase in the
number of new exporters. These entry and exit rates are considerably below the
39.4% rate found by Bernard and Jensen (2004) in their sample of US ﬁrms but it
is in line with the ﬁndings of Aitken et al (1997) in the case of Mexico.
1Maquiladora plants are assembly plants that re-export most of their production. We decided
to exclude these ﬁrms from the analysis since they are set up to export and therefore do not face
any export decision.




Table 1 -Summary Statistics of Exporters in the Sample
1997 1998 1999 2000 Total
Exporters 1,587 1,622 1,489 1,495 6,193
NonExporters 965 930 1,063 1,057 4,015
Total 2,552 2,552 2,552 2,552 10,208
%Exporters 62.19 63.56 58.35 58.58 60.67
Starters 68 127 45 240
Stoppers 33 260 39 332
Moreover, exporters in the sample share the same characteristics previously
found in the literature for exporters operating in other countries (see Bernard and
Jensen (1995) for US, Isgut (2001) for Colombia, Alvarez and Lopez (2004) for
Chile, Van-Biesebroeck (2006) for Sub-Saharan countries and De Loecker (2007) for
Slovenia). Table 2 shows the results from estimating the following equation by OLS:
charactijrt = α+βExporterijrt+γlijrt+Σtδtyear+ΣjλjSectorj+ijrt (3.1)
where charactijrt refers to characteristics of ﬁrm i, in sector j, region r, at time t;
Exporterijrt is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the ﬁrm exports and 0
otherwise; lijrt is the log of ﬁrm level employment and δt and λj correspond to time
and sectoral dummies. The coeﬃcient of interest is β that represents the percentage
diﬀerential between exporters and non-exporters. Table 2 shows the results from
estimating equation (1).
Table 2 -Characteristics of Exporters vs Non-Exporters
β Obs R2
Value Added per worker 0.2755 10,208 0.2147
Total Factor Productivity 0.0385 10,208 0.3643
Capital per worker 0.3403 10,208 0.2359
Average Wage 0.1186 5,326 0.2139
Ratio of Skilled Workers 0.1084 4,504 0.2152
Employment 0.4235 10,208 0.1798
Note: All coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 1% level. All regressions include size
eﬀects except for the employment regression. The number of observations in
the average wage and ratio of skilled workers regressions is lower due to missing
values and to the fact that this information is only available in years 1998 and
2000.
Exporters operate on a larger scale (42%), employ more qualiﬁed workers (10%),
pay higher wages (11%) and are more capital intensive (34%). In addition, using
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value added per capita as an approximative measure of productivity, exporting ﬁrms
are on average 27% more productive. However, productivity diﬀerentials between
exporters and non-exporters reduce to a mere 3% once we consider a measure of total
factor productivity (TFP) that accounts for capital intensity and corrects for the
simultaneity bias often encounter in the estimation of production functions2. Given
the narrow productivity diﬀerential between exporters and non-exporters in the
sample it seems reasonable to investigate the determinants of engaging in exporting
activities paying particular attention to the role of MNE export activities.
3.3. Empirical Methodology
The empirical strategy follows closely Bernard and Jensen (2004) which in turn
base their estimation procedure in the theoretical model proposed by Roberts and
Tybout (1997). In their model, a ﬁrm exports (Yit = 1) if current and expected
revenues are greater than current costs plus sunk costs of entry. Consequently, in
order to identify the factors that aﬀect the probability of exporting the following
model will be estimated:
Yijrt =
(
1 if γYirjt−1 + βXijrt + δZjrt + ijrt > 0
0 otherwise
(3.2)
where Yijrt is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the ﬁrm i, in sector j
and region r, exports at year t; Yit−1 corresponds to the lagged dependent variable,
Xijrt refers to ﬁrm speciﬁc characteristics and Zjrt will capture the sector-region
activities of other exporters and other MNCs exporting. The more natural choice
to estimate equation (2) would be some binary-choice parametric framework like
probit or logit. However, there are two main problems related to the estimation of
equation (2) by these means. The ﬁrst one relates to the existence of unobserved
plant level eﬀects while the second one refers to the potential bias generated by the
inclusion of a lagged dependent variable in the model.
The existence of unobserved plant speciﬁc heterogeneity (κi) translates in the
following equation:
p[Yijrt = 1] = γYirjt−1 + βXijrt + δZjrt + κi + ijrt (3.3)
2TFP is estimated following Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2006). See Villegas-Sanchez (2008)
for a detailed explanation on the methodology applied to this dataset.




In the case of the probit model, the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects can not be conditioned out
of the likelihood and the unconditional model, treating each ﬁxed eﬀect as a dummy,
results in biased estimates. Consistent estimates for the random-eﬀects probit exist,
but this model imposes distributional assumptions on the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect. In partic-
ular the random-eﬀects model requires that the ﬁrm speciﬁc eﬀects are uncorrelated
with the regressors. This requirement is most likely violated in the export decision
case since unobserved ﬁrm characteristics like managerial capability are correlated
with plant characteristics like size, ownership structure, organizational structure or
productivity. In the case of the logit model, it is possible to derive a likelihood
conditional on the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects which is the analog of taking all observations
as diﬀerences from the mean. However, neither strategy is able to account for the
potential bias arising from the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable in the model.
Heckman (1981) proposes a dynamic ramdon-eﬀects probit estimator but again we
need to assume that the ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀects are random3.
Instead we follow Bernard and Jensen (2004) and estimate a linear probability
model ﬁrst ignoring unobserved ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀects. Then, estimating the corre-
sponding ﬁxed eﬀect model. Finally, employing the dynamic panel System-GMM
estimator proposed by Arrellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998).
This estimator uses appropriate lagged levels as instruments for the equations in
diﬀerences and suitable lagged diﬀerences as instruments for the equations in levels.
3.3.1. Firm Characteristics. We divide ﬁrm speciﬁc characteristics aﬀecting
the probability of exporting in those that reﬂect previous success of ﬁrm performance
and those that are indicators of the previous exposure of the ﬁrm to international
goods and capital markets4. Table A in the Appendix provides a detailed explanation
of all the variables used in the analysis.
Firm performance is measured by size and total factor productivity. Empirical
evidence suggests that high productivity precedes entry into the export market.
Roberts and Tybout (1997) relate this pre-entry condition with the existence of
sunk entry costs into the export markets, so that only the most productive ﬁrms
ﬁnd it proﬁtable to incur the export sunk cost. Similarly, in the Melitz (2003)
model the existence of ﬁxed and variable costs guarantee that only those ﬁrms with
3See section 4.3.
4All variables are lagged one period to avoid potential contemporaneous correlation between
the export status and ﬁrm characteristics.
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productivity draws above a certain productivity cutoﬀ will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to export
in equilibrium. Therefore, we would expect that ﬁrms with higher productivity levels
would be more likely to export. In the same ﬂavor, according to the economies of
scale theory a minimum ﬁrm size will be required for ﬁrms to be able to undertake
the ﬁxed cost of exporting. Only ﬁrms that are large enough can reap the beneﬁts
of economies of scale. Larger ﬁrms are expected to be more likely to export or have
a higher export share (Wakelin (1998)).
Regarding ﬁrm’s exposure to globalization we will study two diﬀerent sets of
variables. The ﬁrst set considers whether the ﬁrm has previously engaged in im-
porting activities either of intermediate inputs or of machinery. We would expect
that ﬁrms that have previous contact with international goods markets will be more
likely to engage in exporting activities. The second set of variables looks at the
internal organization of the ﬁrm and controls for whether the ﬁrm is foreign owned
or whether it belongs to a group. These variables are meant to capture diﬀerent
motives behind the foreign investment decision that might in turn aﬀect the ﬁrm
decision to export. The theory on the location of MNE suggests two main reasons
for MNE activity. First, market-seeking or horizontal FDI, where foreign investment
takes place to serve the host country domestic market. Second, factor-seeking or
vertical FDI that seeks to exploit country diﬀerences in factor prices. In this later
situation, it is often the case that production is re-exported to the home country.
3.3.2. Spillovers. There is a substantive empirical literature on export exter-
nalities and the extent to which ﬁrms’ export decision is inﬂuenced by nearby ex-
porters. In particular, a subset of these papers concentrate on the eﬀect of exporting
MNE on the probability that domestic ﬁrms export. A ﬁrm’s export decision might
be inﬂuenced by other exporters operating in the same sector or region through
two diﬀerent channels. First, the existence of other exporters in the same sector-
region may increase the diﬀusion of information about foreign markets and export
activity. In particular, foreign aﬃliates are often thought of having easier access
to foreign markets information because they in turn form part of a foreign group.
As already pointed out exporting involves ﬁxed costs (i.e. including distribution
networks, transport infrastructures, advertising, foreign market consumers taste re-
search or research on competitors and foreign regulations) and the innate exposure




of MNE to international markets confers them information advantages. Informa-
tion spillovers would take place if this knowledge leaks to domestic ﬁrms and as
a consequence domestic ﬁrms engage in exporting activities. The second channel
through which MNE can impact domestic ﬁrms’ decision to export is by, as a result
of competitive pressures, stimulating domestic ﬁrms’ research and innovation activ-
ities which are shown to impact the probability of exporting (see Constantini and
Melitz (2007) for a theoretical model).
The evidence however, is mixed. Aitken, et al (1997) within a static framework
ﬁnd evidence of spillovers from MNCs but not from general export activity. Clerides
et al (1998) apply a dynamic speciﬁcation with sunk cost to Colombian manufac-
turing data and ﬁnd weak support for regional or sectoral spillovers. Barrios, Gorg
and Strobl (2003) using Spanish data ﬁnd that domestic ﬁrms’ decision to export is
positively related to the presence of other exporters in the same sector of activity but
not by multinational ﬁrms. Similarly, Bernard and Jensen (2004), using the same
dynamic framework as Clerides et al (1997) ﬁnd no evidence of export spillovers for
a sample of US manufacturing ﬁrms. Finally, Greenaway, Sousa and Wakelin (2004)
ﬁnd positive spillover eﬀects from MNCs on the decision to export of UK ﬁrms as
well as on their export propensity.
Second, as suggested in Bernard and Jensen (2004) the presence of other ex-
porters might increase the availability of specialized capital and labor which in turn
would lower the cost of production.
3.4. Results
3.4.1. Baseline Speciﬁcation. Table 3 reports results from a basic speciﬁca-
tion that only considers the role of observable ﬁrm speciﬁc characteristics in deter-
mining the ﬁrm’s probability of exporting. Column (1) reports results from pooled
OLS, column (2) shows the within estimation results and ﬁnally, column (3) includes
the results from the System-GMM dynamic speciﬁcation.
The levels results in column (1) of Table 3, show that as suggested by the
economies of scale theory, larger ﬁrms are more likely to become exporters. However,
surprisingly enough, past productivity values do not seem to aﬀect the propensity
to export. This result might be due to the characteristics of the sample. First, the
short time dimension makes it less likely to observe entry and exit from the export




Table 3 - The Decision to Export: Plant Characteristics and Entry Costs
(Dependent variable: Dummy 0/1 on whether the ﬁrm exports at time t)
OLS FE Dynamic
(1) (2) (3)
Exporter 0.793*** 0.272*** 0.594***
(0.009) (0.025) (0.020)
Importer 0.018** 0.045*** 0.043**
(0.008) (0.014) (0.018)
Importer Machinery 0.013* -0.001 0.008
(0.007) (0.008) (0.019)
Employment 0.016*** 0.006 0.017
(0.004) (0.013) (0.058)
Productivity 0.009 -0.001 -0.011
(0.007) (0.009) (0.022)
Foreign 0.052*** 0.015 0.190**
(0.009) (0.017) (0.079)
Group -0.003 0.004 0.006
(0.007) (0.011) (0.029)




Obs 7656 7656 7656
Groups 2552 2552
Hansen 0.897
Note: All ﬁrm characteristics are lagged one period. ***, **, * indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%
and 10%, respectively. Standard errors are heteroskedastic-consistent.
market. Second, as we saw in Table 2, exporters are only 3% more productive that
non-exporters which in turn highlights the importance of, holding productivity dif-
ferentials constant, identifying those factors driving the decision to export. Bernard
and Jensen (2004) ﬁnd similar results in their sample of US ﬁrms once they control
for ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. In their case they also focus in a sample of ﬁrms that are sub-
stantially larger than that of general manufacturers which might explain the lack
of a signiﬁcant eﬀect from past productivity values on the probability of exporting.
Regarding other ﬁrm characteristics, ﬁrms that imported in the previous year both
intermediate inputs and machinery seem to be more likely to export. Finally, being
a foreign ﬁrm increases the probability of exporting however, belonging to a group
does not aﬀect this probability.
Most importantly, as suggested in Clerides et al (1998) the lagged dependent
variable measures the discount on entry costs that ﬁrms with previous exporting
experience enjoy over ﬁrms with no exporting experience. This proxy of sunk costs




turns out to be positive and highly signiﬁcant. However, the existence of unob-
served ﬁrm speciﬁc eﬀects makes the OLS estimate of the lagged dependent variable
upward-biased. In fact, the estimated coeﬃcient suggest that exporting last year
raises the probability of exporting today by almost 80%. Column (2) of Table 3
reports the results from the within estimation of equation (3). The coeﬃcient on
lagged export status is greatly reduced to 0.272. As in Bernard and Jensen (2004)
controlling for ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects makes the other observable ﬁrm speciﬁc characteris-
tics no longer signiﬁcant. However, whether the ﬁrm imported intermediate inputs
in the previous year is still positively and statistically signiﬁcantly related to the
probably that the ﬁrm exports today.
Finally column (3) of Table 3 reports the results from the System-GMM dynamic
panel estimation. Again most of the ﬁrm characteristics are no longer signiﬁcant
except for the importer status of the ﬁrm and whether the ﬁrm is foreign owned
or not. As expected the size of the coeﬃcient on the lagged dependent variable is
between the OLS and the within estimator 0.594. This means that having exported
last year increases the probability of exporting this year by 59%. Although this
eﬀect is relatively large it should be kept in mind that the panel considers ﬁrms
only from 1997-2000. Including lagged values of the regressors reduces the time
dimension to T = 3 and by taking diﬀerences T = 2 which might explain the high
persistence of the export status. The important fact is that even after controlling
for ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects entry costs play the main role.
3.4.2. The Role of Spillovers. Table 4 shows the results from considering
the role of other exporters in the same sector and region5. Column (1) reports the
results when the total sample of ﬁrms is considered, while column (2) looks at the
spillover eﬀect for the sample of domestic ﬁrms. In both speciﬁcations, ﬁrm speciﬁc
characteristics retain the same estimated coeﬃcients and signiﬁcance levels as in the
base speciﬁcation of column (3) in Table 3. Spillovers from exporters are deﬁned
as the share of domestic exports in the same sector and region over total sales in
that sector-region while spillovers from foreign exporters concentrate in the share
5We distinguish 32 regions that correspond to the 32 federal states in which Mexico is di-
vided and 9 sectors of activity according to the Mexican Classiﬁcation of Activities and Products
(CMAP): 31 Food and Beverages; 32 Textiles; 33 Wood Products; 34 Paper and Printing; 35
Chemicals; 36 Production of Non-Metallic goods; 37 Basic Metallic Industry; 38 Machinery and
Equipment and 39 Other. Results from exporters operating in the same sector or exporters oper-
ating in the same region turned out to be insigniﬁcant.




of exports by foreign multinationals in a particular sector-region over total sales in
that sector-region. Similarly to the ﬁndings of Aitken, et al (1997), we ﬁnd evi-
dence of spillovers from MNCs but not from general export activity. However, our
speciﬁcation has several advantages over that of Aitken et al (1997). We explicitly
consider a dynamic framework, endogeneity concerns are directly addressed by the
use of lagged values as instruments and ﬁnally, the GMM-System estimation con-
trols for ﬁrm unobserved speciﬁc eﬀects. Most importantly, the positive eﬀect of
MNCs’ export activities are higher and more statistically signiﬁcant for the sample
of domestic ﬁrms. One additional concern in Aitken et al (1997) was that an alter-
native spillover measure considering the general MNC activity in the sector-region,
was also positive and statistically signiﬁcant. Therefore, the probability of exporting
seemed to be aﬀected by the presence of MNCs in general and not by their export
activities in particular. In this case, including a measure foreign spillovers at the
sector-region turned out to be insigniﬁcant corroborating the ﬁnding that ﬁrms’ de-
cision to export depends on the export activity of MNCs and not on their presence
in general.
If the export activities of foreign companies in a particular sector-region decrease
the sunk entry costs into the export market for domestic ﬁrms we should observe
a positive correlation between the share of foreign ﬁrms exports to a particular
destination and the probability that domestic ﬁrms export to that destination. One
advantage of the ENESTyC survey is that ﬁrms are asked to report the percentage
of net income sales that was derived from domestic sales and exports. In addition,
within the export category it is possible to know which percentage of the exports
where destined to North America, Central America, South America, Europe, Asia
and Other destinations
6. Table 5 shows the number of foreign and domestic ﬁrms
exporting to each category. Moreover, the last row in Table 5 shows that the bulk
of Mexican exports are directed to North America.
Results from the System-GMM estimation of the probability that a domestic
ﬁrm exports to a particular destination are shown in Table 6. Here we repeat
the estimation of equation (3) as in the results presented in Table 4 but this time
6Closer look at aggregate Mexican exports data shows that the Other destinations category
should be mainly driven by exports to Dominican Republic and/or Netherlands Antilles.




Table 4 - The Decision to Export: The Role of Spillovers


















Region-Sector Domestic Exporters 0.080 0.035
(0.096) (0.122)





Note: All regressors are lagged one period. ***, **, * indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10%,
respectively. Standard errors are heteroskedastic-consistent.
Table 5 - Number of Observations by Export Destinations in 2000.
North Central South EU Asia Other
America America America
Total 1239 496 333 232 115 72
Domestic 898 345 193 119 55 46
Foreign 341 151 140 113 60 26
Share of Exports 0.80 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.01
Note: Firms can export to more than one destination and therefore the sum of ﬁrms does not correspond
to the total number of exporters in 2000.
we diﬀerentiate according to export destination. Results show that the lagged de-
pendent variable is positive and highly signiﬁcant irrespective of destination, sug-
gesting that sunk entry cost into the export market are relevant for any type of
target market. However, ﬁrms exporting to North America seem to experience
higher persistence than ﬁrms exporting to other destinations. Regarding the role
of spillovers from other exporters and MNE, we include three diﬀerent variables:
MNCs exporting to destination X (share of exports to destination X by MNE in
the same sector-region in total region-sector sales), Domestic firms exporting to X




(share of exports to destination X by domestic ﬁrms in the same sector-region in
total region-sector sales) and Firms exporting to other than X (share of exports
by ﬁrms in the same sector-region to any destination but X in total region-sector
sales).
Columns (1), (2) and (3) show that there is a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect from
MNE exports activities on the probability to export to North America, Central
America and South America. However, despite the positive eﬀect of MNCs exporting
to South America on the probability that domestic ﬁrms will in turn export to that
particular destination, the eﬀect of other domestic exporters on the probability of
exporting to South America is negative hinting the possibility of competition eﬀects
among local exporters. The fact that MNC export activities inﬂuence the decision
of domestic ﬁrms to export to North America is highly important since 80% of the
Mexican exports are directed to North America. Columns (5) and (6) show that
instead, the main determinant of exports to Asia and Other destinations (recall
Other refers to Dominican Republic/ Netherland Antilles) are the export activities
of domestic exporters exporting to those destinations. Finally, the main determinant
of the probability that domestic ﬁrms will export to the EU is ﬁrm productivity.
The fact that exporting to the EU is mainly driven by productivity diﬀerentials
is not surprising if we think that the EU market is distant and has probably high
quality standards.
3.4.3. Extensions. As mentioned in section 3, the linear probability model is
usually not the natural choice when considering dichotomous dependent variables.
In this section we explore the results from a pooled probit and a random-eﬀects
probit estimator that are shown in Table 7. Column (1) in Table 7 shows the pooled
probit results controlling for year, sector and regional ﬁxed eﬀects. In columns (2)
we ﬁnd the results from estimating a random-eﬀects probit that assumes the ﬁrm
speciﬁc eﬀects are not correlated with the rest of regressors. In both cases the
coeﬃcient on the lagged dependent variable is extremely high (2.760). Heckman
(1981) already suggested that the random-eﬀects probit estimator in the presence of
large heterogeneity of the unobserved ﬁrm eﬀects would result in an upward biased
coeﬃcient on the lagged dependent variable. Despite the potential biases arising
from these estimation methods it is worth noting that the export activity of MNCs
still has a positive and highly signiﬁcant impact on the probability that domestic




Table 6 - The Decision to Export by Destination Market: The Role of Spillovers
(Dependent variable: Dummy 0/1 on whether the ﬁrm exports to destination X at time t)
System-GMM Estimation: Sample of Domestic Firms
NA CA SA EU Asia Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exporter to X 0.582*** 0.476*** 0.400*** 0.415*** 0.408*** 0.272***
(0.022) (0.020) (0.0250 (0.030) (0.039) (0.041)
Importer 0.026* 0.043*** 0.034*** 0.026*** 0.008 -0.003
(0.014) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.006) (0.004)
Importer Machinery 0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -0.009 0.004 0.002
(0.021) (0.015) (0.008) (0.010) (0.007) (0.006)
Employment 0.171** 0.018 0.084 -0.090 0.008 0.046**
(0.070) (0.077) (0.065) (0.055) (0.036) (0.022)
Productivity -0.030 -0.019 -0.008 0.025** 0.013 -0.003
(0.022) (0.019) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.009)
Group -0.036 -0.003 0.014 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008
(0.034) (0.028) (0.013) (0.019) (0.013) (0.012)
MNC exporting to X 0.111** 3.864** 1.029* -0.896 -0.044 0.138
(0.055) (1.932) (0.582) (0.631) (0.144) (0.160)
Domestic Firms Exporting to X -0.130 -0.645 -2.896** 0.049 1.663* 0.355*
(0.144) (1.096) (1.376) (0.230) (0.917) (0.186)
Firms exporting to other than X 0.275 -0.044 -0.053 0.086 0.087 0.041
(0.507) (0.097) (0.101) (0.154) (0.122) (0.036)
Obs 6,033 6,033 6,033 6,033 6,033 6,033
Groups 2,011 2,011 2,011 2,011 2,011 2,011
Hansen 0.573 0.423 0.507 0.332 0.279 0.112
Note: All regressors are lagged one period. ***, **, * indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and
10%, respectively. Standard errors are heteroskedastic-consistent. Destination X refers to North
America (NA), Central America (CA), South America (SA), European Union (EU), Asia and
Other, respectively.
ﬁrms export. In addition, results from the probit estimation results show that the
decision to export is also positively and signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by the neighboring
export activities of other domestic exporters.
3.5. Conclusion
In this paper we investigate the determinants of exporting. We ﬁnd evidence
that foreign ownership and whether the ﬁrm imported intermediate inputs in the
past are the main ﬁrm level characteristics determining the export status of the
ﬁrm. Surprisingly, but similarly to the ﬁndings of Bernard and Jensen (2004) for
the US, ﬁrm level total factor productivity does not play a major role once ﬁrm ﬁxed
eﬀects are taken into account. Instead, we ﬁnd a predominant role of past export
experience. Having exported last period increases the probability of exporting today




Table 7 - The Decision to Export: Probit Specifications






Exporter 2.760*** 0.832 2.760*** 0.840
(0.059) (0.052)
Importer 0.130** 0.052 0.157*** 0.061
(0.058) (0.052)
Importer Machinery 0.082 0.033 0.094* 0.038
(0.056) (0.053)
Employment 0.187*** 0.074 0.124*** 0.049
(0.040) (0.035)
Productivity 0.099* 0.039 0.070 0.028
(0.057) (0.046)
Group -0.090 -0.036 -0.111** -0.045
(0.057) (0.051)
Region-Sector Domestic Exporters 1.105*** 0.439 1.293*** 0.502
(0.318) (0.245)
Region-Sector Foreign Exporters 0.580** 0.230 0.762*** 0.298
(0.266) (0.144)





Note: All regressors are lagged one period. ***, **, * indicate
signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
by 59%. Finally, ﬁrms’ decision to export is positively inﬂuenced by the presence of
exporting MNE in their same sector and region.
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10.2870/26978Table A - Variables
Variable Deﬁnition
Exporter 1 if ﬁrm exported
Importer 1 if ﬁrm imported intermediate inputs
Importer Machinery 1 if ﬁrm imported machinery
Employment Log(average number of workers)
Productivity Log of total factor productivity from a 2-digit
industry-speciﬁc production function estimated us-
ing Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2006) technique.
Foreign 1 if at least 10% of the ﬁrm capital structure is owned
by a foreign investor.
Group 1 if the ﬁrm belongs to a group.
Region-Sector Domestic
Exporters
(Deﬂated Export Sales by Domestic
Firms)/(Deﬂated Total Sales) for ﬁrms operat-
ing in the same 2-digit sector and region.
Region-Sector Foreign Ex-
porters
(Deﬂated Export Sales by Foreign Firms)/(Deﬂated
Total Sales) for ﬁrms operating in the same 2-digit
sector and region.
MNC exporting to X (Deﬂated Export Sales by Foreign Firms to destina-
tion X)/(Deﬂated Total Sales) for ﬁrms operating in
the same 2-digit sector and region.
Domestic ﬁrms exporting
to X
(Deﬂated Export Sales by Domestic Firms to desti-
nation X)/(Deﬂated Total Sales) for ﬁrms operating
in the same 2-digit sector and region.
Firms Exporting to other
than X
(Deﬂated Export Sales by Firms to any other desti-
nation than X)/(Deﬂated Total Sales) for ﬁrms op-
erating in the same 2-digit sector and region.
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